

GLOBE

L'INSTITUT

Inauguration de la Résidence étudiante Grand Morillon

DOSSIER

The Moving Fault Lines of Inequality



THE
GRADUATE
INSTITUTE
GENEVA

INSTITUT DE HAUTES
ÉTUDES INTERNATIONALES
ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT
GRADUATE INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AND
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

L'ÉDITORIAL

- 2** Au-delà de la diversité : la relation et l'errance – *Marie-Laure Salles*

L'INSTITUT

Diversity Month at the Institute

- 4** True Diversity in Our Midst – *Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou and Davide Rodogno*
- 5** Which Diversity? – *Graziella Moraes Silva*
- 6** La diversité dans le monde et à l'Institut – *Dêlidji Eric Degila*
- 8** Inauguration de la Résidence étudiante Grand Morillon
- 10** Rencontre avec François Bellanger, nouveau membre du Conseil de fondation
- 11** Un projet collectif pour l'Institut. Entretien avec Marie-Laure Salles
- 12** Team from Harvard University Won 2020 Geneva Challenge on Social Inclusion

L'ACTUALITÉ

- 13** When Twitter becomes Sheriff of the Virtual Wild West – *Thomas Schultz*
- 14** The Historical Legacy of the Arab Spring – *Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou*
- 15** Restaurer la « res publica » – *David Sylvan*

LE DOSSIER – The Moving Fault Lines of Inequality

- 18** The Rise of Inequality and Its Contested Meanings – *Dominic Egge*
- 20** Visible and Invisible Inequalities – *Gopalan Balachandran*
- 22** Inequality and Gender – *Elisabeth Prügl*
- 24** The Enduring Inequities of Racism – *Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou*
- 26** Inequality in Hunger and Malnutrition – *Anne Saab*
- 28** Income Inequality and Economic Growth: Known Unknowns – *Ugo Panizza and Sarah Voitchovsky*
- 30** Understanding the Implications of Inequality for the Elites – *Matias López and Graziella Moraes Silva*

L'ENSEIGNEMENT

- 32** Suerie Moon Recently Nominated as Professor of Practice
- 34** L'antiracisme est une question de démocratie – *Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou et Davide Rodogno*
- 36** Teaching Gender at the Institute – *Nicole Bourbonnais*
- 37** L'enseignement à distance : une opportunité pour une nouvelle ère pédagogique – *Cédric Dupont*

LES ÉTUDIANTS

- 38** Students' Social Innovation Project Wins C4SI 2020 Edition
- 39** Joint University Initiative Tackles Women's Underrepresentation in Economics
- 40** Supporting Talented Students from around the World

LES ALUMNI

- 42** Portrait – *Daniel Urbain Ndongo*
- 43** Portrait – *Jessica Byron-Reid*

LA RECHERCHE

- 44** Meet Grégoire Mallard, New Director of Research
- 46** Religion et politique dans le monde contemporain – *Jean-François Bayart*
- 48** Nouvelles publications



L'ÉDITORIAL

Au-delà de la diversité : la relation et l'errance

Marie-Laure Salles
Directrice

La diversité est un concept complexe. On peut l'utiliser au nom de la justice et de l'équité, ou pour justifier les inégalités. Elle peut libérer des formes légitimes d'affirmation de soi, comme elle peut imposer ou renforcer les carcans essentialistes d'identités qui deviennent alors « meurtrières », pour utiliser le terme d'Amin Maalouf (Maalouf 1998). La diversité est-elle une revendication et une construction sociale et politique ? Ou bien résulte-t-elle d'attributs assignés à la naissance et d'héritages ? En d'autres termes, la diversité nous constitue-t-elle en tant que personnes, ou bien l'affirmons-nous comme expression de notre liberté individuelle ? La tension conceptuelle est palpable et elle révèle une problématique politique plus cruciale encore.



L'être humain n'est pas une monade auto-suffisante mais un animal social. Notre individualité n'est supportable que si et lorsqu'elle s'inscrit dans une matrice permettant l'échange, la relation, le collectif et l'appartenance – une société, voire une communauté. Ceci n'a jamais été aussi clair que depuis mars 2020. Un virus s'attaque à nos corps, menace nos vies. Mais les injonctions qui l'accompagnent – distanciation sociale et isolement – nous amputent d'une part essentielle de notre humanité. Ces derniers mois, nous ressentons comme jamais, dans notre chair et notre cœur, l'évidente nécessité de notre être social. En 1987, Margaret Thatcher affirmait catégoriquement que « la société n'existe pas » – affirmation à vocation performative qui deviendrait bien vite l'un des mantras néolibéraux. En mars 2020, alors qu'il était malade et en quarantaine,

les propos de Boris Johnson lui-même annonçaient la deuxième mort de Margaret Thatcher : « Ce que la crise du coronavirus révèle, nous disait-il alors, c'est bien que nous faisons société. » Mais faire société, c'est savoir aller au-delà de nos différences. Comment, dès lors, réconcilier diversité et société, identités différenciées et communauté ? Là se trouve sans doute l'une des questions les plus urgentes et les plus graves de notre époque.

À travers ses incursions dans la *Poétique du divers*, Édouard Glissant nous suggère une piste intéressante pour saisir le problème et rêver la solution. Il nous faut penser dynamique et mouvement, et non pas statique et catégories fixes. La diversité devrait être un paysage ouvert et fluide, aux nombreux espaces communs, et non pas un patchwork d'espaces identitaires refermés sur eux-mêmes.

« Comment être soi sans se fermer à l'autre et comment s'ouvrir à l'autre sans se perdre soi-même ? » (Glissant 1996 : 23).

Ce n'est pas une question que Glissant pose ici mais une affirmation, un programme, une boussole. Au-delà de l'être, Glissant pense la relation. Il oppose l'identité (et donc la diversité) « racine », qui « tue » alentour, à l'identité (et donc la diversité) rhizome, qui aère et ramifie. C'est cette dernière qu'il faut privilégier.

« Naître au monde, c'est concevoir (vivre) enfin le monde comme relation : comme nécessité composée, réaction consentie » (Glissant 1969 : 20).

De cette idée émerge un impératif catégorique – celui de l'errance. Au-delà d'une statique de la diversité, il faudrait plutôt penser « l'infidélité à soi-même », ne pas se satisfaire d'être mais devenir « changement, mobilité » (Ray 1978). Pour Édouard Glissant, l'errance n'est pas

hasardeuse ; elle est délibérée et présuppose notre ouverture, notre volonté d'apprendre, de grandir, de coexister, de nous enrichir mutuellement, d'être ce que nous devenons. L'errance est la voie vers une compréhension (*cumprehendere*, emporter avec) respectueuse avec à la clef des compositions et recompositions intégratives. Comme le disait Edward Saïd : « Je pense que l'identité est le fruit d'une volonté. (...) Qu'est-ce qui nous empêche, dans cette identité volontaire, de rassembler plusieurs identités ? (...) Pourquoi ne pas ouvrir nos esprits aux Autres ? Voilà un vrai projet ! » (Saïd 1997).

Un tel projet devrait être le nôtre. Ne nous leurrons pas, le combat ne sera pas facile. Mais il est clair qu'il n'a jamais été aussi nécessaire – dans cette période où la distanciation qui nous tient éloignés ne peut que renforcer le risque d'identités meurtrières. Errons, émerveillons-nous, rêvons, pensons et agissons étape par étape pour inventer ensemble des espaces collectifs qui s'enrichissent de la *cum-préhension* de nos différences et penser ce faisant les maux de notre monde malade !

PÉROU, Cusco.
Vinicunca,
la montagne
arc-en-ciel.
iStock/maylat

Cet article a été publié dans *Le Temps* du 1^{er} février 2021.

Glissant, Édouard (1969). *L'intention poétique*. Paris : Seuil.
Glissant, Édouard (1996). *Introduction à une poétique du divers*. Paris : Gallimard.
Maalouf, Amin (1998). *Les identités meurtrières*. Paris : Grasset.
Ray, Lionel (1978). *Partout ici même*. Paris : Gallimard.
Saïd, Edward (1997). « Ne renonçons pas à la co-existence avec les Juifs. » Interview dans *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 16 janvier.

Diversity Month at the Institute

In an institution open to the world, it might be superfluous to wonder about diversity. However, for members of a cosmopolitan community like ours, representing more than 100 nationalities, diversity is much more complex than expected. It is essential that each of us can think about this in order to create an inclusive environment as well as peaceful, stimulating and respectful interactions. The values embodied by our institution must govern our interactions, exchanges and behaviour. Besides, it's critical for us, as an academic organisation, to reflect the world in which we are living today. This is why the Graduate Institute celebrates diversity, gender and respect each November.

True Diversity in Our Midst

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

Professor and Chair of the Department of International History and Politics
and **Davide Rodogno**

Professor of International History and Politics
Head of Interdisciplinary Programmes



In November 2020, the Graduate Institute celebrated a new diversity.

This annual celebration is in line with the values historically professed and pursued by the Institute: excellence, collegiality and respect, along with solidarity, justice and diversity.

Values, however, are not merely feel-good posters, advertising that which we would like to be known for. Rather, values exist first and foremost only when enacted, only when given actual meaning. Honestly and lastingly.

Amongst these values of ours, diversity stands as a core component of how the Institute looks at the world, what it works to embrace and represent, and what it has become, or at least is becoming.

As we all strive to make sense of global affairs around us – their past, present and future – we bring such diversity of outlooks to such complexity of matters. We anchor those variegated perspectives in the multiplicity of the backgrounds embodied by our students, staff, researchers, fellows and professors. And we use those multiple outlooks and those various backgrounds to build a common platform with a community distinctly characterised by generosity of spirit.

Diversity should not be understood, as it is too often, as a mere code word for racial, ethnic, religious, gender, linguistic or geographic expansion of a traditionally exclusive academic or professional environment. That is limitative, and indeed patronising to those “now included”. True diversity is intelligence, humanity and humility. It is the recognition that one's enrichment is predicated upon exchange and sharing.

That is the deeper diversity the Institute cherishes and the one it stands for, today more than ever.



L'INSTITUT

Which Diversity?

Graziella Moraes Silva

Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology

When I speak to students and colleagues at the Graduate Institute, we all agree that diversity is one of our main strengths. At the same time, and somewhat contradictorily, many of us are also deeply frustrated about our difficulties in truly engaging with it.

The idea that diversity is an added value to education can be traced back to the 1978 US Supreme Court's *University of California v. Bakke* decision. In that decision, considering “race” in college admission was deemed legal, not because of the need to redress past discrimination against African Americans nor to create social inclusion but due to the value of diversity as a “compelling interest” that would benefit all students. Diversity, therefore, was not only about racial inclusion, but about bringing different perspectives about the world to the educational process.

Since then, the idea of diversity has travelled the world but many have become frustrated with it. Some argue that diversity limits social inclusion to tokenism or to what the Indian Supreme Court in the 1990s termed a “creamy layer”, due to its lack of class and socioeconomic considerations. Others argue that diversity does not mean anything if whiteness remains the norm and differences have to be constantly contextualised (where are you from?), justified (how can you be here?) and often essentialised (are you “really” the other?). As student collectives in Brazilian federal universities have recently voiced, it is not enough to have quotas for black and low-income students if institutions themselves are not decolonialised.

As we think about diversity this month, let's remember that diversity has weak and strong versions. In its weak form, bringing diversity is simply seeing a colour palette or different accents in the classroom. Such a weak version can co-exist with stereotyping and stigmatisation. We “include” those who we see as “different” in our classrooms but still assume and often contribute to reproducing their subordination. In its strong and more desirable version, diversity creates a space in which different perspectives and ways of seeing in the world can be learned. The strong version of diversity needs the active engagement of everyone and institutional practices that encourage horizontal exchanges. Only embracing this strong version of diversity will allow us to remain a truly excellent and increasingly global Institute.

USA, Berkeley.
A rally support of
overturning the
California Supreme
Court's decision
in *Regents of
the University of
California v. Bakke*.
7 May 1977.



L'INSTITUT

La diversité dans le monde et à l'Institut

Dèlidji Eric Degila

Chargé d'enseignement invité, Département de relations internationales/science politique

ÉTATS-UNIS, New York, Central Park. *Enlightened Universe*, pièce monumentale du sculpteur espagnol Cristóbal Gabarrón, créée à l'occasion du 70^e anniversaire de l'ONU. L'œuvre représente 70 personnages grandeur nature se donnant la main autour d'un globe, créant une chaîne de citoyens du monde, respectueux de la nature et aux responsabilités partagées. 24 octobre 2015. UN Photo/Cia Pak

Quels sont les défis de la diversité dans le monde d'aujourd'hui ?

La diversité est une notion complexe et multiscalaire qui rend compte de réalités diverses selon qu'on se place au niveau global ou national, à l'échelle d'un pays ou d'une institution. Au sein de toutes les sociétés humaines au sens de la *civitas* telle qu'appréhendée par Montesquieu, le premier défi lié à la diversité est d'ordre structurel, pour ne pas dire épistémologique. On pourrait l'articuler de la manière suivante : tous les humains sont-ils considérés égaux par leurs semblables ? Une telle interrogation peut paraître anachronique pour certains, mais elle est fondamentale pour bien cerner les multiples problèmes relatifs à la diversité dans le monde contemporain. La réponse normative à cette question est bien connue : faut-il rappeler les nombreux instruments juridiques internationaux, tels que la Charte des Nations Unies de 1945, la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme du 10 décembre 1948, les différents pactes internationaux relatifs aux droits civils et politiques, ainsi qu'aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, signés par la plupart des États ? Mais la réalité est tout autre, et ce à toutes les échelles.

À l'échelle des États, la problématique de la diversité est différemment articulée selon qu'on se trouve dans un contexte démocratique ou autoritaire. Après ce qu'il est

convenu d'appeler la « troisième vague de démocratisation », la plupart des constitutions du monde – y compris celles de régimes dictatoriaux – prônent l'égalité pour tous, même si la vraie réalité est tout autre. Dans ce contexte, s'interroger sur les défis de la diversité au sein de régimes autoritaires revient souvent à poser la question des droits humains, tant les personnes issues des minorités y subissent toutes formes d'injustice et d'inégalité bien souvent belligènes.

Dans les États démocratiques relativement homogènes d'un point de vue identitaire, on peut concevoir l'égalité de toutes les citoyennes et tous les citoyens. Les défis de la diversité y sont généralement liés à l'orientation sexuelle ou à la place réservée aux personnes déficientes. L'enjeu majeur est la promotion d'une plus grande culture de tolérance et d'inclusion de la différence liée au handicap.

Dans les pays démocratiques hétérogènes où l'état de droit est une réalité, les défis de la diversité subsistent de manière protéiforme. En effet, au sein de nombreux États démocratiques pluri-identitaires – multiraciaux, multiethniques et/ou multiconfessionnels – les personnes issues des minorités sont souvent victimes de discriminations systémiques : elles ont généralement un niveau d'éducation moins élevé et sont affectées par un taux de

chômage plus élevé que la moyenne nationale. En outre, lorsqu'elles ont un niveau d'instruction et d'expérience professionnelle identique à celui de personnes issues de la majorité, cela n'est bien souvent pas pris en compte. Ce type de discrimination est à l'œuvre dans différents domaines tels que la santé, le logement, l'éducation ou la sécurité. Il n'est pas nécessaire de mentionner ici les récents événements qui se sont produits aux États-Unis et qui mettent tristement en exergue la relation dyadique entre diversité et égalité.

Quel que soit le type d'organisation, un des défis majeurs liés à la diversité réside dans une meilleure prise en compte des différences, qu'elles soient culturelles, philosophiques ou personnelles, en favorisant une réelle inclusion de toutes et tous à travers notamment plus d'égalité. Pour cela, la diversité doit être envisagée comme un atout, une richesse qui nourrit ce qui fait tenir ensemble nos morphologies sociales.

Quels sont les défis pour l'Institut ?

L'Institut est une institution académique qui a beaucoup évolué par rapport aux entités universitaires dont il est le produit. Aujourd'hui, les statistiques montrent

d'importants défis en matière de diversité, que ce soit au niveau de sa composante étudiante, au sein de l'administration ou au niveau du corps enseignant. Ces défis sont complexes et sont aujourd'hui une priorité pour les instances de gouvernance de l'Institut, qui peuvent notamment s'appuyer sur la Commission sur le genre, la diversité et l'inclusion.

En outre, l'Institut soutient différentes initiatives destinées à promouvoir davantage de diversité au sein de notre communauté, et l'on peut se réjouir de l'engagement de nos étudiants qui sont de plus en plus sensibles à cette problématique. C'est notre responsabilité collective d'œuvrer pour une plus grande diversité au sein de l'IHEID en favorisant plus d'inclusion tout en continuant à promouvoir une culture de l'excellence, pierre angulaire de notre identité. Il serait sans doute utile que toutes les composantes de l'Institut, dans le respect des spécificités propres à chacune d'entre elles, soient davantage exposées aux différentes manières d'appréhender la question, dans un esprit d'ouverture et de générosité propice à un mieux vivre ensemble. Et c'est fort-e-s de notre diversité que nous pourrions exprimer ce qu'il y a de meilleur dans notre communauté, et ainsi continuer à rayonner.



Dèlidji Eric Degila enseigne au Département de science politique/relations internationales ainsi que dans les programmes interdisciplinaires de l'Institut. Originaire du Bénin, diplômé de l'ENA, il est conseiller scientifique du Cours régional des Nations Unies sur la prévention des conflits et le rétablissement de la paix organisé par l'UNITAR à Addis-Abeba au bénéfice des fonctionnaires de l'Union africaine et des autres organisations régionales africaines. Il est par ailleurs *Visiting Professor of African Politics* aux universités de Waseda et Komajo au Japon et enseigne dans plusieurs universités en Afrique ainsi qu'en Amérique latine et centrale. Il est l'actuel président du Global South Caucus de l'International Studies Association, la plus grande organisation académique dédiée à l'étude des relations internationales.



L'INSTITUT

Inauguration de la Résidence étudiante Grand Morillon

Le 23 février, l'Institut a inauguré virtuellement la nouvelle Résidence étudiante Grand Morillon, dessinée par l'architecte japonais de renom Kengo Kuma.

Le public a ainsi pu admirer, dans un film de 15 minutes, ce magnifique bâtiment, avant-gardiste dans sa conception, qui offre un cadre de vie exceptionnel et inspirant par son architecture et sa décoration lumineuses et chaleureuses. Outre les 630 logements, il offre des espaces communs tels que des cuisines partagées, des salles d'études, un amphithéâtre polyvalent, des salles de jeux et de fitness, des jardins communautaires, une terrasse panoramique et un café-restaurant.

Dans son allocution, Marie-Laure Salles, directrice, a souligné que « ce bâtiment aura pour vocation de devenir un lieu de rencontres réelles et physiques, d'interactions humaines, un lieu où vont se tisser de multiples liens, qui montre que l'Institut est un espace ouvert, inscrit dans le monde mais aussi partie intégrante de la cité ».

Philippe Burrin, ancien directeur et initiateur du projet, a quant à lui partagé son émotion par ces quelques mots : « Un projet qui vient à son terme donne toujours un peu d'émotion. D'abord, parce que l'achèvement de ce projet signifie qu'on est allé de l'idée à la réalisation. Un immeuble, c'est comme un livre : ça prend quelques années pour s'élaborer et se développer et puis un jour, le résultat est là, l'ouvrage a pris corps. »

Ce bâtiment couronne un projet d'une quinzaine d'années, le Campus de la paix, qui comprend des bâtiments historiques – la villa Moynier et la villa Barton –, l'immeuble de la rue Rothschild et les constructions récentes comme la Maison étudiante Edgar et Danièle de Picciotto et la Maison de la paix.

Cette réalisation illustre aussi une stratégie immobilière de l'Institut qui vise à tirer le meilleur parti de son statut de fondation privée en montant des partenariats avec des mécènes soucieux de lui donner les moyens d'un développement dans la durée.

Rolf Soiron, président du Conseil de fondation, Marie-Laure Salles et Philippe Burrin remercient chaleureusement toutes celles et tous ceux dont le soutien, le savoir-faire et le talent ont permis à ce projet de voir le jour, malgré les aléas de la pandémie.

Des portes ouvertes seront organisées les 5 et 6 juin prochains si la situation sanitaire le permet.

Pour voir le film :
→ <https://youtu.be/yaeSk4nHD8c>

Balade graduelle.

« Dans cette résidence, nous voulions éviter la ségrégation verticale habituelle – parties communes au rez-de-chaussée et appartements dans les étages –, qui dépend beaucoup de la circulation des ascenseurs. Nous avons plutôt proposé une promenade ascendante “taillée” dans le volume de l'édifice, la balade graduelle, qui permet aux piétons d'accéder à tous les étages, du rez-de-chaussée jusqu'aux toits. Toutes les installations communes sont distribuées le long de cette promenade afin de provoquer la rencontre entre étudiant-e-s et d'offrir un sentiment de communauté. »

KENGO KUMA, architecte




« J'aime beaucoup la façon dont Kengo Kuma a conservé son identité. Son usage iconique du bois crée une atmosphère chaleureuse et accueillante pour les nouveaux venus. La décoration est sobre, ce que j'apprécie. On ressent dans chaque espace une connexion avec la nature. »

HANA SUGIYAMA, étudiante inscrite en master en études du développement

Cuisine commune.
Salle de lecture.



Passerelle reliant les deux bâtiments.
Studio.





L'INSTITUT

Rencontre avec François Bellanger

Nouveau membre du Conseil de fondation



François Bellanger, avocat et professeur de droit à l'Université de Genève, a rejoint le Conseil de fondation de l'Institut en mai 2020.


Qu'est-ce qui vous a incité à accepter de rejoindre le Conseil de fondation? Que souhaitez-vous apporter au Conseil et à l'Institut?

L'Institut est une institution universitaire de premier ordre. Participer aux travaux de son conseil est un privilège dès lors qu'il est responsable du choix des options stratégiques de l'Institut et le garant de son bon fonctionnement. Chaque membre peut ainsi apporter sa contribution tant au présent qu'à l'avenir de l'Institut, notamment en anticipant les défis futurs. Je n'ai donc pas hésité à accepter cette fonction lorsqu'elle m'a été proposée.

Mon parcours personnel comme professeur de droit public à l'Université de Genève m'a donné une grande connaissance de nos institutions cantonales et fédérales ainsi que du fonctionnement du monde universitaire suisse. J'ai aussi acquis par mon métier d'avocat une expérience du monde de l'entreprise et des contraintes et opportunités de l'économie privée. Enfin, exerçant depuis plusieurs années des fonctions de président du conseil de plusieurs fondations, je connais le rôle et les responsabilités des membres d'un tel conseil. J'entends puiser dans ces expériences afin d'amener ma contribution au conseil de l'Institut.

Vous connaissez bien l'Institut. Que pensez-vous de son évolution et quels sont, selon vous, les défis auxquels il devra faire face ces prochaines années?

Le premier défi, le plus immédiat, sera de mesurer l'impact de la pandémie sur le monde d'après. Nous savons que ce monde ne sera pas pareil à celui que nous avons connu, mais il est difficile de savoir aujourd'hui l'étendue des changements qui seront générés par cette crise sans précédent. Le deuxième défi est l'importance croissante de renforcer les collaborations existantes et de développer de nouveaux liens afin d'assurer une présence forte de l'Institut dans ces régions. Le troisième défi est de garder le niveau d'excellence de l'Institut, et notamment sa capacité à développer une réflexion innovante sur les grands problèmes de notre planète, de favoriser la responsabilité mondiale, notamment dans une perspective sociale et de développement durable, et de faire progresser le respect de la diversité.



L'INSTITUT

Un projet collectif pour l'Institut

Entretien avec Marie-Laure Salles, directrice

Mur virtuel collaboratif.

Vous dirigez l'Institut depuis le 1^{er} septembre 2020 et vous avez lancé, dès votre arrivée, un projet collectif. De quoi s'agit-il?

Notre monde est en pleine mutation et notre modèle universitaire en transition. Les enjeux complexes de cet environnement en redéfinition créent l'opportunité d'une réflexion en profondeur sur l'identité et la raison d'être de l'Institut – avec des conséquences bien entendu sur nos processus et nos modes d'organisation et de gouvernance. Le projet collectif que nous avons entrepris vise à engager une réflexion avec toute la communauté de l'Institut, en associant parties prenantes internes et externes.

Comment le projet se déroule-t-il et quels en sont les objectifs concrets?

Ce projet qui se veut volontairement et foncièrement inclusif se déroule en deux phases. La première, qui s'est achevée en janvier, a eu pour objectif de faire émerger une vision, une mission et des valeurs/principes partagés qui soient en cohérence avec notre identité historique tout en l'adaptant aux enjeux et aux réalités du monde contemporain. Nous avons mis en place les moyens d'une mobilisation la plus large possible autour de cette réflexion.

La seconde phase a pour objectif de faire évoluer nos programmes, nos processus organisationnels et la gouvernance, afin de mettre en action cette identité redéfinie et d'assurer une coordination et un fonctionnement transversal encore plus fluides et efficaces. Des groupes de travail thématiques sont constitués qui rassemblent des représentantes et représentants de toutes les parties prenantes concernées.

L'objectif est que nous puissions commencer l'année académique 2021-2022 sur ces bases réinventées, émergeant d'un projet qui nous appartient à toutes et à tous, un véritable projet collectif.

Comment avez-vous procédé pour organiser cette large consultation à l'interne en pleine période de pandémie? Et êtes-vous satisfaite des premiers résultats?

Les premières séances ont été organisées en présentiel avec une partie des participantes et participants en ligne. Nous avons ensuite dû passer le processus entièrement en ligne. Nous avons, avec le professeur Cédric Dupont, utilisé l'outil Mural, un espace de travail numérique et visuel qui a permis à chacune et chacun de publier sa contribution sur un mur virtuel. Cela a très bien fonctionné. La participation a été importante et j'ai été frappée par l'intérêt suscité par ce projet et par la richesse des contributions. Je souhaite exprimer mes vifs remerciements aux collaboratrices et collaborateurs qui se sont impliqués et engagés malgré la situation très particulière.



When Twitter Becomes Sheriff of the Virtual Wild West

Thomas **Schultz**

Visiting Professor of International Law

Professor of International Arbitration, University of Geneva

Co-Director of the Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement (CIDS)



On 8 January 2021, Donald Trump's Twitter account was terminated. Jack Dorsey, Twitter's CEO, had wielded the banhammer. Great? Well, the general reaction to this has mostly been, surprisingly, no.

The reaction has mostly been that it is yet more evidence that freedom of expression is ever more tightly muzzled, that Twitter is a public service that must guarantee a diversity of views, that big tech companies are abusing their power ever more and that they are bad anyway, and more generally, that the world is a dark and terrible place getting worse.

This is not a surprising reaction in that it was difficult to predict. Core Trump supporters crying out is as normal as football rowdies hollering if their leader were forced to switch from chants and insults to nuance and complexity. The fact that media pundits (often lawyers, like me) uncritically repeat perspectives developed by others and lament the lack of proliferating regulation – as if more law, like more sun, is a cure-all – that too is regrettably normal. It is a surprising reaction because it does not seem to make much sense; there are numerous problems of Internet governance, but this is not one of them.

On 8 January 2021, Donald Trump was still the American president, at the helm of a deeply torn and tormented country, threatening to go up in flames at the slightest provocation. The attacks on the Capitol had just occurred, fuelled by insidious rapid-fire 280-character thought fragments tossed off by the man in charge. Since January four years earlier, that Twitter account had been the vehicle for 200 A4-pages worth of insults, over 500 tweets marked as misinformation by Twitter itself, and innumerable lies told for power and for profit, including a big boost of birtherism (Barack Obama being a secret Muslim born abroad set on taking America down). An account that contributed to the killing by negligence of hundreds of thousands of people by making COVID mask wearing a sign of weakness rather than a symbol of solidarity, of responsibility to others.

Yes, I think it is surprising to believe it was a dangerous idea to close that account in that situation, a Twitter account, the one communication instrument that so cleanly kills nuance and complexity, things so essential to politics and the modern world; an instrument so perfectly tailored to spread propaganda, yet never made for it.

But what lessons can be drawn from this? A lesson about where power lies: Twitter stopped a man, and should have stopped him earlier, which no country could have done in the same way. A lesson, also, that we should beware of the David and Goliath syndrome: the idea that they are big and we are small, so they are wrong and we are right. And a lesson that we lawyers shouldn't, in the name of legal certainty, draw up rules so complicated that it takes scholars years to figure out what exactly they mean.

L'INSTITUT

Team from Harvard University Won 2020 Geneva Challenge on Social Inclusion

SWITZERLAND, Geneva. From left to right: Masao Takahashi, Member of the Executive Committee at the World Economic Forum; Florian Schatz, Development Practitioner; Marie-Laure Salles, Director of the Graduate Institute; Jenö Staehelin, Founder of and Donor to the Advancing Development Goals Contest; and Maria Luisa Silva, Director of the UNDP Office in Geneva.

6 October 2020.

The 2020 edition of the Geneva Challenge invited teams of graduate students from all over the world to present innovative and pragmatic solutions to address the challenges of social inclusion. Out of 145 project entries, the team from North America and Oceania (Harvard) was chosen as the winner of the Challenge's eighth edition for "Project Gem: A Teletherapy Platform to Connect Elderly with Family Caregivers".

"This project started out of a personal need that we share: we, on the team, are all very close to our grandparents, but it is very difficult during our lives to stay in touch with them all the time", said team spokesperson William Ge. "So we created a digital platform for family caregivers to maintain a social presence in the lives of their loved ones, even from a distance."

Other winners included the teams from Europe (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm School of Economics) and Asia (Tata Institute of Social Sciences), which were each awarded second prize *ex aequo*. The teams from South America (The Graduate Institute, University of Chile, National University of La Plata, University of Geneva) and Africa (Gulu University) were each awarded third prize *ex aequo*.

A special prize was also attributed in partnership with Sustainable Development Solutions Network – Youth (SDSN Youth) to a team with members from the Graduate Institute, the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Moscow State Academic Art Institute and the

Higher School of Economics for their project "RuRelief: Multifunctional System for Refugee Support in Russia".

Launched in 2014, the Geneva Challenge, created thanks to the vision and generosity of Swiss Ambassador Jenö Staehelin and under the patronage of the late Kofi Annan, is an annual contest for master students, encouraging them to devise innovative and practical proposals for effecting change in the world.

The next edition of the Geneva Challenge will tackle "The Challenges of Crisis Management". Crisis management concerns a multitude of groups and has a strategic impact on human development, productivity, economic growth and long-run development of countries and regions around the world. Therefore, a call for innovative and crosscutting proposals accounting for the context and the multitude of potential actors involved is critical.

Teams have been invited to register their participation before 18 April 2021. The winning project will be awarded CHF 10,000, the two teams in second place will receive CHF 5,000 and the two teams in third place, CHF 2,500.



L'ACTUALITÉ

The Historical Legacy of the Arab Spring

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

Professor and Chair of the Department of International History and Politics

Not to be read in terms of current affairs, the Arab Spring is rather a historical work in progress.

Ten years ago, a wave of unprecedented political protests swept across the Arab world. Starting in the countryside of Tunisia, following the police beating of a street-side fruit seller, popular movements – often led by disenfranchised youth groups – demonstrated for months on calling for the fall of the autocratic regimes that had led these countries for decades.

The “Arab Spring”, as the series of revolts came to be known, brought to an end the presidencies of Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and, later on, Yemen’s Ali Abdallah Saleh. As the regimes cracked down on protestors, unleashing police and armies, a similar nascent movement in Bahrain was brought to a halt courtesy of a Saudi military intervention, and civil wars ensued in Libya, Syria and the Yemen.

The conflicts and political transitions that followed became engulfed in the complex and frustrating travails of societal transformation, with many round the world turning from enthusiasm to doubt about the fate of these democratisation processes. As extremists of all hues became

inevitably involved and violence spiralled, the revolutions were decreed failed by many a naysayer.

Lost in such ahistorical impatience, unrealistic judgments and sterile binaries of failure or success were sober long-term assessments of what the “Spring” was fundamentally about, namely the massive and spontaneous region-wide rejection of postcolonial authoritarianism. For here was the people’s jury standing out 50 years after decolonisation and holding to the regimes’ face their utter failure in building new, independent and accountable states. In slow motion, the revolutions did continue throughout the decade, marred by the growing pains of the struggle for liberalisation. By the early 2020s, talk of an Arab Spring 2.0 was on as similar largescale demonstrations came to force political change in Algeria, the Sudan and Lebanon – again invariably followed by disenchantment.

Instead of reading the Arab Spring in terms of current affairs, the events should be understood as a historical work in progress. The legacy of the Arab Spring is threefold, playing out at national, regional and international levels. Firstly, the uprisings introduced a new cognitive outlook on domestic politics in Arab society. Secondly, the movement embodied, regionally, the substantiation of ethics of democracy, which it also legitimised lastingly. Finally, the movement represented the forceful advancement of modern epistemic social struggle at a global level – one whose “children” are Los Indignados, Occupy Wall Street, the Gilets jaunes and Black Lives Matter.

TUNISIA, Sousse. Torn poster of longtime Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. 15 June 2011. numbeos/iStock



L'ACTUALITÉ

Restaurer la « res publica »

David Sylvan

Professeur de relations internationales/science politique

Nos institutions politiques subissent une pression inédite depuis les années 1930. L’une des sources de pression est bien connue : le nombre croissant de dirigeants et de mouvements xénophobes et illibéraux, et leur apparente popularité électorale. Pourtant, cette menace pour les normes démocratiques n’est pas la seule à laquelle nous faisons face. Deux autres dangers remettent en question la continuité même d’une gouvernance républicaine.

Dans le monde actuel, les républiques sont, certes, presque toujours démocratiques. Mais lorsque Leonardo Bruni a ressuscité le terme au XV^e siècle, il l’a choisi délibérément car il faisait écho à la *res publica* de Cicéron – littéralement « la chose publique » – afin de signaler qu’elle est l’antithèse du pouvoir monarchique. Pour ce dernier, les affaires de l’État étaient privées, elles relevaient de la couronne. Les républiques étaient en revanche constituées de tous les citoyens, égaux devant la loi, même si plus de la moitié de la population se voyait alors privée de citoyenneté.

La privatisation des affaires publiques

Une condition sine qua non de gouvernance républicaine, quelle qu’en soit la forme institutionnelle, tient à ce que les affaires de l’État soient débattues et tranchées sans égard pour leur substance. Cependant, si certaines questions se voient considérées comme hors limites et que l’on restreint fortement le débat à leur sujet, cela revient à dire qu’elles constituent en réalité la propriété privée d’un sous-groupe. De même, si certaines questions ne sont discutées que par certains sous-groupes – bien qu’elles soient en principe ouvertes à chacun –, le public se morcelle entre des cliques qui ne communiquent plus entre elles et deviennent, de facto, privées. Ces deux dangers – que l’on pourrait nommer « le silence » et « les silos » – ont malheureusement atteint des niveaux alarmants. Prenons d’abord la menace du silence. Ces 70 dernières années, les démocraties du monde entier ont peu à peu esquivé les débats parlementaires sur une série d’enjeux liés à la sécurité nationale : la taille et les opérations de différentes branches de l’armée, des services de renseignement, des agences chargées du contre-terrorisme ainsi que de certaines unités de la police. Cela ne signifie pas que de vives controverses n’aient pas

eu lieu au sein des parlements nationaux, mais elles sont devenues de plus en plus rares. Et lorsqu’elles se produisent, les camps opposés au sein de l’hémicycle ont tendance à s’accorder sur un éventail de problèmes de plus en plus large. Le résultat est que la sécurité nationale a progressivement échappé à la surveillance et à la délibération républicaines.

Silos et chambres d’écho

La menace des silos est, en revanche, d’un millésime un peu plus récent. L’avènement de la télévision, de nouvelles pratiques de marketing et de l’internet ont ébranlé les fondements des journaux traditionnels et du large spectre de questions qu’ils s’efforçaient de soumettre à leurs lecteurs. Fox News a démontré que le journalisme télévisé peut fournir un éventail limité de sujets (majoritairement fictifs) à une large audience. Plus récemment, Facebook et d’autres réseaux sociaux ont permis à leurs utilisateurs de sélectionner une étroite variété de sujets et d’en faire leur fil d’actualités quotidiennes, renforçant cette étroitesse à travers les chambres d’écho des plateformes. Le résultat de ce phénomène – des citoyens vivant dans des réalités totalement séparées – est tout aussi fatal à la poursuite d’une gouvernance républicaine.

Les silos contribuent en réalité au silence. Sans un public disposé à consommer un large choix de sujets d’actualité, le nombre de voix alternatives que l’on peut percevoir sur les questions de sécurité nationale, et auxquelles on peut réagir, restera à un niveau historiquement bas. Par conséquent, une tâche essentielle pour les années à venir tiendra à trouver comment taxer les réseaux sociaux les plus grands et les plus profitables, et à utiliser ces fonds pour subventionner de multiples sources d’information. De telles politiques publiques, combinées à d’autres réformes – comme l’obligation de réautoriser formellement les programmes liés à des agences de sécurité nationale, ou l’utilisation plus fréquente d’assemblées citoyennes plus larges et de préférence multinationales –, constitueraient un pas important pour faire reculer les menaces pesant, à terme, sur la gouvernance républicaine.

Cet article a été publié dans *Le Temps* du 2 janvier 2021.

ITALIE, Rome. Statue de Cicéron. iStock/ra-photos

Dossier produced by the Research Office, based on *Global Challenges* (no. 9, 2021), a series of dossiers designed to share with a wider public the ideas, knowledge, opinions and debates produced at the Graduate Institute.

→ <https://globalchallenges.ch>

LE DOSSIER

THE MOVING FAULT LINES OF INEQUALITY

INDIA, Bhopal. Indian slum dwellers collect potable water from a municipal water tanker. Slum dwellers depend on government supplies for drinking water and struggle to get adequate supply during summers. 21 March 2018. AFP

THE RISE OF INEQUALITY AND ITS CONTESTED MEANINGS

Dominic Eggel

Research Adviser at the Research Office

Inequality is complex and multifaceted. It depends on a series of global processes, technological innovations, economic growth and redistribution policies. Inequality is eminently cross-sectional as it spans issues of class, gender, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion. Like a thousand-headed hydra, inequality finds expression in inequitable access to health, food, air, water, education and security but frequently takes on more subtle, sublimated forms of discrimination hiding in plain sight such as mental prejudice or administrative antipathy.

Inequality is relative, contingent on its terms of comparison, and subjective. It depends on culturally and psychologically mediated perceptions and discourses. Inequality, finally, is noxious. It results in stifled economic growth, political tensions and worsening social indicators. Inequality directly threatens democracy, as it erodes the middle classes, increases social polarisation and fuels political mistrust, constituting a favourable breeding ground for illiberal or populist movements.

Historically, inequality has been the norm. As Thomas Piketty has argued, and contrary to the predictions of classic equilibrium models, the natural tendency for inequality in capitalist societies – if remained unchecked – is to rise. As Marx had anticipated, in the long run capital yields by far exceed general economic growth and labour compensation.

While poverty has been diminishing and relative income has been growing on a global scale for over two centuries, inequality – as measured by instruments such as the GINI coefficient – has been increasing again since the early 1980s. With the financial crisis of 2007, growing digitalisation and the current pandemic, global inequality has further worsened, as fortunes attain unprecedented levels and

economy. We are indeed witnessing a “return of capital” as the rich benefit from the sheer scale of their portfolios, privileged investment opportunities, as well as tax evasion and disproportionate political impact. Inequality has also risen because of the fall from grace of the welfare state and, more broadly, of social democracy. Over the past decades, trade unions have lost their clout and workers writ large have

“Inequality is not inevitable as it depends on political choices.”

revenue concentrates in the top percentiles of societies. As a consequence, a new class of globally connected superrich has emerged, deriving their wealth not just from land, property and government bonds, as previously, but also from prodigious executive salaries and “super-bonuses”.

The causes driving inequality are multiple. Aside from structural megatrends such as globalisation, climate change and urbanisation, a key factor is the growing financialisation of the

seen their rights unremittently eroding, their real wages falling and their status mercilessly fragilised by the neo-liberal grinding machine.

Three discourses have intersected and confronted each other over the stakes of inequality as, in addition to the aggravating social fracture, further fault lines have opened or hardened along logics of race, gender, ethnicity and religion.

The modern discourse of equality has its roots in the Enlightenment’s



VENEZUELA, Caracas. A woman looks at the signs displaying prices of products in US dollars outside a supermarket. In Venezuela, nobody wants bolivars, the weakened national currency. Everything can be paid for in dollars, which have been prohibited for 15 years but keep gaining power in a country hit by years of recession and hyperinflation. 9 December 2020. Federico PARRA/AFP

struggle to end the discriminations and privileges of the Ancien Régime. It found expression both in a liberal branch defending equality before the law and individual freedom and a socialist branch defending socio-economic policies of redistribution and social mobility. The basic tenet is to equalise economic differences while maximising private freedom. The movement in favour of equality culminated in the twentieth century, when inequality declined in the decades after World War II, mostly in the West, but, currently, it has little wind in its sails.

The proponents of the equity paradigm form an offshoot of the equality paradigm, deploring its blindness towards religion, gender and ethnicity and its failure to live up to its promises. Women, indeed, typically still bear the brunt of poverty, violence and inequality, and racial and sexual minorities continue to face systemic discrimination. Accordingly, the proponents of

the equity paradigm claim that for equality to materialise, women and minorities first need to gain equal access to opportunity through positive discrimination and other support mechanisms.

The proponents of the identity paradigm, finally, argue that the equality (and/or equity) discourse is fallacious, vain and hypocritical at best, noxious at worst, as it is, precisely, the biased impetus towards equality itself that sustains and worsens prejudice and discrimination. Accordingly, they have given up on the idea of equality altogether, dismissing it as an imperialistic, universal construct devised by white (male) elites to buttress their domination over society. From such a perspective, the priority is no longer to fight for equal access to rights, equal opportunities, or more just social distribution, but to defend specific groups and their own sets of exclusive interests, griefs and rights.

Inequality, however, is not inevitable as it depends on political choices. In the context of a looming recession in the wake of the COVID crisis, turning a blind eye to inequality would indeed prove disastrous. What is needed is a renewed impetus for more consensual and inclusive social change to avoid the fragmentation and polarisation that will likely play into the hands of illiberals and other proponents of bio and power politics. Instead of the current dialogue of the deaf, a more productive exchange between proponents of equality (and equity) and those of identity is needed. This will require to square the circle again by devising new ways of reconciling equality and diversity, redistribution and recognition.

LET US BREATHE
Stop Poisoning Delhi's Air



THE MOVING FAULT LINES OF INEQUALITY

VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE INEQUALITIES

Gopalan Balachandran

Professor of International History and Politics

INDIA, New Delhi. A demonstrator, wearing a face mask due to heavy smog conditions, takes part in a demonstration demanding the government take measures to curb air pollution. 3 November 2019. Sajjad HUSSAIN/AFP

The renewed attention to economic and social inequalities in the North is timely and welcome. In the South, however, poverty reduction remains the priority, mainly to be achieved through faster growth notwithstanding worsening income and wealth inequalities. Interest in reducing inequalities in the South began to wane half a century ago under the influence of Western aid policies that prioritised basic needs and poverty reduction over measures like land reforms that could both alleviate

poverty and mitigate rural inequalities. This indifference has hardened over the years into systemic neglect.

Inequalities, we always knew, diminish human life. The pandemic has revealed something else we always knew, but chose to ignore as trivial: inequalities can be life threatening. In revealing the nexus between discrimination and inequality, Black Lives Matter lifted a veil on hidden inequalities and succeeded to some extent in rewiring our shock reflexes. The stark racial and social differences in COVID

mortality may not otherwise have gained the same attention. Racial differences in maternal mortality rates have also recently been in the news. They may not surprise most of us, yet have now a capacity to shock.

Recognising and tackling inequality involves deliberate political choices. There is no reason, a priori, to expect societies to tend towards greater equality. Moreover, decades of neoliberalism have so hollowed out political institutions and norms of accountability even in countries that nominally count as

democracies, that there is the risk of new, life-threatening forms of inequality failing to register forcefully enough on our radars.

Take for instance clean air. Developing countries have the worst air quality according to most rankings; 27 of the 30 cities with the highest levels of air pollution are in South Asia. WHO estimates there are 7 million premature deaths worldwide every year from air pollution, which has a disproportionate impact on the relatively poorer inhabitants dwelling in streets and slums, or working outdoors in the toxic air. Historically, the air in rapidly growing industrial cities all over the world has been deadly, often for long periods. So long as rich and poor are forced to breathe the same air, we can reasonably expect the political will for a cleanup. But one may wonder whether or how such will might materialise if the rich are able to live in environment-controlled climate bubbles produced by air purifiers, air filters, and air conditioners.

The privatisation of clean air, with all its consequences for health and morbidity, and its disappearance as a commons may reflect the appalling levels to which inequality can extend. It is not an isolated instance. Many of us would sooner eat sashimi in southern cities than drink water from local taps. Domestic water purifiers affordable to the middle classes have relieved municipal authorities of the obligation to provide clean drinking water. While those who cannot afford water purifiers manage as best they can, the sale of potable water has become a booming business. And at least in Bengaluru, India, where middle-class housing complexes in some newer neighbourhoods rely on tankers to ferry ground water by road over long distances, a powerful “tanker mafia” was reported to have held up plans for public water supply schemes.

Public healthcare and education have likewise collapsed in many poor countries because the middle classes have fled to private clinics, hospitals and schools, most of which operate for profit. The perverse incentives and effects of “for profit” healthcare are well recognised. For all we know, pervasive microbial antibiotic resistance may well one day turn out to be its most “democratic” legacy. Private schools are, as we know, a slippery slope to inequality of access to university education and employment. Security is another good where privatisation and

process of enclosure entailed profound consequences for land tenure, ownership, and the emergence of wage labour and agrarian capitalism. But arguments that privatising the commons fundamentally reconfigured our relation to nature, commodified its everyday gifts as a prelude to commodifying and monopolising other essentials of life to foster new relations of power, do not usually receive the consideration they deserve. Such perspectives may, however, help us better recognise and understand a phenomenon like the privatisation of clean air.

“Inequalities can be life threatening.”

inequality have gone hand in hand, as the rich retreat into gated communities and the public guardians of law and order vent their thwarted authority on the poor and powerless.

It is hard even in the times of COVID to imagine a dystopian world in which clean air comes at a price. Yet it is a sobering thought that, whether from optimism or a sense of fatalism, we may be prone to normalising outcomes that have been bitterly contested in the past, without fully appreciating all the stakes involved. Consider how historical enclosures of the rural commons tend to be viewed. Restrictions on foraging forests for food, fuel or fodder, grazing on common lands, fishing public streams, etc., deprived the rural poor of their customary rights and aggravated poverty and inequality. As is well-known, this

We cannot always trust our social science sensibilities to recognise inequalities, many of which we may be unaccustomed by experience to seeing. Black Lives Matter has retaught us the role that power plays in producing, reproducing, displacing, and suppressing inequalities. It has also shown us the ubiquity of denial – just consider what it took for society to acknowledge the reality of discrimination against women or Dalits – and the kind of mobilisations required to render inequalities visible and affirm them as such.

INEQUALITY AND GENDER

Elisabeth Prügl

Professor of International Relations/Political Science and Co-Director of the Gender Centre

Is a husband justified to hit or beat his wife “if she burns the food, argues with him, goes out without telling him, neglects the children or refuses sexual relations”? Demographic and health surveys around the world tracing violence against women reveal astonishing opinions. As many as 72% of males aged 15 to 49 in Papua New Guinea and Afghanistan consider wife beating justified. Even more shockingly, in many places women tend to agree with the statement more often than men.¹ While there is considerable variation in such

Development in 2015. But in addition to outrage over continuing gender-based rights violations, there is also talk of the gender equality agenda having gone too far. Pushback comes from conservative governments that have long refused equality in the family and have questioned sexual and reproductive rights – in particular LGBTQ rights and abortion. Authoritarian governments that seek to roll back feminist achievements contribute to this global pushback, from decriminalising domestic violence in Russia to abolishing gender

evidence remains unidimensional. Thus, there have been significant gains for women, especially in the area of social policy where governments have played a role in promoting equality. In most countries today, girls and boys participate equally in primary education, and there is progress of gender inclusivity at other levels of education as well. In healthcare, the risk of maternal deaths has been reduced significantly, as has the number of unintended pregnancies.² But these figures differ by geographical location. Moreover, progress in other areas has been limited. In addition to gender-based violence, two are worth examining in more detail: economic participation and political participation.

Although gender equality policies have long prioritised moving women into jobs and gaining them independent access to income, the gap between women’s and men’s rate of labour force participation has remained virtually the same over the past 25 years. Globally, women’s participation in the paid economy in 2020 was 47%, compared to 74% for men (although there are significant differences geographically, with larger gaps in Northern Africa and Western and Southern Asia). As a result, women’s access to independent income continues to fall well short of that of men – even before unequal wages and job segregation are taken into account. A key problem is women’s disproportionate responsibility for care and household labour. Globally, marriage and having children depresses women’s labour force participation while it has the opposite effect on men. Women’s unpaid labour includes not only care labour but also unpaid family labour in agriculture, which is particularly significant in Sub-Saharan Africa.³ Patriarchal household

“The challenges to gender equality and inclusion remain both structural and psychic.”

attitudes globally, the figures are but the tip of an iceberg. The #MeToo and similar movements offer evidence that more subtle and certainly no less harmful forms of gender-based violence continue to be rampant. People who do not conform to dominant gender identifications and sexual orientations are particularly affected.

We should be surprised. Since the adoption of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, gender equality has become a topic of national and international policymaking, affirmed in a range of international documents and instruments, and integrated into the UN’s Agenda for Sustainable

studies programmes in Hungary, effectively banning abortion in Poland, and arresting feminist activists advocating for basic rights in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Political leaders, such as in the US and the Philippines, epitomise this backlash when they pride themselves on sexually assaulting women, wearing abuse as a badge of honour rather than acknowledging it as a crime.

Sexism, racism, homophobia, ableism and other forms of othering have long lurked beneath the surface of our globalised world, serving as bulwarks against demands for justice and inclusion. International gender equality policies are only beginning to address these intersections, and most existing



USA, Forth Worth. Lathe operator machining parts for transport planes at the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation plant. October 1942. Howard R. HOLLEM

governance thus functions to hold back women’s economic empowerment.

In contrast, there have been some advances in women’s political participation, though starting from a very low level and with gender gaps remaining significant. The percentage of women in parliaments has more than doubled in the past 25 years to almost 25% in 2020. This increase is largely due to the introduction of quotas, with gains concentrating in Europe, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand. Similarly, the number of female heads

of state has increased from 12 in 1995 to 20 in 2020 (12 of these are in Europe). Despite such progress, however, political participation of women has rarely reached a critical mass. Globally, women occupy half the seats in only four national parliaments.

Today, gender equality and inclusion are not a matter of viewing the glass as half full or empty. Rather, issues of difference have become fiercely contested and are not easily amenable to technocratic solutions. Quotas may add women to parliaments and company

boards, but they do not disrupt gender binaries that buttress divisions of labour and ideas of female difference. The challenges remain both structural and psychic. We need to revolutionise economies so that they prioritise care and the preservation of life over profits. And we need to disrupt deep-seated heteronormative imaginaries of women as the natural Other that render them easy objects of violence.

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, statistics are from UN DESA’ Statistics Division, *The World’s Women 2020: Trends and Statistics*, <https://worlds-women-2020-data-undesa.hub.arcgis.com/>, accessed 14 January 2021.

² Guttmacher Institute, “Unintended Pregnancies and Abortion Worldwide”, Fact Sheet, July 2020, <https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortion-worldwide>, accessed 14 January 2021.

³ *Progress of the World’s Women 2019–2020: Families in a Changing World* (New York: UN Women, 2019), 114 and 119.



THE MOVING FAULT LINES OF INEQUALITY

THE ENDURING INEQUITIES OF RACISM

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

Professor and Chair of the Department of International History and Politics

Ceaselessly breeding asymmetry, racism dwells in the intangibles of existence and experience.

Racial prejudice is quintessentially synonymous with unequal treatment. As a system, racism is predicated on the establishment of imbalanced socioeconomic relations. Perpetuated by asymmetrical political rules of interaction – often explicitly or implicitly reinforced by hampering legal structures

and neutralising jurisprudence – mechanisms of bias are embedded in injustice, which they also further. Untangled in this way, racism and inequality become near-indissociable vectors of variegated and layered dispossession. With the passage of time, racial constructs and racist realities pass on generationally, problematically compounding their pernicious and lasting effects.

Linking status and opportunity, racism also moves to justify inequalities.

It forcefully articulates a worldview that alternatively rationalises existing disparities in terms of racial, ethnic, cultural, economic or religious preference or seeks to translate them operationally in a *political economy of otherness* (extending it to all realms of communal and individual difference). Impressed this way, racial inequality should not, however, be quantified solely in economic terms or per the obvious denial of opportunities of

livelihood (such as housing, employment, access to services and mobility). Racism dwells, importantly, in the intangibles of existence and social experience – intimate spaces of inequality whose violence is as acute as the one playing out at the more visible,

century. All along, two traits recur in the form of instrumentalisation – of science, law and class as noted, but as well of predispositions, patterns and inclinations – and weaponisation, notably of systems, politics and, today as yesterday, imagery and discourse.

“When it comes to racism, inequality has nine lives.”

less private surface. With consistency and endurance, bias speaks a language of inequality of being, seeing, doing – and crucially of not allowing. If racism is endemic, it is because it wields this multiplicity of calculated actions with an expected result, alignment with existing processes and neutralising of transforming possibilities.

Racism also shares an incestuous life with concealment. Though this may seem surprising given the oft-ideologised public expressions of racism, it is not completely so when the core logic of racism is seen for what it is, namely an organising device designed to produce societal imbalance. Naked, in-your-face prejudice being difficult to countenance systemically in the long run (e.g., slavery, segregation and apartheid), racism’s unwieldiness is remedied by tricks of the trade, hiding it in plain sight. These run the gamut from the “evolutionary models” or “civilisational ladders” peddled by many a “great mind” of the Enlightenment and the modern era to the hidden racialised securitisation of the early twenty-first

century. Ever rationalised, instrumentalised and weaponised thus, the replenishment of inequality is – conversely – fundamentally enabled by a deliberate distortion of the drivers of equality. The very repetitive nature of everyday status quo allows those benefiting from it to evade its questioning, painting efforts to redress variance, such as the removal of statues of slave owners, as troublesome “techniques of cancellation”. Even in the post-Black Lives Matter world, diversity is frowned upon (paid lip service to but often processed by human resources as, a decade ago, banks dragged their feet on compliance requirements). Statues of slave-owners are indeed defended in the name of a self-serving (mis)understanding of history. The tables are turned, as illustrated by accusations of reverse discrimination made to antiracists denouncing the continuity of systemic preference. The mainstreaming of such techniques – witness the efflorescence of antipolitical correctness – is primarily illustrative of agile privilege-wielding.

When it comes to racism, inequality has nine lives. The wherewithal of prejudice lodges itself too easily in the impersonal structures of institutions and the cowardice of bureaucracy, in the language of phony science and the unshakable Eurocentrism of academia, in the geographies of dangerousness and the criminalisation of “the other”, in the political immunisation of some cultures and the policing of others and in the usurping of health regimes. Each new era – as the persistence of racism is revealed, time and again – allows remixed social contexts to be skewed in alignment with misalignment. Thus, the quaint opportunities of globalisation’s “information superhighway” gave way to algorithms of oppression, and instead of disappearing, borders found new life birthing myriad new ways for racism to speak to itself across time and space only to deny the crossing of such lines.

If contemporary racism is arguably more problematic than earlier configurations, it is because it has subsumed these already-complex historical lines, synthesising them by simultaneously overtly discriminating, covertly denying, systematically targeting and systemically preventing advancement. The plethora of possibilities for inequity and iniquity to coexist continuously speaks, in the final analysis, of the historical and global weight of hierarchy and the patterns of interaction derivative from it. The issue is not reinvigorated populism, illiberal ideologies or chaotic social media but rather, more profoundly, the endemic requirements of social orders that seem to cultivate difference, nurture dichotomies and invite ranking – unable or unwilling to transcend such tropes.

USA, Washington, D.C. The Lincoln Park Emancipation statue depicts former US President Abraham Lincoln standing over a kneeling, freed African American man. This statue is among American monuments drawing scrutiny. 22 June 2020. Jim WATSON/AFP

INEQUALITY IN HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION

Anne Saab

Associate Professor of International Law
Co-Director of the LL.M. in International Law

Hunger remains an enormous problem in today's world. It affects an estimated 690 million people, even before taking into account the additional consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Hungry people include subsistence farmers whose harvests fail because of extreme weather events, day labourers who run out of work because of economic crises or illness, and generally people living in poverty anywhere in the world and unable to provide enough food for themselves and their families.

Hunger and malnutrition are associated terms that are often used interchangeably. However, unlike hunger, malnutrition does not refer exclusively or specifically to insufficient quantity of food in terms of caloric intake, but also to insufficient nutritional quality of consumed food. A growing number of people in the world suffer from overweight and obesity, the consequence of a form of malnutrition associated with mass consumption of processed foods that are high in calories but low in nutritional value. Whether we are speaking about a lack of (access to) food or a lack of (access to) nutritious food, inequality in its many different forms is a main driver for both hunger and malnutrition.

At the level of states, inequality depends on the existence and the strength of social welfare systems. People who have insufficient income to buy food for themselves and their

families might receive welfare payments, provisions from food banks, and free school meals in countries where such support is available. Citizens of less wealthy countries may have to rely more on family and community or on international food assistance, or simply have no support at all. The inequality in access to food and healthy diets is expected to grow wider in the face of the COVID-19 crises. States that

have the means provide unprecedented economic support to prevent their population from losing their incomes and going hungry.

Lack of (access to) nutritious food often results in malnutrition in the form of obesity and related health consequences. The quality of one's diet is

largely not a matter of choice, but depends on physical and financial accessibility of types of food. Highly processed and unhealthy foods that contain much sugar, salt, and saturated fats are often more available and more affordable than healthier fresh foods. Education also plays a role in the consumption of healthy foods, with unhealthy diet choices being more widely advertised.

The nexus between inequality and food therefore goes further than physical availability and economic access to healthy food. While serious changes in our food consumption patterns are necessary to tackle hunger and malnutrition, access to a healthy diet is a privilege of the lucky few. A large proportion

“The power of consumers is negligible in comparison with the power of corporate players in the global food system.”



INDIA, Rajasthan. Four women, in traditional clothing, are inspecting red chili peppers drying in the sun. brytta/iStock

of the world's population, in rich countries and poor countries alike, does not have the luxury to secure a healthy diet. Many people struggling to make a living simply do not have the time to buy and prepare healthy meals, nor do they have the capacity to navigate through an increasingly complex maze of dietary guidelines. This is not to deny the value and the contribution of consumer behaviour and consumer patterns, such as trends towards more organic products, less meat, and more generally quality food over fast food. However, we must recognise that only a minority of consumers are in the comfortable position to be able to make these choices as individuals, and the power of consumers is negligible in comparison with the power of corporate players in the global food system.

In a neoliberal food system, corporations have become incredibly mighty with the role of the state diminishing. Powerful conglomerates of food companies (such as Nestlé and Unilever),

agricultural biotechnology corporations (such as Monsanto and Syngenta), and supermarkets influence what food is being produced and made available to consumers. Dominance of the private sector means that profits from food sales weigh more than considerations of health and wellbeing. Highly processed unhealthy foods are available cheaply and in bulk, while healthier options tend to be more expensive and targeted at a more limited group of wealthier consumers. Public authorities frequently counter calls for hard measures such as sugar tax and stricter controls on advertisements for children's foods by emphasising consumer choice and market freedom. Consequently, regulatory measures often remain limited to soft nudges such as nutritional labelling.

The neoliberal global food system focuses predominantly on growth in terms of food production. This remains true in spite of annual reports by the Food and Agriculture Organization stressing that there is enough food

available globally to feed the entire world population. The primary issue both for hunger and for malnutrition is not overall global availability of food, nor is it overall global capacity to produce food. The real issue is what kind of food is being produced and who has access to adequate food and a healthy diet. It is an issue of distribution of food and of choices that are made on what kinds of foods are produced, advertised, and made available financially and physically. It is time for states to take their responsibility in regulating global food systems both domestically and internationally, rather than leaving this up to private actors in free markets. In a world where both hunger and obesity are on the rise, and where the knowledge and capacity to provide adequate healthy diets are available, it should not be acceptable to limit state regulation to gentle recommendations and de facto leave the private sector in control.



THE MOVING FAULT LINES OF INEQUALITY

INCOME INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: KNOWN UNKNOWNNS

Ugo Panizza

Professor of International Economics

Deputy Director of the Centre for Finance and Development and Sarah Voitchovsky

BANGLADESH, Dhaka. Bangladeshi labourers carry baskets of sand on their heads on the bank of the Turag River. Thousands of labourers from the countryside work in the capital from dawn to dusk for a daily wage of no more than Taka 80 (USD 1.15), earning a livelihood for their family. 24 October 2007. Arjana Khan GODHULY/AFP

Until the 1990s, mainstream economic research typically assumed that inequality was a temporary side-effect of economic growth¹. This view was challenged by a series of influential articles which highlighted several channels through which income inequality can have both detrimental and positive effects on economic growth.² Rapid increases in inequality in most advanced economies have led policymakers to focus on the negative growth effects of these trends. This view is well expressed in an opinion piece entitled “Equality Is Key to Global Economic Growth” published in January 2016 by

Christine Lagarde, the then Managing Director of the IMF, in *The Boston Globe*.

Statements of this sort are becoming increasingly common from political leaders, consistent with an emerging consensus that inequality is adversely related to growth. However, the empirical literature on the links between inequality and growth does not align with this simple narrative, especially because the channels through which inequality may affect growth remain poorly understood.

The main channels through which high inequality negatively affects growth include: lack of access to

education for poorer individuals, pressure for inefficient redistribution and populist policies, corruption, and political instability. While many simple regression analyses support the postulate of a negative link between inequality and growth, a closer look at empirical studies in the last two decades reveals a wide diversity of outcomes suggesting these results are sensitive to slight variations in model specifications and data. Differences between studies that influence reported results include the econometric methodology (panel versus cross-sectional analyses),

“The lack of robustness of empirical results across methodologies and samples frustrates attempts at drawing firm conclusions regarding the expected ‘overall’ effect of inequality on growth.”

the length of growth spells (e.g. 5, 10 or 30 years), the overall period of analysis (e.g. 1960–85 vs 1980–2005), differences in data quality, the choice of the inequality index, the specification used to control for the effect of inequality (e.g. linear or non-linear effects), the concept of inequality considered (e.g. net/gross income, or wealth inequality), and the sample of countries. The lack of robustness of empirical results across methodologies and samples frustrates attempts at drawing firm conclusions regarding the expected “overall” effect of inequality on growth.

The unidirectional effect of inequality as expressed in reduced form studies thus contrasts with the complexity and variety through which inequality has been hypothesised to affect economic outcomes in the empirical literature. Studies have considered, for example, how inequality may influence growth via: its effect

on redistributive policies, access to education for credit-constrained individuals, individual incentives, the demand for manufactured goods, the size of the market and incentives for innovation, the fertility rate, the crime rate, the risk of social conflict and protection of property rights, the ability of government to respond to external shocks, lobbying- or rent-seeking-induced misallocation of productive resources, or individual savings or labour supply in the context of social comparisons.

Each of these channels has been hypothesised to influence the inequality-growth relationship either positively (higher inequality leads to higher growth) or negatively (higher inequality leads to lower growth). Moreover, some of them may work in conjunction, making it difficult (or impossible) to anticipate whether inequality is good or bad for growth on average.

The sensitivity of empirical results outlined above could be due to variation in the relative importance of disparate channels, which the simple statistical models are ill-equipped to control for given their assumption of unidirectionality. To address this issue, some recent studies have adopted empirical specifications designed to accommodate for the possibility that inequality may influence growth through a multiplicity of channels. Their aim is to assess the “overall” effect of inequality on growth against the overall balance of all contributing channels. Although not identified directly, specific channels are thus assumed to be linked to different types of inequality such as: short-term vs. long-term effects of inequality, inequality of opportunity vs. residual inequality interpreted as inequality of efforts, inequality originating at the bottom of the distribution vs. inequality at the top of the distribution, inequality depending on the income growth of people in different parts of the distribution.

Over the past decades, there have been important changes in income inequality both within and across countries. These changes have led to the widespread perception that inequality has large effects on political stability, human capital investment and rent-seeking. However, heterogeneity and lack of good data limit our ability to tease out clear effects in statistical analyses. The bottom line is that, as usual, things could be more complicated than what it seems and more research and better data are needed.

¹ A.B. Atkinson, “Bringing Income Distribution In from the Cold”, *Economic Journal* 107 (March 1997): 297–321.

² For an overview, see S. Voitchovsky, “Inequality and Economic Growth”, in *The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality*, ed. B. Nolan, W. Salverda, and T.M. Smeeding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF INEQUALITY FOR THE ELITES

Matias López

Postdoctoral Researcher at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy and Graziella Moraes Silva

Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology

Inequality has become increasingly salient in the public debate. The COVID-19 crisis deepened social gaps, benefiting a few billionaires, for instance tech bosses, while driving large proportions of people to poverty and food insecurity. Although the wealthiest people

increasingly generating a global caste of superrich individuals that cut across the Global North and Global South.

While it is clear that inequalities, both of wealth and income, punish those at the bottom of the income distribution, we know much less about

However, do higher levels of inequality systematically prove beneficial to the global elites? Or, to put it differently, will the wealthy generally prove supportive of measures aggravating inequality such as tax cuts and social welfare retrenchment? Such a perspective is most visibly contradicted by global initiatives like The Giving Pledge, urging “the world’s wealthiest individuals” to commit to redistribution on moral grounds. Philanthropy has been booming over the past decades, partly because it allows elites to reap social capital and prestige.

Given the limits of voluntaristic commitments – which vary across individuals, countries and macroeconomic contexts – and the potentially noxious consequences of private (and largely financialised) philanthropy, one should, however, hope that moral commitment and social prestige are not the sole drivers of elite commitment to redistribution. Luckily, they are not. From an economic perspective, the “rich” have material incentives to give up part of their assets to protect their position. After all, more concentrated resources lead to higher shares of marginalised or discontent citizens likely to fight for redistribution through votes or political violence.

on the planet are still concentrated in North America and Europe, the wealth of billionaires grew in China (+1146%), Russia (+80%), India (+90%) and Brazil (+99%), according to UBS billionaires report 2020. Income concentration is

how inequality affects those located at the top. A straightforward answer is that a skewed income and wealth distribution benefits the wealthy as they gain from cheap labour and other forms of material and symbolic distinctions.

“The potential risks of political instability to the wealthy point to the important issue of how economic inequality articulates to democracy or the lack thereof.”



The potential risks of political instability to the wealthy point to the important issue of how economic inequality articulates to democracy or the lack thereof. It was traditionally assumed that authoritarian governments and their ingrained tendency to protect elites better suit those benefiting from inequality. Numerous cases have been documented where corporate leaders have endorsed authoritarian incumbents or coups against democracy in order to curtail redistribution and curb political representation. However, political scientists have increasingly shown that authoritarian regimes are more likely to expropriate wealth under particular circumstances such as during crises of legitimation. In some cases, economic elites have pushed for democratisation after experiencing the dangers of authoritarianism through persecution and expropriation. Emerging democracies opened the way for majoritarian groups to reshape income distribution and potentially diminish inequality, but they have also protected wealth through a liberal commitment to the rule of law and private property.

In many ways, the inequalities currently prevailing in democracies can be traced to the wave of democratisation of the last quarter of the twentieth century. New democracies frequently inherited repressive structures from previous authoritarian regimes as a result of biased institutional arrangements with former elites and ousted autocrats. The powerful, however, are also wielding extensive political leverage in more long-standing democracies. In the 2020 US elections, for example, 10 individuals donated nearly 60 million dollars for political campaigns and parties. According to extensive research, such practices allow the preferences of top-earners to translate to actual policy much more frequently than they do for average-income citizens.

For stability to prevail in unequal democracies, inequalities need to be perceived as legitimate. Recent studies have shown that the well-off are in constant need of justifying their advantage. Several cultural processes play a key role in mediating the merit of elites while questioning the deservingness of the poor through racial, ethnic and national

stigmatisation that justify their marginalisation and exclusion from social policies. Where elite narratives justifying inequality fail to resonate with the general public, democracy risks being challenged by anti-establishment leaders and parties. Opening the Pandora’s box of populism remains, however, an uncertain undertaking for the elites as it provokes political volatility and may equally result in favours for the rich as in more radical redistributive policies putting their assets at risk.

In short, how the wealthy relate to inequality varies across contexts and may thus best be explored as an empirical question.

INDIA, Bangalore. US founder and CEO of Amazon.com Jeff Bezos poses atop a lorry after handing over a USD 2-billion cheque to Indian Vice President and Country Manager of Amazon.in, Amit Agarwal (unseen). The investment will go towards raising the bar for online shopping in India. 28 September 2014. Manjunath KIRAN/AFP

Suerie Moon Recently Nominated as Professor of Practice



Suerie Moon, who is also Co-Director of the Global Health Centre, was recently appointed as Professor of Practice. Her work is broadly concerned with the intersection of global governance and public health.

You studied history at Yale, international relations at Princeton and public policy at Harvard. When and how did you decide to specialise in global health?

Since childhood, I have wanted to understand better why some people in the world have so much less than others. As I learned later, this inequality and precarity applies to both wealth and health. I started in global health when I began working for Médecins sans frontières (MSF) in 1999, a few years out of university. At that time, most people in the field came from medicine or public health, not history or politics, and HIV was out of control – very few people outside the US and Europe had access to treatment. Prior to joining MSF, I had worked briefly with the US Peace Corps on education in rural South Africa, one of the countries hardest hit by HIV/AIDS in the world. I witnessed first-hand the very human consequences of this global crisis in the

host-family that welcomed me, and the ripple effects throughout society of the loss of a teacher, parent or child.

I began to wonder why some of the medical treatments that were available in the North were not accessible in the South. Part of the reason was international patent rules that impeded developing countries from accessing low-cost generic versions of HIV medicines. Those patent laws were the product of decades of power disparities between former colonisers and colonised, between public and private interests. Understanding that health is not only a technical issue that depends on biology, but also the outcome of global power dynamics has driven my interest in the field ever since. Over the last 20 years, the movement for globally equitable access to HIV treatment has demonstrated how civil society mobilisation could profoundly shape public policy. But it was working in China, where there is limited space for public protest, that made me realise how research also had the power to change minds. This experience persuaded me to pursue a PhD.

In 2016, you joined the Graduate Institute after teaching at the Kennedy School of Government and the T.H. Chan School of Public Health at Harvard. Why did you decide to come to Geneva?

As the world's "global health capital", Geneva was a place I came to often for work. What struck me when I first came to the Graduate Institute was the unique place it occupied as an academic institution within the sea of international policy processes constantly swirling around it. Each time I stood outside Petal 2 catching up on the week's events, I felt like a kid in a candy store. So many opportunities to hear new ideas, debate big questions, and meet movers and thinkers! My research was focused on global governance and health, and the Institute's Global Health



USA, Los Angeles. Aerial view of a COVID-19 vaccine site. adamkaz/iStock

Centre was one of a handful of places in the world that approached health as a global political issue. When the opportunity arose to join the Institute – to take a front-row seat as a participant-observer to global governance processes – I jumped at the chance.

You've recently been appointed as the first Professor of Practice at the Institute. What does this new position represent to you and what does it imply for the Graduate Institute?

It's a great honour! The Institute created this faculty category a couple years ago, and to me it represents a commitment to strengthening and institutionalising its place in the world of policy and practice. One of the Institute's truly unique assets is being embedded in the international community, not only in the realm of ideas and knowledge, but also in the day-to-day, on-the-ground practices of global governance. This special relationship between academia and policy is in the DNA of the Institute, which was founded as a scholarly counterpart to the League of Nations.

In academia we continue to struggle with how to protect our intellectual independence and the arms-length vantage point we have on society, without isolating ourselves from it – the perennial ivory tower problem. How can we engage with the world, while retaining the clear-eyed vision to study, understand and explain it? For me, a Professor of Practice

should wrestle productively with this tension, and occupy this sometimes-unsettled sometimes-unsettling middle ground. A Professor of Practice should build a bridge for the bustling two-way traffic of ideas, research questions and forms of knowledge that can flow when we better connect these two worlds together. One way to do this is by intentionally designing our research to inform, and be informed by, efforts to address real world problems.

Global health has been profoundly impacted by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. What do you take away from this crisis?

I suspect we won't grasp the full global effects of COVID-19 for years to come, so I'll limit myself to an obvious takeaway: the utter inadequacy of our international arrangements to protect health. The need for international cooperation has never been clearer – to share information, to ensure access to vaccines, to protect livelihoods – but we keep failing. This is not "just" a health issue. But health has traditionally been a low priority, while economy and security are considered issues of high politics. COVID-19 forced us to see that without health, society cannot function. My hope is that there will be a fundamental shift in thinking: that political leaders will see the need to invest as much political and financial capital in building a stronger global health system as they have in building military alliances or a globalised economy. Let's see what they do.



L'ENSEIGNEMENT

L'antiracisme est une question de démocratie

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou et Davide Rodogno, professeurs d'histoire et politique internationales, ont lancé au début de 2020 un cours intitulé « Une histoire internationale du racisme ». Quelques mois plus tard, le meurtre de George Floyd, un Afro-Américain tué par un policier blanc, provoquait un débat planétaire. Pour eux, le racisme, loin d'être un problème ponctuel, est l'une des forces structurantes des relations internationales.

Comment vous est venue l'idée de ce cours ?

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou Les grands thèmes contemporains – environnement, santé, sécurité – sont traités de manière systématique et systémique, alors que ce grand problème semble absent dans l'enseignement de haut niveau. Nous avons voulu l'aborder dans sa dimension internationale et sur le long terme, à l'inverse des approches ponctuelles, limitées géographiquement à un pays ou un continent.

Davide Rodogno Si nous travaillons sur l'histoire internationale du racisme, il faut aussi aborder celle de nos disciplines académiques. Une grande partie de notre programme des cours tente de réfléchir sur nous-mêmes et notre institution. L'histoire, notre discipline, a souvent flirté avec le racisme. De même pour les autres disciplines de l'Institut. Pour être authentiques, il faut dire aux étudiants que nous aussi, en tant qu'institution, avons un passé. Et, comme dans toutes les institutions, il y a eu des professeurs racistes.

Mahmoud D'ailleurs, la recherche sur cette question est porteuse de racialisation. La discipline des relations internationales, née aux États-Unis il y a un siècle, l'a longtemps ignorée. Aujourd'hui, elle est traitée dans ce que l'on nomme les *area studies*. *African-American studies*, *Asian-American studies*, *Latino studies* induisent toutes la fragmentation d'un savoir donné à la communauté de ceux qui y seraient intéressés de par leur vécu. Cela induit un casting intellectuel. C'est paradoxal : au nom d'une réflexion sur un problème sociétal, on en vient à le reproduire.

À vos yeux, « le racisme est considéré, à tort, comme un effet secondaire des relations internationales alors qu'il en est une force structurante ».

Davide Il est en tout cas un prisme au travers duquel les relations internationales doivent être étudiées. Mais il a été oublié, de manière très confortable et complaisante. Dans n'importe quel autre sujet de recherche, on vous dirait : « Mais pourquoi ignorez-vous l'éléphant dans la pièce ? » Et vous seriez tenu de vous expliquer. Pas pour le racisme. Or il sous-tend une vision des relations internationales basée sur une hiérarchie des civilisations.

Mahmoud La discipline des relations internationales traite cette question avec paternalisme. « C'est bien d'aborder aussi cette question », entend-on souvent. Le terme opérationnel ici est *aussi*. Il y a une norme à laquelle on intègre quelque chose qui n'est pas vu comme légitime. L'histoire du racisme dans les relations internationales est celle d'une

gêne permanente, d'une question perçue comme une expérience émotionnelle vécue à l'échelle d'un individu. Or il y a des dimensions sociétales, internationales et historiques, et il faut en observer le télescopage.

Le meurtre de George Floyd représente-t-il ce télescopage entre un cas individuel et une dimension nationale et internationale ?

Davide En réalité, nous sommes déjà passés par là. Pensez au mouvement des droits civiques dans les années 1960 : ces précédents ont eu une réverbération internationale, et il est inquiétant qu'on les ait oubliés. Mahmoud et moi sommes par conséquent réservés quant à l'avenir de Black Lives Matter (BLM). Oui, le mouvement s'est étendu bien au-delà des frontières américaines suite à la mort d'un individu. Mais les promoteurs de BLM opèrent par sections locales. Cette fragmentation est positive dans la phase militante. Mais elle ne l'est pas lorsqu'il s'agit de trouver une coordination internationale. Nous ne voyons pas l'émergence d'une ONG nommée « BLM International », et l'élan actuel risque de perdre toute sa force s'il ne saisit pas l'occasion de devenir un mouvement de droits humains. Nous nous demandons donc s'il est dans la nature du racisme d'être encore tellement ancré dans un contexte national.

Mahmoud La nature du racisme est de fonctionner à différents niveaux. Y a-t-il un racisme ou des racismes ? Y a-t-il quelque chose qui constitue le racisme de manière intemporelle ? BLM est certes une très bonne nouvelle pour la société américaine qui perpétuait le racisme et normalisait une violence systémique. Mais le talon d'Achille de BLM aux États-Unis tient à sa provincialité : la question américaine est tellement prégnante pour ses acteurs qu'ils ont du mal à l'internationaliser et à la poser dans un cadre, non pas de droits civiques, mais de droits humains. Par ailleurs, l'anti-racisme est vu comme une forme de militantisme. Or les grands thèmes de notre époque – l'environnement ou la santé – nous concernent tous, au même titre que l'antiracisme. C'est une question de démocratie : soit on prend au sérieux les idéaux démocratiques sur le long terme, soit on en fait des campagnes bobos éphémères.

Le populisme représente un autre phénomène majeur de notre époque. Est-ce qu'à vos yeux une politique populiste comporte forcément une dose de racisme ?

Mahmoud Ce sont deux animaux différents mais très liés. Le racisme, dans son programme d'action politique, tend vers l'autoritarisme. De même, le populisme et les dictatures qu'il peut engendrer fonctionnent en fermant des espaces, en rejetant l'altérité. Ces dix dernières années, le racisme se



SUISSE, Genève. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou (à gauche) et Davide Rodogno lors de la manifestation Black Lives Matter. 9 juin 2020.

télescope avec le grand retour de l'autoritarisme au niveau mondial. Cela le rend encore plus insidieux à la faveur d'un contexte où des dirigeants d'États démocratiques – aux États-Unis ou en Europe – veulent comprimer les libertés.

Davide Tous les populistes ne dégèrent pas jusqu'à l'autoritarisme. Certains, parce qu'ils ne sont pas assez puissants, restent dans un contexte démocratique qui les empêche de dévoiler le visage vers lequel ils tendraient naturellement. Mais ces mouvements ont des points communs, comme la xénophobie. Par ailleurs, l'idée d'une société globale dont on parlait dans les années 1990 a aujourd'hui disparu en faveur d'un retour à la notion de souveraineté nationale. Le populisme est forcément ancré dans cette notion. Cela nous ramène à la nature du racisme, phénomène qui se développe avec l'apparition de l'État-nation.

Cet entretien, réalisé par Marc Allgöwer, a été publié dans *Le Temps* du 29 décembre 2020.

Pour lire l'intégralité de l'entretien :
→ www.graduateinstitute.ch/fr/communications/news/lantiracisme-est-une-question-de-democratie



L'ENSEIGNEMENT

Teaching Gender at the Institute

Nicole Bourbonnais

Associate Professor of International History and Politics
Co-Director of the Gender Centre

SENEGAL, Dakar. Women hold banners during a protest against the recent price increase for basic foodstuffs during the traditional workers' May Day march by the CNTS (National Confederation of Senegalese Workers). Workers around the world have made soaring food prices their May Day battle cry. 1 May 2008. Georges GOBET/AFP

Since arriving at the Institute in 2014, I have taught many different subjects, but my courses on gender have sparked some of the most stimulating classroom discussions. Gender ideologies and structures shape global history, politics, law, society, and economics in ways that are exciting to explore in an intellectual sense, but they also impact our daily lives in very concrete ways that cannot be easily disentangled from academic theory. Even the most abstract discussions can feel immensely personal.


This reality can create unique pedagogical challenges. How can we strike the right balance between free expression and sensitivity, objectivity and subjectivity, when dealing with such intimate territory? These challenges, however, can also be productive. As feminist researchers have argued, the intersection between the personal and the intellectual can be a particularly rich site of analysis. In the classroom, the dialogue between the professor, the reading material, and students' lived experiences can take us all to a higher level, forcing us to rethink not only our research agendas but also our own relationships, politics, and social actions.

The Institute offers a rich curriculum on gender to help students navigate these complexities. We have courses on gender and development; gender and international affairs; public policy, economic development and gender; reproductive politics in the 20th and 21st centuries; population and development; gender, sexuality and decolonisation;

women and kinship; religion, politics and sexuality; gender and bodies in global health; gender and international relations; and the sociology of gender. Students in the interdisciplinary programmes can pursue a minor in gender, and most courses are open to students from the disciplinary programmes. The Institute's Executive Education programme offers further courses on gender, including a new course on "gender in the time of pandemics".

The Gender Centre also provides a space for interdisciplinary exchange beyond the classroom. Our Gender Seminar Series (GSS) features research on everything from domestic work to populism to international law. We hold regular public events: last semester, this included a series of lectures on gender and race, and this spring we will hear talks on feminist decolonisation and on sexual violence against men. We are also collaborating with student groups to organise events, and invite PhD students to apply for affiliation with the centre.

Over the years, I have benefited significantly from these activities, as spaces not only to share knowledge but also to learn from others who have challenged my own assumptions and perspective. Indeed, as much as I am a professor, I also consider myself a lifelong student, especially when it comes to the immensely multifaceted field of gender studies.



L'ENSEIGNEMENT

L'enseignement à distance : une opportunité pour une nouvelle ère pédagogique

Cédric Dupont

Professeur de relations internationales/science politique
Président de la formation continue


Alors que s'esquisse une levée progressive des restrictions sanitaires, un brusque retour de manivelle guette l'enseignement en ligne. En effet, l'opinion dominante est que certes il fonctionne, comme une bouée de sauvetage technique, mais au prix de souffrances individuelles et de nouvelles fractures sociales. Il serait donc grand temps de tourner la page et de le ranger au placard. Si tel était le cas, on se priverait d'une formidable opportunité d'avancer vers une nouvelle ère pédagogique. Car les solutions en ligne offrent des perspectives bien plus prometteuses que la « télévision scolaire de degré zéro » que les étudiants ont souvent eu à subir pendant de longues semaines.

Cela nécessite d'une part une adaptation des outils techniques, au-delà de la téléconférence, en privilégiant une plus grande ergonomie d'utilisation, de flexibilité et de « sociabilité ». Ces outils existent déjà et seront amenés à se développer. Mais, d'autre part, et surtout, cela nécessite une réflexion pédagogique plus profonde, notamment sur la question du rythme et des formes d'apprentissage. Une refonte des temps et modes d'interaction est un point de départ, par exemple par la réduction de la longueur moyenne des interfaces synchrones et l'aménagement de temps de pause plus longs. Cela pourrait s'accompagner par davantage de temps pour des interactions asynchrones, sous la forme de classe inversée ou, plus novateur dans des institutions universitaires, par de brefs tutoriels. Mais le temps pourrait également être réalloué à des moments d'échange et de partage

ouverts, optionnels, qui pourraient jouer un rôle pédagogique mais également social.

Car à n'en pas douter, le défi d'un enseignement en ligne, particulièrement dans le cas extrême du tout à distance, est celui de l'atrophie du lien d'humanité entre étudiants et enseignants, et, surtout, entre étudiants. Or, les institutions ont clairement donné la priorité à la continuité de l'enseignement sans se montrer suffisamment attentives ni créatives dans le soutien à un maintien d'interactions d'humanité, notamment hors cours. Même avec des moyens limités, de petites initiatives (ouverture de salles de cours avant l'heure, salles exclusives pour étudiants, temps de méditation) peuvent améliorer le quotidien.

Mais, plus fondamentalement, chaque enseignant, dans une démarche réflexive, devrait questionner sa manière d'enseigner, apprendre à varier ses pratiques, développer une écoute différente, et surtout imaginer un futur éducatif plus flexible et davantage façonnable par chaque étudiant. Dans une telle perspective, les voies ouvertes par les solutions à distance sont enrichissantes, porteuses de changement positif, et non pas seulement un mal nécessaire le temps d'une pandémie.



LES ÉTUDIANTS

Students' Social Innovation Project Wins C4SI 2020 Edition

A team of four Graduate Institute students proposed Radio Hope, a creative solution to provide girls with a learning continuum during the COVID pandemic and beyond. Their proposal was submitted as part of an experiential education programme at Collaborate for Social Impact (C4SI), a design-thinking workshop for graduate students in Switzerland.

"Girls' education has always been close to our hearts", said team members Kirti Jhunjhunwala, Kamran Khan Niazi, Aurelie Semunovic and Devika Vohra about their motivation. "We are a team with diverse backgrounds and strong ties in developing countries. Having seen first-hand the abhorrent condition of education for girls and especially younger girls, we were eager to come up with a solution that had the concrete potential to improve this situation."

The pandemic posed difficulties for children around the world to continue their education, especially online. The UN estimated that 24 million children may be out of school because of COVID-19, with the impact on girls far worse than on boys, especially in developing countries. Thus, Radio Hope's programming was designed to include special sessions on women's hygiene, mental health and general welfare. To attract both children and their parents, the classes would be promoted by female celebrities. In addition, a two-tier incentive system would ensure the audience of both younger girls and their parents.

"Radio Hope is extremely feasible and some form of it has already been implemented in several countries", explained the team. "So we want to work towards ensuring it gets implemented in countries that need it the most, especially during this pandemic. Future steps in order to mobilise this project require converting the idea into a

policy brief, which can be rolled out to potential organisations currently striving to improve girls' education."

The C4SI challenge typically includes eight teams participating under eight challenge setters (including NGOs/IOs), who develop the "challenge" that the teams need to then solve through a social innovation project.

■ The team from the Graduate Institute was guided by mentor and Institute alumnus Karun Gopinath. Samhita S. Ayaluri, an Institute student and President of MentorEd, a student initiative on education at the Institute, and Dr Claire Somerville, Executive Director of the Gender Centre and Lecturer in Interdisciplinary Studies, were co-challenge setters.

LES ÉTUDIANTS

Joint University Initiative Tackles Women's Underrepresentation in Economics

Women in Economics Léman is a joint initiative by PhD candidates at the Graduate Institute, the University of Geneva, the University of Lausanne and EPFL that aims to launch a conversation about the repercussions of systemic gender biases on researchers within the economics field.

In an interview, the initiative's cofounders Laura Nowzohour (PhD candidate in International Economics at the Graduate Institute), Alice Antunes (PhD candidate in Political Economy at the University of Lausanne) and Federica Braccioli (PhD candidate in Economics at the University of Geneva) discuss the important role of their initiative.



Laura Nowzohour (left), Alice Antunes and Federica Braccioli.

Why is there such a shortage of women in economics?

Alice Antunes There are a few different reasons for this. First, academic economics tends to reward men. Articles written by men are more likely to be accepted for publication in top-ranked journals. Economics is also often openly hostile against women – with little accountability for sexual harassment and open racism. Second, there are societal pressures that might keep women from economics. There is a shortage of women in more math-intensive fields, which could be explained by the fact that society rewards people for sticking to stereotypes: women who deviate from the "nurturing and kind" type are often punished for doing so.

What concrete actions have been established by this initiative thus far?

Laura Nowzohour We wanted to understand better the role of gender in economics. During eight workshops and *apéro* sessions last year, we dove deep into some pertinent pain points. Then, we set up a website and a Twitter account where we document and disseminate our activities for greater visibility, while also establishing a community and allies. To support and empower our community of women economists, we also set up a mentoring programme

to improve regional networking and exchanges. Finally, we are seeking institutional change. Our departments, and Professors Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Lore Vandewalle in particular, have been supportive, so we look forward to a fruitful collaboration on implementing ideas to improve inclusion and diversity "at home".

In greater numbers, what will women be able to contribute to this field?

Federica Braccioli As Marianne Bertrand wrote, "[...] it is tempting to say, and many have, that the world would be a kinder – and, in the long-run, better – place if more women were in charge [...]. While I find it hard not to sympathise with this argument, I also fear that it is ultimately counterproductive [...]. Instead, we should strive for a better allocation of talent in society, [regardless of gender identity]." The economic challenges of the 21st century are massive and we cannot afford to ignore the voices of talented women to tackle them. Once the allocation of talent will be fairer, we will be better able to observe women's contributions.

Supporting Talented Students from around the World

Graduate Institute Community Scholarship

BASSIE BONDEVA TURAY is from Freetown, Sierra Leone. He is an alumnus of the United World College Red Cross Nordic in Norway and received his Bachelor in International Relations from the University of Rochester in the United States. He is currently working towards a Master in Development Studies with a focus on Mobilities, Spaces and Cities.



“ I am humbled and deeply grateful to the Institute’s community for awarding me this scholarship. Undoubtedly, I would not have been able to undertake this life-changing opportunity of studying at this world-class institution without it. And with what I stand to benefit from the Institute’s leading and diverse community of faculty and scholars, this award enables me to take a valuable step towards realising my short- and long-term career goals. ”

■ Since 2013, the Graduate Institute community – the Foundation Board, administrative personnel and faculty, as well as retired professors – has mobilised to raise funds that provide a full scholarship for a student from the Global South. These funds are awarded annually as a show of solidarity with the Institute and with those students who would not be able to study in Geneva without financial aid.

Alumni Scholarship

DONGCAI CHEN is pursuing his Master of International Law. From Guangxi province, China, he already holds a Master in International Economic Law. Currently, he is trying to explore more branches of international law and acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the discipline. His desire is to further enrich his theoretical foundation and contemplate ways for enhancing the status quo of human rights and environmental protection in China.



“ It is my dream to study at the Graduate Institute as it is among the foremost international law research centres in the world. This scholarship is literally vital for helping me realise my dream and pursue my ambitious career goal of promoting human rights, environment and other international rules under the Belt and Road Initiative. ”

■ The Alumni Scholarship was established in 2013 to fund the academic and living expenses of a student in financial need for a year. Funds for the scholarship are collected through direct donations on the Alumni Scholarship webpage and also during a raffle and silent auction held at the annual Alumni Reunion, which reunites alumni from around the world each year.

Washington, D.C. Alumni Chapter Scholarship

KULANI ABENDROTH-DIAS is a first-year PhD candidate in International Relations/Political Science. She holds a Master in Social Psychology from Princeton University, and a Master of Science in European Integration, specialising in Economics and Security, from the Institute of European Studies in Brussels, Belgium. Previously, she worked for the UN Development Programme, UN Peacebuilding Fund and UN Institute for Disarmament Research. She is a German national born in Sri Lanka.



“ I am thrilled to have won the Washington, D.C. Alumni Chapter Scholarship as it will allow me to continue my doctoral studies at the Institute, looking at the influence of the development of artificial intelligence and machine-learning technologies on human security. It is particularly relevant for me to explore this interdisciplinary project at the heart of the academic and policy-oriented setting that is international Geneva. ”

■ The Washington, D.C. Alumni Chapter Scholarship was created in 2009 to promote awareness of the Graduate Institute in the United States, while also helping the Institute recruit graduate students of high calibre. The scholarship is available to first-year master or doctoral students – irrespective of nationality – from American universities who wish to study at the Institute. It is awarded based first on academic achievement and secondly on economic need and funds nine months of study.

New York Alumni Chapter Scholarship

PRACHI JHA is from Jamshedpur, India, and is working towards her Master in Development Studies. She holds a dual Bachelor in Psychology and English Literature from Lewis and Clark College. Previously, Prachi worked with high-impact education organisations in India such as Teach for India and Ashoka University. For the last five years, she has been running her own education not-for-profit, Life Lab Foundation.



“ Having worked more than nine years in the field of education with underprivileged communities, I’ve seen how education can transform lives. Thanks to the generous New York Alumni Scholarship, I’m able to embark on this journey myself. With the strong academic foundation in development combined with the professional and personal networks I gain at the Institute, I hope to continue to make a difference in the lives of the most marginalised communities in the world. ”

■ The New York Alumni Chapter Scholarship was created in 2019 to promote awareness of the Graduate Institute in the United States, while also helping the Institute recruit graduate students of high calibre. The scholarship is available to first-year master or doctoral students – irrespective of nationality – from American universities who wish to study at the Institute. It is awarded based first on academic achievement and secondly on economic need and funds nine months of study.

Portraits

DANIEL URBAIN NDONGO (Cameroun)

Directeur de l'Institut de relations internationales du Cameroun

Né en 1965, Daniel Urbain Ndongo commence sa formation par une maîtrise en économie de l'Université de Yaoundé avant de se tourner vers les relations internationales. Il obtient un doctorat à l'Institut des relations internationales du Cameroun (IRIC), un établissement fondé en 1971 avec la participation de l'Institut, alors Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales (IUHEI), et qui s'apprête à célébrer son cinquantième en avril. Devenu cadre à la Direction Europe Amérique, puis chef de service du Courrier et de la Valise diplomatique au Ministère camerounais des relations extérieures, il vient à Genève entre 1999 et 2000 suivre le Programme de spécialisation en diplomatie multilatérale de l'IUHEI, qui donnera un coup d'accélérateur à sa carrière diplomatique



De retour au Cameroun, il est nommé attaché au Cabinet civil de la Présidence de la République par S.E. Paul Biya, Président de la République. Ce sera le début d'une longue et riche expérience au Cabinet du Chef de l'État, qui lui permettra d'affûter ses talents de négociateur et de manager tout en occupant d'autres postes de responsabilité. Entre 2008 et 2020, il dirige en outre la Division de la

coopération à l'ONG internationale des Premières Dames d'Afrique dénommée Synergies africaines contre le SIDA et les souffrances.

Fort de cette expérience qui lui a valu de nombreuses distinctions honorifiques, Daniel Urbain Ndongo a été promu par décret présidentiel directeur de l'IRIC en juillet 2020, avec un triple objectif : renforcer la dimension internationale de l'IRIC, professionnaliser les enseignements pour favoriser l'insertion des diplômés et diplômées dans un monde de plus en plus compétitif, et développer les infrastructures.

Une convention a ainsi été signée avec le Ministère congolais des affaires étrangères portant sur la formation, le recyclage et le perfectionnement du personnel diplomatique du Ministère à l'IRIC, un mémorandum d'entente a été conclu pour la mise en œuvre du Programme de recherche sur la gouvernance globale des forêts et les inégalités entre le Nord et le Sud au Cameroun, coordonné par l'Université de Helsinki et l'Université de Göttingen et financé par la Fondation Volkswagen, et un accord avec la Fondation Konrad Adenauer permettra d'octroyer des bourses. Des personnes professionnelles et expertes des métiers de l'international viendront enrichir le corps enseignant et de nombreux partenariats avec des missions diplomatiques, organisations internationales et entreprises garantiront des stages académiques et professionnels aux étudiant-e-s. Enfin, une bibliothèque moderne numérique et des résidences universitaires devraient aussi voir le jour.

Comme le relève Daniel Urbain Ndongo, sa carrière exemplaire illustre ce que la diplomatie camerounaise et africaine doit à l'Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement de Genève.

JESSICA BYRON-REID

Director of the Institute of International Relations at UWI Trinidad

Jessica Byron-Reid is from Saint Kitts and Nevis (SKN) in the Eastern Caribbean. She pursued undergraduate and initial graduate studies at the University of the West Indies (UWI), the latter taking place at the Institute of International Relations, established in 1966 with support from the Swiss Confederation and the Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, where she completed her PhD in 1990. Her doctoral dissertation on the roles played by regional groupings in Southern African and Central American conflict management in the early 1980s stimulated her long-term interest in the value of regional cooperation for small states.

Jessica's professional journey has been a mix of working for national and regional governments largely in the spheres of diplomacy or education, and for international and regional universities. She initially worked in a nascent SKN Ministry of External Affairs, then moved to London to work for the Eastern Caribbean High Commission, where she learned about national and regional policymaking/implementation and about the diplomatic dynamics of Caribbean small island developing states (SIDS), particularly in the Commonwealth, European Union and UN circuits.

Jessica returned to full-time academia in 1990, moving to The Hague to teach, research and help with the International Institute of Social Studies' graduate programme in International Relations' administration. She also contributed to foreign policy training workshops at the Clingendael Institute – a period of tremendous growth for her.

In 1994 Jessica returned to the Caribbean to teach international relations and in 2016 was appointed as the Director of the Institute of International Relations at UWI Trinidad. She has been consistently engaged in teaching and research collaborations with universities and colleagues in the Greater Caribbean, notably in the French Caribbean, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and the Guianas. For the past 30 years, she has been involved in the training and development of large numbers of Caribbean professionals in international relations and related fields.

She has also worked individually and with several global and hemispheric research and advocacy networks as well as multilateral organisations to contribute to knowledge production by increasing the volume of research-based publications on the Caribbean, Latin America and SIDS. Over the years, she learned of the value of working with both state and non-state bodies for an international relations graduate, as well as nurturing relationships in the policy world, academia and other areas of civil society.




→ www.graduateinstitute.ch/alumni



LA RECHERCHE

Meet Professor Grégoire Mallard, New Director of Research



How would you describe the research works carried out at the Institute in the world panorama?

Our specificity comes from our unique location in the heart of Geneva and from the very specific mix of disciplines and interdisciplinary fields represented at the Institute. This set of disciplines offers enough diversity for us to engage in interdisciplinary dialogue and enough focus to prevent us from stretching too thin. Our researchers all have the unique specificity of also asking questions relevant to ongoing global discussions – for instance about social, racial or gender inequalities, or about territorial, financial, digital or natural vulnerabilities – or to broad ideologies and utopias about governance, democracy and the rule of law. In addition, being located in Geneva with faculty, fellows and students from all over the world means that researchers are connected to many dispersed, international field sites. This combination between the immediate presence of international organisations in Geneva and the vibrant, diverse academic cultures at the Institute is responsible for such intellectual creativity.

What are the strengths and weaknesses of these research works?

I would emphasise how cutting-edge our research is. The number of research grants that the Institute's faculty has managed to attract in the last few years, as well as the first-rate venues in which our faculty and students publish their books and articles, bear witness to such academic excellence. Another strength of the Institute at the present moment is that a new generation of researchers has turned the Institute into their new permanent home. This generation is by definition younger and more diverse, both in terms of nationalities and gender, which is always a good thing to spur intellectual openness, curiosity and cooperation. Still, there are trends we may want to counterbalance. One revolves around the issue of language. In today's world, scientific or academic excellence has come to rhyme with research published in the best English-speaking journals. If we purely follow requirements related to academic excellence, we thus risk moving our research outputs in a purely monolingual direction, and this may be true whether you teach at the Graduate Institute or at any other Swiss university. So we should be able to broaden our intellectual conversations beyond the English-speaking world. It raises the question of how we engage with diverse publics, in different languages and with different objectives, and still follow the goal of academic excellence.

How will you orientate the development of research at the Institute in the next months?

Academic excellence will continue to be our primary objective, and we all know that academic excellence is most often achieved by letting individual researchers freely select their research projects to push the boundaries of knowledge in their own fields. So, there is something inherently self-defeating in seeking to achieve academic excellence by orientating research from the top down. If any orientation is given, it must be done by creating new spaces for dialogue and breaking down walls between researchers themselves, not by imposing new directions. And just on this point, there is a lot that can be done, especially now that we have a new Director, Marie-Laure Salles, who brings with her a new perspective and a new set of priorities. For instance, the Institute funds a lot of extremely creative research at the PhD level, and more could be done to give visibility to our PhD researchers so that they interact with other researchers beyond the traditional confines of the PhD supervisor-supervisee relationship. Another example is how we could imagine new ways for the many thematic research centres to develop new institutional venues for cooperation, but the reflection on how they could share the wealth of experience accumulated on cross-cutting research themes and overlapping sets of issues has yet to be turned into concrete institution-building projects.

Can you observe the impact or the consequences of the pandemic on research topics or on the way to conduct research?

I think that as a community of researchers, the pandemic forces us to really question notions of solidarity and competitiveness between researchers and research universities. These questions require us to re-think, deeply, questions of ethics in the conduct of research, but also about politics, so that we take stock of the fragility of the world that we took for granted: a world in which researchers were free to travel to distant places for fieldwork or conferencing as much as their research funding authorised without questioning either their carbon footprint or quasi-extraterritorial immunity when moving in and out of countries where local researchers were not as free to voice their ideas. The contemporary challenges that not only the pandemic, but also the political response to the pandemic, pose to our globalised academic way of life are not just challenges, but also opportunities for us to re-think how we travel in this world, how we exchange ideas in seminars that can now connect researchers across oceans and continents thanks to digital platforms, and how we relate to our local communities, especially the most vulnerable in our societies. We're just witnessing the beginning of a re-definition of our ways of living and interacting as academics, but it's clear that major changes will come from our response to the crisis. These are difficult but interesting times.

Religion et politique dans le monde contemporain

Jean-François Bayart

Professeur d'anthropologie et sociologie

Titulaire de la chaire Yves Oltramare Religion et politique dans le monde contemporain

Créée en 2013, la chaire Yves Oltramare – son initiateur et mécène – s'est donné pour objet la compréhension des relations complexes entre ce que nous avons pris l'habitude de nommer la « religion » et le « politique », et pour but l'enrichissement du débat public à ce propos. J'ai l'honneur d'en avoir reçu la charge en 2015, après le décès de son premier titulaire, le professeur Martin Riesebrodt, en 2014.



La difficulté de l'exercice, outre le contexte à la fois passionnel et polémique dans lequel il se situe, tient à la double injonction à laquelle sont soumises les sciences sociales. D'une part, elles doivent se garder du piège de la surinterprétation religieuse de faits trivialement sociaux, économiques ou politiques qui parfois se parent du manteau de la croyance pour signifier tout autre chose. Même les pratiques religieuses, telles que les pèlerinages, comportent une part mondaine qui est inassimilable à l'expérience de la transcendance dont parlait un William James (1842-1910). Mais, d'autre part, les sciences sociales doivent aussi prendre acte de l'irréductibilité des logiques intrinsèques de la foi. Leurs concepts ne peuvent appréhender l'expérience de la transcendance car, comme chacun le sait, les Voies du Seigneur sont impénétrables.

En outre, aucun des deux termes que la chaire met en relation ne va de soi. Les catégories intellectuelles de la religion et du politique ne sont apparues dans leur sens contemporain qu'au XIX^e siècle, dans le sillage de la division de l'*ecclesia* au moment de la Réforme, de l'autonomisation de l'État moderne et de sa professionnalisation progressive en Europe. Le terme de religion a longtemps été dépréciatif. Pour les bons chrétiens il désignait l'incroyance, ou la croyance des autres, fautive par définition. Dans le même temps la notion de politique s'est différenciée non seulement de la sacralité – le fameux processus de sécularisation ou de « désenchantement du monde » – mais aussi de l'économique. Non pas que le « marché » soit devenu indépendant de l'État,

mais parce que nous tenons, contre toute évidence, qu'il l'est ou peut l'être. Cela ne signifie pas que nos ancêtres confondaient ces réalités, pensaient que tout est dans tout. Mais ils nommaient autrement que nous ces distinctions et ne les plaçaient pas aux mêmes endroits. On en dira autant des autres « religions » que le christianisme. En dépit d'une mauvaise légende, l'islam a toujours discerné l'État (*dolat*) et la religion (*din*), quitte, pour certains de ses penseurs, à regretter et vouloir effacer leur décalage. À tout cela s'ajoute la disparité de la religion et de la culture, que nous tendons à faire coïncider quand elles s'opposent volontiers, notamment sous la pression des fondamentalismes.

Modernes et supposées rationnelles, les catégories de religion et de politique ne sont pas pour autant explicatives. Le politique est, par excellence, le lieu de conflits d'interprétations ou d'intérêts. La religion n'est pas plus cohérente. Les croyants ne sont jamais d'accord entre eux, que ce soit sur un plan politique ou dans leur conception de la transcendance. Le djihadisme, par exemple, divise les sociétés musulmanes, autant qu'il les oppose à l'« Occident ».

L'erreur est d'imputer à la religion (ou à la culture) une unité et une atemporalité dont elles sont dépourvues, l'une et l'autre. N'existent que des pratiques concrètes, dans des situations et des époques données, pratiques effectives qui sont souvent en dissonance avec les textes sacrés sans que l'on ait à douter de la sincérité des croyants. Ce que nous nommons la religion est d'ordre historique et social, tout comme le politique. Aussi la religion n'est-elle jamais la cause du politique. Il suffit de prendre acte de la diversité des régimes qui se réclament du christianisme, de l'islam, du bouddhisme, de l'hindouisme, du confucianisme – ou qui sont associés à ces courants de pensée – pour l'admettre. Narendra Modi n'est pas le Mahatma Gandhi...

Simultanément, le politique ne se dissocie pas complètement de la religion, et la laïcité ne change rien à l'affaire. Point de relation d'extranéité entre les deux dimensions, mais un rapport d'engendrement mutuel, au prix d'une tension permanente. L'État moderne est né au



1. Entretien avec Eric Fassin : « Genre, conservatisme religieux et instrumentalisation des libertés ».

XVI^e siècle de la matrice du Saint-Siège, tel que l'avait institutionnalisé la réforme grégorienne, au XI^e siècle. De nos jours la République islamique d'Iran a paradoxalement promu la prééminence de la raison d'État sur la raison religieuse. L'État-nation a souvent favorisé une définition ethno-religieuse de sa citoyenneté, parfois au grand dam des autorités spirituelles elles-mêmes. Ainsi, aujourd'hui, de la réprobation du Vatican face à l'instrumentalisation du catholicisme par un Matteo Salvini. De son côté l'État affecte le champ religieux en contribuant à sa bureaucratization et en lui imposant ses politiques publiques dans des domaines qui lui sont chers, comme la famille, l'éducation, la santé, l'état-civil, les mœurs. Dieu et César sont comme deux larrons en foire.

Pour démêler ces réalités complexes dans le contexte contemporain la chaire Yves Oltramare récuse toute interprétation culturaliste, inévitablement illusoire, et les resitue à l'aune tamisée de la sociologie historique et comparée du politique. On y perd en sensationnel et en facilité, mais on y gagne en profondeur et souvent en perplexité.

Les entretiens de la chaire Yves Oltramare

La chaire Yves Oltramare a pour ambition d'associer à son animation scientifique les étudiant-e-s de master, les doctorant-e-s et les postdoctorant-e-s de l'Institut (et au-delà). Ces entretiens leur offrent l'opportunité de dialoguer avec des personnalités de la recherche que la Chaire invite à réfléchir sur l'interaction complexe entre le religieux et le politique dans le monde contemporain.




2. Entretien avec Sophie Schrago : « Islam, genre et politique : filmer des militantes musulmanes en Inde ».

3. Entretien avec Alessandro Jedlowski : « Dimension de l'occulte dans le cinéma africain contemporain ».

Retrouvez les entretiens sur cette page :

→ www.graduateinstitute.ch/fr/discover-institute/support-institute/chaire-yves-oltramare

Nouvelles publications




University of Toronto Press. April 2021. 208 p.



Cambridge University Press. June 2021. 250 p.




Chinese version: Beijing: Law Press. 2020.
Russian version: Moscow: Pero Press. 2020.



Brill | Nijhoff. 2020. xvi, 291 p.



eLivres de l'Institut 7. Graduate Institute Publications. Janvier 2021.



Translated from the French by Patrick Camiller. Berghahn. 2020. 148 p.

BUTINAGE: THE ART OF RELIGIOUS MOBILITY

Yvan **Droz**, Yonatan N. **Gez**, Jeanne **Rey** and Edio **Soares**

Based on comparative ethnographic research in four countries and three continents, this book explores the notion of “religious butinage” as a conceptual framework intended to shed light on the dynamics of everyday religious practice. Derived from the French word *butiner*, which refers to the foraging activity of bees and other pollinating insects, this term is employed by the authors metaphorically to refer to the “to-ing and fro-ing” of believers between religious institutions.

Focused on urban, predominantly Christian settings in Brazil, Kenya, Ghana, and Switzerland, *Butinage* examines commonalities and differences across the four case studies and identifies religious mobility as located at the meeting points between religious-institutional rules and narratives, social norms, and individual agency and practice. Drawing on anglophone, francophone and lusophone academic traditions, this monograph is dedicated to a dialogue between ethnographic findings and theoretical ideas, and explores how we may rethink common conceptions of religious normativity.

MULTIMODAL POLITICAL NETWORKS

James **Hollway**, Dimitris **Christopoulos**, Mario **Diani** and David **Knoke**

This book synthesises new understandings of multimodal political networks: what they are, how to measure and analyse them, and what they can reveal about political structures and actions. Multimodal networks consist of two or more types of social entities, such as individual or collective actors or physical or virtual objects, and the relations connecting them. Complexity arises because actors interact with one another not only directly, but also indirectly through other modes. A primary purpose of this book is to draw the attention of political theorists and researchers to new tools for extending political network research into multimodal realms and revitalising established domains. *Multimodal Political Networks* introduces key theoretical concepts of fields, arenas and social spaces, offers a primer on one-, two- and three-mode network analysis, and demonstrates the wide applicability of these advances through chapters on agency and political entrepreneurship, public policy, civil society, social movements, international relations and legislative influence.

THE MALVINAS/ FALKLANDS BETWEEN HISTORY AND LAW *REFUTATION OF THE BRITISH PAMPHLET “GETTING IT RIGHT: THE REAL HISTORY OF THE FALKLANDS/ MALVINAS”*

Marcelo G. **Kohen** and Facundo D. **Rodriguez**

Las Malvinas entre el Derecho y la Historia, published in 2015 by the University of Buenos Aires publisher Eudeba and translated in English in 2017, is now also available in Chinese and Russian. In 2008, two British authors published a pamphlet entitled “Getting it Right: The Real History of the Falklands/Malvinas”. Since then, a variety of versions of this pamphlet have been published, one of them officially distributed by the British government in the United Nations Decolonization Committee in June 2015. Marcelo Kohen and Facundo Rodriguez refute each of the new British arguments, both from the historical and legal point of view. Their book gives the reader first-hand information about all aspects of this longstanding dispute, much of it hitherto not exploited in the abundant bibliography. It is an indispensable source for understanding the positions of the parties to the dispute, whose solution is still pending.

FLEXIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CONCILIATION REVISITED

Edited by Marcelo **Kohen** and Christian **Tomuschat**

In recent years, the tendency has been to settle international disputes by informal methods. Among those methods conciliation has seen a successful revival, after many years of decline, in the case of *Timor Leste v. Australia*, while inter-State complaint proceedings under the UN-sponsored human rights treaties have unexpectedly reached their merits stage of conciliation.

The present book takes stock of these developments by portraying, at the same time, the potential of the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, which still remains to be fully activated. Additionally, the contributions reach out to geographical areas in Africa and Asia. An analysis of the relevant procedural mechanisms completes the study to which 14 authors from nine different countries, including Professor Jorge **Viñuales**, have contributed.

INDONÉSIE : L'ENVOI MOUVEMENTÉ DU GARUDA DÉVELOPPEMENT, DICTATURE ET DÉMOCRATIE

Jean-Luc **Maurer**

Quatrième pays le plus peuplé de la planète, puissance économique émergente majeure ayant une position stratégique clef et plus grande démocratie du monde musulman, l'Indonésie reste néanmoins fort méconnue. Cet ouvrage a pour objectif de contribuer à une meilleure connaissance dans la sphère francophone de cet important pays à travers l'histoire de son développement économique, social et politique, aussi mouvementée qu'emblématique dans ses succès ou ses échecs. Il se concentre sur les péripéties de ce processus de développement au fil des 75 ans écoulés depuis la proclamation d'indépendance du pays jusqu'à nos jours, où il est confronté aux ravages de la pandémie de COVID-19. La nature emblématique du cas examiné résulte non seulement du fait que l'Indonésie, partie de très bas, a fait d'énormes progrès sur le plan économique et social, mais aussi de la relation complexe et ambiguë entretenue entre ce développement, la dictature et la démocratie, les deux régimes politiques sous lesquels elle a vécu depuis 1945. L'analyse de ce lien en « 3D » constitue le fil rouge du livre.

HOMO ITINERANS TOWARDS A GLOBAL ETHNOGRAPHY OF AFGHANISTAN

Alessandro **Monsutti**

Afghan society has been marked in a lasting way by war and the exodus of part of its population, but also by the presence of a myriad of international and nongovernmental organisations, as well as armed forces from many countries. *Homo itinerans* comes in many ways. The movement of refugees trying to get to Europe, Australia or North America is matched by the flow of experts who exercise their talents in Afghanistan after having been in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine or East Timor. The latter travel from North to South and promote social and political norms supposed to be universal; the former move in the opposite direction and unmask through their mobility the inequitable distribution of resources, whether it is economic well-being or the possibility of living in security.

Adopting mobility as an analytical key, playing with scales, this book offers a decentred perspective on the contemporary world, bringing the readers from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to Europe, North America and Australia.

→ <https://doi.org/10.4000/books.iheid.7876>

Nouvelles publications




Cambridge University Press. April 2021. 640 p.

THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUGO GROTIUS

Edited by Janne E. **Nijman** and Randall **Lesaffer**

This volume offers a comprehensive overview of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) for students, teachers and general readers, while its chapters also draw upon and contribute to recent specialised discussions of Grotius’s oeuvre and its later reception.

Contributors cover the width and breadth of Grotius’s work and thought, ranging from his literary work, including his historical, theological and political writing, to his seminal legal interventions. While giving these various fields a separate treatment, the book also delves into the underlying conceptions and outlooks that formed Grotius’s intellectual map of the world as he understood it, and as he wanted it to become, giving a new political and religious context to his forays into international and domestic law.



Bloomsbury. 2020. 304 p.

GLOBALIZING THE U.S. PRESIDENCY *POSTCOLONIAL VIEWS OF JOHN F. KENNEDY*

Cyrus **Schayegh**

Using John F. Kennedy as a central figure and reference point, this volume explores how postcolonial citizens viewed the US president when peak decolonisation met the Cold War. Exploring how their appropriations blended with their own domestic and regional realities, the chapters span sources, cases and languages from Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe to explore the history of US and third world relations in a way that pushes beyond US-centric themes.

Examining a range of actors, *Globalizing the U.S. Presidency* studies various political, sociocultural and economic domestic and regional contexts during the Cold War era, and explores themes such as appropriation, antagonism and contestation within decolonisation. Attempting to both de-americanise and globalise John F. Kennedy and the US presidency, the chapters examine how the perceptions of the president were fed by everyday experiences of national and international postcolonial lives. The many examples of worldwide interest in the US president at this time illustrate that this time was a historical turning point for the role of the US on the global stage. The hopes and fears of peaking decolonisation, the resulting pressure on Washington, Moscow and other powers, and a new mediascape together ushered in a more comprehensive globalisation of international politics, and a new meaning to “the United States in the world”.





EXECUTIVE EDUCATION
SDGS IMPACT THE FUTURE OF WORK: ARE YOU READY?

Make sense of the new environment
 Embark with us and grow your ability to operate under uncertainty. Bridge academic insights with your reality. Identify the challenges you face to ensure you/your organisation are/is equipped with the skills and knowledge needed to make a sustainable impact.

Join us and start your learning journey!

More at
www.graduateinstitute.ch/executive



Éditeur: Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement
 CP 1672 – CH-1211 Genève 1 | Tél.: +41 22 908 57 00 | graduateinstitute.ch
 Responsable d'édition: Sophie Fleury, sophie.fleury@graduateinstitute.ch
 Crédits photographiques:
 Couverture: CHINA, Shanghai. An aerial view of a shanty town with old houses next to clusters of modern high-rise residential apartment buildings.
 7 December 2016. Shen CHUNCHEN/Imaginechina via AFP.
 P. 8, 9, 10, 37, 44-45, 51: Gérald SCIBOZ.
 P. 13: iStock/narvikk.
 P. 34: iStock/Montes-Bradley.
 Impression: Jullierat Chervet
 © The Graduate Institute, Geneva, March 2021 | ISSN: 1662-8497