

GLOBE

L'INSTITUT

Marie-Laure Salles,
nouvelle directrice
de l'Institut

DOSSIER

The New Frontiers
of Risk



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L'INSTITUT

Rencontre avec Marie-Laure Salles, nouvelle directrice de l'Institut

Vous avez pris vos fonctions le 1^{er} septembre 2020. Pourquoi avez-vous accepté de prendre la direction de l'Institut ?

J'admire depuis longtemps l'IHEID. J'admire la qualité de son corps professoral, l'excellence mais aussi la pertinence de la recherche qui est produite à l'Institut. Dans un monde où les problèmes deviennent de plus en plus complexes, interconnectés et transnationaux par nature, le regard international et transdisciplinaire qui est la marque de l'Institut est de plus en plus incontournable. Dans un monde où la collaboration internationale est mise à mal alors qu'on en a plus que jamais besoin, l'Institut représente un hub intellectuel important pour la nécessaire réinvention de cette collaboration. Je me réjouis à l'idée d'écrire, avec l'ensemble de l'équipe et tous nos partenaires, cette nouvelle page de l'histoire de l'Institut. C'est un défi que j'accepte avec enthousiasme mais aussi avec beaucoup d'humilité.

Comment pensez-vous mettre votre expertise en management et innovation au service de l'Institut et de son rayonnement en Suisse et à l'international ?

Le management est un outil, et comme tous les outils son efficacité dépend de la manière dont il est manié. J'ai beaucoup étudié le management en tant que chercheuse – une partie de mes travaux de recherche s'est attachée à

construire, de fait, une sociologie du management, que je décris parfois comme la « religion » du XX^e siècle. À partir des années 1920 nous avons progressivement managé de plus en plus de sphères de nos vies – l'entreprise mais aussi le foyer, puis l'université et l'hôpital, les services publics, le sport, les organisations culturelles, voire même l'église, et jusqu'à nos vies, nos conflits et nos amours. J'ai aussi beaucoup managé moi-même, dans ce monde particulier qu'est le monde académique où les logiques de management entrent parfois en discussion, si ce n'est en conflit, avec les logiques de collégialité qui ont longtemps caractérisé l'Université. Je pense que ce double regard – celui, pragmatique, de l'acteur et celui, réflexif, du chercheur – me permet d'avoir aujourd'hui une maîtrise intéressante de cet outil. J'en vois l'utilité mais aussi les limites et les dangers ; je l'utilise sans tomber dans le fétichisme. C'est de fait un peu la même chose avec l'innovation. C'est un outil important lorsqu'on sait le manier, là aussi sans tomber dans le fétichisme qui a toujours un effet boomerang. On voit souvent des entreprises s'épuiser à travers une injonction perpétuelle d'innovation qui, lorsqu'elle n'est pas inscrite dans un projet qui lui donne sens, génère souvent une forte démotivation chez les collaborateurs. C'est cet écueil qu'il faut éviter tout en trouvant les moyens de déclencher une réflexivité créative à tous les niveaux de l'organisation conduisant à une innovation saine et durable.

Vous êtes spécialiste de la gouvernance d'entreprise, de l'éthique et de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises. Comment un institut universitaire comme le nôtre peut-il innover dans ces domaines ?

Dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, les frontières entre le public, le privé et les organisations non gouvernementales sont de plus en plus fluides et changeantes. Qui plus est, les grandes organisations – les entreprises en particulier, mais les ONG aussi – ont à la fois une existence très locale, ancrée dans des environnements régionaux ou nationaux, et une projection transnationale. Dans ce contexte transnational, le politique et la gouvernance sont toujours plus des espaces partagés où les multinationales, notamment, jouent un rôle important. Un Institut comme le nôtre doit bien sûr se saisir de cette évolution, des questions qu'elle pose mais aussi des opportunités qu'elle peut présenter pour déployer des solutions durables et actionnables à tous les grands problèmes et enjeux de notre siècle.

Comment voyez-vous l'évolution de notre Institut dans le paysage académique international et quelles sont vos priorités pour le début de votre mandat ?

Avant toutes choses, nous devons définir qui nous sommes ou plutôt qui nous souhaitons être, en cohérence avec notre histoire et notre identité, dans ce monde complexe et toujours plus incertain qui est le nôtre. C'est cette cohérence d'identité et de projet qui fera ensuite notre force dans l'environnement coopétitif international. Il faut souligner comment notre monde académique aujourd'hui combine les logiques de compétition classiques avec des logiques de collaboration toujours plus importantes. Avoir une identité forte et savoir l'affirmer est à la fois un puissant atout dans le jeu compétitif et un facteur d'attraction qui nous donne une place de choix dans les dynamiques de collaboration. C'est ainsi que j'envisage l'avenir de l'Institut dans le paysage académique international – comme un acteur très clairement identifiable, à « forte personnalité », dont le rôle et la présence sont remarquables, remarqués et recherchés.

Selon vous, quelles compétences les étudiants doivent-ils développer pour relever les défis d'aujourd'hui et de demain ?

Ce monde étrange et souvent inquiétant qui est le nôtre va en effet exiger des compétences très particulières chez nos étudiants qui s'apprentent à devenir les décideurs de demain. Il leur faut plus que jamais développer un esprit critique – savoir penser par eux-mêmes et non pas à travers des schémas prédéfinis qui sont susceptibles de devenir obsolètes du jour au lendemain. Le regard des sciences sociales dans une perspective transdisciplinaire qui est à la base de notre pédagogie à l'Institut reste le meilleur garant pour développer un véritable esprit critique. Dans la même logique, il va leur falloir aussi apprendre à intégrer l'incertitude comme une donnée du monde à venir et donc des contextes dans lesquels ils seront amenés à prendre des décisions. On parle bien d'incertitude et pas de risque ; au contraire du risque, on ne peut pas mesurer, estimer, l'incertitude et par conséquent il est impossible de s'y préparer sauf à l'intégrer comme une donnée structurante de notre manière de voir le monde. Cela n'y paraît pas mais c'est une révolution assez profonde de notre manière d'appréhender les questions là où il y a encore quelques mois l'on avait plutôt tendance à penser que tout problème était modélisable, compréhensible grâce à la puissance des données et transformable, là aussi par le miracle des technologies décisionnelles, en solutions.

Nos étudiants, et nos futurs décideurs, doivent en outre apprendre à assumer leurs responsabilités. Le monde de ces dernières décennies s'est écrit comme un monde de « responsabilité limitée » et l'on a oublié que l'autre face du pouvoir et du leadership est la responsabilité assumée ! Il est temps de revenir à nos fondamentaux. Cette prise de responsabilité exige bien sûr du courage, et dans un monde où le management par la peur semble devenir une logique de gouvernement (au sens où Michel Foucault employait ce terme) le courage est une qualité qu'il va falloir toujours davantage encourager et entretenir.

Enfin, la curiosité, mère de la créativité, me semble une compétence de plus en plus indispensable. Sans cette envie d'inconnu et d'exploration, il me semble difficile d'envisager comment nous pourrions trouver des solutions aux questions profondes qui tourmentent notre monde !



Marie-Laure Salles succède à Philippe Burrin, qui a dirigé l'Institut durant 16 années.

Avant de rejoindre l'Institut, Marie-Laure Salles était professeure des universités au Centre de sociologie des organisations de Sciences Po Paris et doyenne de l'École du management et de l'innovation à Sciences Po, école qu'elle a fondée en 2016. Auparavant, elle avait été doyenne de la faculté, doyenne du programme doctoral et responsable du Centre de recherche sur le capitalisme, la globalisation et la gouvernance à l'École supérieure des sciences économiques et commerciales (ESSEC Business School) à Paris, tout en y occupant un poste de professeure.

Marie-Laure Salles est titulaire d'un doctorat en sociologie de l'Université Harvard et d'une habilitation à diriger les recherches de l'Université Dauphine. Ses travaux explorent, dans une perspective historique et comparative, l'évolution et la gouvernance du capitalisme, les questions d'éthique et de responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise, le rôle des réseaux dans la diffusion des normes, pratiques et idées, et les dynamiques de gouvernance, en particulier transnationales, de l'action économique.

Marie-Laure Salles a été professeure invitée dans de nombreuses institutions académiques de prestige aux États-Unis et en Europe. Elle connaît bien l'Institut puisqu'elle y a été, durant une année, professeure et chercheuse invitée au Centre sur la gouvernance globale. Elle est titulaire d'un doctorat *honoris causa* de l'Université de Stockholm et est par ailleurs chevalier de la Légion d'honneur.

« Notre époque est radicale. Je rejoins l'Institut à un moment où il est urgent pour les organisations et les institutions de se réinventer. Le monde de l'enseignement supérieur vit un tournant alors que la collaboration internationale doit être profondément repensée. Ce double défi est exaltant. Je me réjouis de m'en saisir avec l'ensemble de l'équipe et tous nos partenaires. »



L'INSTITUT

Saskia Sassen Receives the 2020 Edgar de Picciotto International Prize

The 2020 Edgar de Picciotto International Prize was awarded to Saskia Sassen during the opening lecture of the academic year on 15 September.

Saskia Sassen is the Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology at Columbia University and a Member of Columbia University's Committee on Global Thought, which she chaired until 2015. She is a student of cities, immigration and states in the world economy, with inequality, gendering and digitisation three key variables running through her work.

Professor Sassen has published eight books and in addition, she is the editor or co-editor of four books, that have been translated into over 20 languages. She has received many awards and honours, among them multiple *doctor honoris causa*, the 2013 Prince of Asturias Award for Social Sciences, an election to the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the title *Chevalier de l'Ordre des Arts et Lettres* of the French Republic. She has also been a committed and influential participant in the public debate, appearing in many journals, including *The Guardian*, *The New York Times*, *Le Monde*, *Die Zeit* and the *Financial Times*, among others.

On this occasion, Professor Sassen delivered the opening lecture of the new academic year, entitled "Can Complexity Camouflage Violence?", by videoconference. Her lecture focused on modes of power, and how those that we think of as positive should increasingly be recognised as acts of violence. Focusing on the sector of high finance, Professor Sassen stated: "The intermediary is the actor in our economy that rarely loses. The ones that end up losing are the originator and the final buyer." Denouncing the proliferation of extractive intermediaries,

she declared our current period to be increasingly drawn to complexity, saying that "complexity functions as a secret we need to disrupt". On a positive note, Marie-Laure Salles, the Institute's new director who introduced and moderated the discussion, underlined that the COVID crisis is one of the moments in which we can consciously change our way of living.

■ The Edgar de Picciotto International Prize was created as a tribute and token of thanks to Edgar de Picciotto who, along with his family, gifted a generous contribution for the realisation of the Edgar and Danièle de Picciotto Student House, which hosts students coming from all over the world to the Graduate Institute. The Prize, awarded every two years, is intended to reward an internationally renowned academic whose research has contributed to the understanding of global challenges and whose work has influenced policymakers.

The Prize was first awarded in 2012 to Amartya Sen, who is the 1998 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. It was subsequently awarded in 2014 to Saul Friedländer, Emeritus Professor at the University of California Los Angeles and recipient of the 2008 Pulitzer Prize, in 2016 to Paul Krugman, winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, and in 2018 to Joan Wallach Scott, Emerita Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University.

Beth Krasna, Vice-Chairwoman of the Foundation Board, gives the 2020 Edgar de Picciotto International Prize to Saskia Sassen

Hommages à Philippe Burrin



Philippe Burrin est parti à la retraite le lundi 31 août 2020 après avoir dirigé l'Institut durant 16 années, d'abord comme directeur de l'Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales (HEI) puis de l'Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID), suite à la fusion en 2008 de HEI et de l'Institut universitaire d'études du développement (IUED). Ancien étudiant de l'Institut, il y a enseigné en qualité de professeur d'histoire internationale de 1993 à 2004. Ses travaux, qui ont été traduits en plusieurs langues, portent sur l'histoire européenne du XX^e siècle, en particulier sur le fascisme, le nazisme et l'antisémitisme. Il a reçu de nombreux prix, dont le Max-Planck Forschungspreis en 1997.

Philippe Burrin, professeur et directeur de thèse

En 1992-93, j'étais en troisième année de licence HEI. Philippe Burrin avait 40 ans et la *gravitas* du professeur expérimenté. Il donnait un enseignement obligatoire à la salle AC – l'auditorium Jacques-Freymond – sur l'histoire des relations internationales entre la fin du XIX^e siècle et 1945. Il arrivait peu avant le début de la leçon, décontracté. Avec une voix basse, il racontait l'histoire de manière accessible et captivante. Philippe Burrin abordait les guerres, les nationalismes, les migrations, les régimes autoritaires et totalitaires, les colonialismes et les génocides. Il entrelaçait les événements, les acteurs, et multipliait les perspectives. Il savait faire des gros plans et des vues d'ensemble. Son style avait du Stanley Kubrick et du Martin Scorsese : évocateur, net et tranchant. Philippe aimait provoquer, cela n'a pas changé. Il était redouté, surtout comme examinateur. Sa sévérité n'était point gratuite : elle avait pour but de nous pousser à faire le mieux possible. Il fut un directeur de thèse franc et direct. Ses critiques désorientaient et forçaient à se remettre en question. Entrer dans son bureau pour recevoir son commentaire d'un chapitre était comme une douche écossaise, ô combien nécessaire, qui me préparait, sans que j'en aie conscience, à affronter les obstacles et les critiques de la carrière académique.

Les séminaires de Philippe Burrin avaient lieu les mardis à 8 heures du matin et seuls celles et ceux vraiment motivés y participaient. Je ne l'ai jamais vu avec une note, un livre, une photocopie, qu'il enseigne l'histoire du nazisme, des

régimes autoritaires et des totalitarismes, des migrations, de l'antisémitisme et des racismes ou des occupations militaires de Napoléon à nos jours. Dans les petites salles de la villa Barton, toujours assis, il croisait l'histoire avec l'économie, le droit, la sociologie et les sciences politiques. Il incarnait l'esprit de l'Institut. *La France à l'heure allemande*, livre de sa consécration, montre toute la finesse et l'originalité des analyses d'un historien dont la plume cisèle avec une précision chirurgicale, d'un chercheur qui sait s'aventurer dans les zones grises, celles des accommodements et des ambiguïtés de la nature humaine. L'homme, réservé et insondable, contraste avec l'historien de *Ressentiment et apocalypse*, qui nous a raconté si bien *Hitler et les Juifs*.

Pendant les trois dernières décennies, j'ai souvent cherché à lire entre les lignes du sarcasme et de l'humour caustique de Philippe. J'ai voulu décoder les émotions qu'il garde bien au fond de ses yeux vifs et impénétrables : temps perdu. En revanche, depuis longtemps je sais que je peux compter sur un mentor à la présence discrète mais bienveillante et clairvoyante. Un oiseau rare. Je rends hommage à mon directeur de thèse, collègue et directeur, historien remarquable et bâtisseur sagace et éclairé d'un Institut tourné vers l'avenir – un homme d'une intelligence extraordinaire.

DAVIDE RODOGNO

Professeur d'histoire internationale



Philippe Burrin, directeur

Philippe Burrin incarne l'efficacité éclairée et la calme ténacité. J'ai travaillé tout au long de ma carrière professionnelle avec un grand nombre de directeurs, à la fois dans le secteur public et privé. Philippe est sans hésitation le directeur le plus efficace jamais rencontré. Il n'a jamais bénéficié de l'aide de la traditionnelle myriade d'assistants ou de consultants et s'est toujours abstenu de citer en permanence chiffres ou rapports d'experts ou encore de se vanter de maîtriser toutes les situations.

Aux belles paroles, il a préféré les belles actions qu'il a menées avec une inébranlable opiniâtreté. Ainsi, il a permis à l'interdisciplinarité, qui crée des réponses inattendues, de se développer ; il a mis en place un système de bourses destinées aux étudiants des sociétés moins favorisées afin qu'ils se préparent à des carrières internationales dans l'espoir de faire évoluer le monde ; il a fondé, à côté des traditionnels départements académiques, des centres de recherche dédiés à l'étude des grands défis du monde ; il a enfin œuvré pour mieux intégrer la diversité dans nos structures, conscient cependant que les habitudes prennent du temps à évoluer.

L'asymétrie existe dans nos systèmes de gouvernance et les directeurs connaissent mieux que les membres des conseils stratégiques les situations parfois complexes et les détails des procédures à respecter. Conscient de cela, Philippe a développé pour le Conseil de fondation de l'Institut, qui se renouvelle régulièrement, des synthèses de

grandes clarté et objectivité. Celles-ci nous ont permis, tout au long de ces années, d'avoir des débats engagés, intelligents et souvent passionnants, que nous n'oublions pas.

On peut s'interroger sur les raisons d'un tel succès dans une institution au sein de laquelle Philippe a passé presque toute sa vie. L'explication se trouve peut-être dans le dernier rapport annuel où il a souligné : « Ce qui définit ultimement une institution, ce sont les valeurs qu'elle porte et qui animent l'action des personnes qui lui consacrent leur énergie et leur intelligence. »

Au nom du Conseil de fondation et de tous ses amis, je remercie Philippe Burrin pour ses années passées à l'Institut. D'abord comme professeur qui s'est fait un nom dans le milieu académique grâce à ses travaux sur les grands fléaux du XX^e siècle, puis comme directeur d'une institution à laquelle il a su donner les bases d'une solide organisation, mais aussi une cohésion et des valeurs, sans jamais occulter les difficultés rencontrées.

Tu peux être fier, Philippe, des grands succès que tu as accomplis.

ROLF SOIRON

Président du Conseil de fondation

Philippe Burrin avec Kofi Annan, ancien secrétaire général des Nations Unies et alumnus, lors de la conférence d'ouverture de l'année académique 2013-2014.



Philippe Burrin, Gender Champion

Elisabeth Prügl (right) with Arancha Gonzalez, former Executive Director of the ITC, at a roundtable on gender parity organised at Maison de la paix.

Philippe Burrin is a certified gender champion. You will find his face on the website of the International Gender Champions initiative, and it has been there from its beginnings five years ago. How does one become a gender champion? The answer may be somewhat disappointing since it essentially means joining what my Graduate Institute colleague Anna Leander calls a “whitelist” (as opposed to a blacklist). In other words, not much is needed to qualify except to commit yourself to good work in the future, in this case three pledges, including that you will not be participating in all-male panels.

But Philippe Burrin is not just a whitelisted gender champion, he deserves a true certification as an ally of feminist causes. Indeed, when comparing the faculty at the Graduate Institute today to that at the time of the merger in 2008, the Burrin years achieved no less than a revolution. At the time, the old HEI and the old IUED had two female professors each (though IUED, unlike HEI, had five female lecturers in addition, two of whom were specifically recruited to teach gender and development). In other words, the faculty of the new Institute was largely male; it was also almost entirely white and mostly senior. But over the past 12 years, old white men have had to yield significantly to women and young scholars. With 35 percent of female professors, the Graduate Institute today is among the top performers on gender diversity among Swiss universities. Moreover, there is now a cohort of junior and mid-level colleagues, and a faculty somewhat less white and more diverse with regard to origin. This did not just happen by chance, but required leadership.

Gender and diversity issues have become a matter of institutional interest beyond faculty appointments. Philippe Burrin enabled the creation of the Gender Centre in 2010 (with some serious nudging from the feminist


faculty), helping make visible feminist research conducted in the Institute’s five disciplinary departments. He supported the establishment of the anti-harassment network Antenne H in 2015, giving the Institute a mode of intervention in cases of sexual harassment and bullying. In 2019, he backed the setting up of the Gender and Diversity Commission, creating a locus of strategic thinking and topical action on the matter. With regard to curriculum, he championed required gender courses in the interdisciplinary masters (MINT) programmes, and students can today earn a certification in gender studies in conjunction with their degrees.

Philippe Burrin, of course, is well-known for exercising forceful leadership. When the Institute missed targets for female hires doing it the slow way (i.e. by recruiting assistant professors who would gradually work themselves up the ladder), he convinced the Foundation Board to use the power of the purse and offer lines to departments to hire senior female colleagues. Their arrival over the past few years has decisively changed the culture of the Institute. Convinced of the need to create awareness on gender issues, he intervened in gender-blind curriculum revisions for the MINT programmes to suggest mandatory gender courses. Such unexpected interventions sometimes caused whiplash, but they certainly were effective.

As he turns over the helm of leadership, he leaves behind the infrastructure for making the Institute a place where difference is not only seen as a problem but celebrated as a matter of richness.

ELISABETH PRÜGL

Professor of International Relations/Political Science
Co-Director of the Gender Centre



Philippe Burrin, entrepreneur de la Cité

Qui est-il? Un homme inquiet, de ceux qui doutent, qui cherchent à comprendre. De l’espèce des sceptiques jubilatoires que les noirceurs du monde n’étonnent pas, qui sait mieux que d’autres ce que des hommes peuvent faire à d’autres hommes. Qui trouve dans son pessimisme la passion d’agir. Qui aurait pensé que ce Valaisan, homme de savoir, parti de son village pour le Collège de France, s’arrêterait à Genève pour devenir un entrepreneur de la Cité?

Je l’ai vu s’élancer. Il était professeur, homme redouté, écouté, aimé, historien de haut vol. Il est devenu directeur. Puis, étape par étape, visage de l’IHEID, incarnant à lui tout seul, contre vents et marées, la nouvelle institution et ses ambitions. C’était les années 2000. Il a compris alors qu’un bâtiment peut être bien plus qu’un objet: un sujet frémissant, capable de vivre, de donner à ses usagers le goût d’étudier, d’oser, le courage d’être eux-mêmes. Qu’un campus est bien plus qu’un lieu: un récit qui, avec la mémoire accumulée, avec les objets et le territoire, donne à imaginer la possibilité d’un autre avenir. Un dispositif d’émancipation plutôt que de contrôle. Voir, imaginer, puis faire, donc convaincre, séduire, forcer le passage, bousculer ceux qui doivent être bousculés, oser. Il l’a fait et le résultat vit dans la ville. En plus cela rapporte. Qui dit mieux? Ainsi sont nées la Maison de la paix, la Maison des étudiants, bientôt la nouvelle résidence, et la villa Barton rénovée, devant laquelle il y a longtemps l’attendait sa BMW noire. Quel aurait été le chantier suivant? Seule la retraite pouvait l’arrêter.

Qui est-il? « Dans chaque homme, il y a toujours deux hommes et le plus vrai, c’est l’autre », disait Borges. L’autre Philippe a ce fonds de rébellion qui permet de voir derrière ce qui est, ce qui pourrait être, d’entrevoir dans le fracas du monde un autre monde, un monde plus juste que sa pudeur et le doute l’empêchent de nommer. Qui est-il? Il est, plus sûrement que tous les hommages, ce que disent de lui ses bâtiments. Un homme qui ne demande pas pour faire mais fait pour demander. Un homme qui sait qu’il vit du côté des riches et qu’il y a un autre côté. Un homme qui ne pense qu’à ça. « Il faut choisir », disait Thucydide, « se reposer ou être libre. » Il a choisi.

Fin des années Burrin, il quitte la tribu. Et en la quittant il offre à ceux qui restent, il offre à la nouvelle directrice, une identité, un lieu, un élan surtout. Presque une tradition. Ils pourront vivre ici dans le grand théâtre lémanique, vivre ici pour habiter le monde et tenter de le comprendre. Indifférents, les bâtiments qu’il a fait naître le regardent partir. Ils ont l’avenir devant eux. L’entrepreneur de la Cité s’en va. Les pyramides restent.

CHARLES KLEIBER

Ancien secrétaire d’État à l’éducation
et à la recherche

La Maison des étudiants Edgar et Danièle de Picciotto vue depuis la Maison de la paix.



IN MEMORIAM

Curt Gasteyger

Curt Gasteyger, professeur honoraire, nous a quittés le 14 juillet

Nous avons appris avec tristesse la disparition du professeur Curt Gasteyger à l'âge de 91 ans. Il avait pris sa retraite de l'Institut en 1994 après y avoir enseigné vingt ans. Il avait obtenu en 1954 un doctorat en droit de



l'Université de Zurich, puis effectué des séjours de recherche au Collège de l'Europe à Bruges, à l'Université libre de Berlin et dans plusieurs grandes universités américaines. Sa carrière professionnelle avait débuté dans des *think tanks* spécialisés dans la politique internationale et en particulier dans la sécurité internationale, comme l'Institut international d'études stratégiques de Londres où il fut directeur d'études de 1959 à 1962 et l'Institut

atlantique des affaires internationales de Paris dont il fut le directeur adjoint de 1968 à 1974. Nommé professeur à l'Institut (HEI) en 1974, il développa le Programme d'études stratégiques et de sécurité internationale (PESI) et lui donna une place de premier plan sur une scène mondiale dominée par la guerre froide.

Le professeur Gasteyger combinait avec aisance la recherche universitaire et l'expertise tournée vers les décideurs. Par l'organisation de séminaires qui attiraient des personnalités de haut niveau tout comme par ses articles dans la presse internationale, il exerça une influence notable en matière de politique de sécurité sur les responsables politiques suisses et européens. Son empreinte fut tout aussi forte sur les étudiants, notamment ses doctorants qui lui gardent un très vif sentiment de reconnaissance, et

sur ses collègues qui appréciaient la vivacité de son esprit et son engagement dans la vie institutionnelle.

Ses travaux et sa contribution aux débats d'actualité lui ont valu une notoriété dont l'Institut a grandement bénéficié et un certain nombre de distinctions. Il fut ainsi appelé à siéger dans la Commission Volcker, chargée en 1996 de faire la lumière sur les comptes juifs en déshérence, et reçut en 2003 la grand-croix du Mérite de la République fédérale d'Allemagne.

En témoignage de reconnaissance, l'Institut créa en 2005, avec le soutien de l'Association pour la promotion et l'étude de la sécurité internationale (APESI), la chaire Curt Gasteyger en sécurité internationale, dont le professeur Tom Biersteker est actuellement le titulaire.

L'Institut gardera un vibrant souvenir de cette personnalité qui a marqué son histoire.

PHILIPPE BURRIN

L'ACTUALITÉ

International Relations and the Camouflaging of Racism

Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

Professor of International History

Head of the International History Department

Global affairs have ignored the racism elephant in their midst, at knowledge's expense.

In 1903, the historian and sociologist W.E.B. Du Bois predicted that the 20th century would be the one of the colour line. Such augury, as astute as it was logical for the Harvard scholar, was surrounded by a world dominated by slavery, colonialism and segregation. More than a century later, the new millennium is still wrestling with the so-called "race question". In recent years, the issue has come to hold sway over global politics. A cursory glance at current affairs reveals an international landscape replete with racism. Stories about genocide in Myanmar, systemic racism in the United States, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in Europe, African migrants enslaved in North Africa, Asian workers discriminated against in the Gulf, Muslims denied citizenship in India, and Africans experiencing witch-hunts in China and Russia populate the news.

Yet an equally passing glimpse at the curricula of international affairs will find the question of racism absent, sidelined or confined to so-called area studies – the latter an instance of intellectual cultural coding. Such absence is arresting. Students step in classes where international notional variables are discussed *in extenso* while that which "racially" plays out urgently within those examined structures, organisations, states and societies is left unspoken. Such dissonance – those same students step out of their courses into the breaking-news world of yet another racial killing – is no longer tenable.

The disappearing of racism from international affairs is a matter of long standing. Whereas, as political scientist Robert Vitalis remarked, in the first decades of the 20th century international relations meant race relations, by the post-World War II period, an invisibilising shift had taken place. As the language of race was excised from the emerging



international relations field, the issue of racism itself was similarly left out of its nascent corpus. In seeking to rightfully curb racial categories from the production of knowledge, scholars indulged nonetheless what Frank Furedi termed a kind of self-censorship on racism.

Over the next decades, as decolonisation and postcolonialism played out with eminently racial undertones, and as social strife across the world took the form of bias and ever-complexifying discriminatory modes, international relations students were trained per a tradition ignoring that central dimension of the past and, indeed, current century. The study of racism was largely left to (Black and Brown) scholars seen to be personally concerned with the issue. Consequently, our understanding of the fullness of the issues driving global politics has been stripped of a fundamental dimension. In playing catch-up today, a new generation of scholars has to remedy such amnesia and camouflaging.

USA, California, Santa Monica. A woman waves from the "hoop bus" as protesters ride their bikes nearby during the Bike Rides for Black Lives demonstration in support of the Black Lives Matter. 12 July 2020. Chris DELMAS/AFP

Politics of the Coronavirus Pandemic

After the COVID-19 pandemic shook the world, faculty from the Graduate Institute mobilised to analyse the political, economic and social impacts of the health crisis. The following articles are based on a special issue of *Global Challenges*, "Politics of the Coronavirus Pandemic" (special issue no. 1, 2020), which was co-produced by the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy and the Research Office.

→ <https://globalchallenges.ch>

The Vaccine Race: Between Public Health, Geopolitics and Commerce

Suerie Moon

Co-Director of the Global Health Centre



RUSSIA, Moscow. A medical worker demonstrates the Russian coronavirus vaccine developed by the Gamaleya Scientific Research Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology during the third phase of the postregistration clinical trials. 30 September 2020. Iliya PITALEV/Sputnik via AFP

Access to safe, effective COVID-19 vaccines can help restore full economic and social life. But who will get them first? From a public health perspective, all countries should get rapid access to a vaccine to save lives, alleviate suffering and stop the pandemic.

Yet from a geopolitical perspective, these vaccines have become a strategic asset and an object of fierce competition. The US, China and Russia have all made vaccine development a matter of national prestige and the focus of intelligence operations. All three countries have pushed the accelerator hard, raising concerns that safety and efficacy testing will be relaxed for political ends. Those ends are both domestic and international, as success can bolster political support at home and strengthen alliances abroad.

Against this backdrop, WHO, Gavi and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations are leading a multilateral effort to make vaccines available to all countries, regardless of income. The COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (Covax) initiative offers countries a structure to pool risk,

share access to vaccines, and subsidise the poor. It is meant to prevent countries from taking more than their fair share. But many governments have rushed to secure vaccine supply for their own citizens through bilateral agreements. Because total production capacity cannot meet global needs, each bilateral deal shrinks the slice of pie left for Covax and the roughly 160 countries that will rely on it, at least in part.

Unsurprisingly, middle-income countries with domestic production capacity, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia and Mexico, have not been waiting passively, nor have they put all their eggs in one (multilateral) basket. Rather, they have sought and secured technology transfer from Western and Chinese firms. A web of agreements, some public and others not, is crisscrossing the globe, linking the countries that can supply Western, Chinese or Russian-developed vaccines to everyone else. The picture that emerges is not of a centralised, multilateral system governed by public health logic or ethics, but rather a spaghetti bowl of agreements driven by geopolitical, industrial and financial might.

Pharmaceutical companies stand to benefit from this scramble. In choosing how much to sell to each buyer, their decisions have tremendous public interest implications. While some have eschewed profiting from the pandemic, others see a major windfall. Meanwhile, the governments that have heavily subsidised, de-risked and guaranteed the purchase of these vaccines, thus far, have been too busy securing supply for themselves to regulate firms to ensure vaccines are affordable or available to all.

This volatile mix of public and private, geopolitical and health interests will shape the course of the pandemic. While public health dictates getting vaccines first to the most vulnerable and hard-hit worldwide, political and commercial interests may stretch this pandemic far longer than need be.



POLITICS OF THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

Institutions under Stress: The COVID Crisis and the Futures of Global Governance

Nico Krisch

Professor of International Law

Crisis facilitates change: they remove obstacles which, in normal times, sustain the status quo, and they often strengthen existing trends that may have been slowed down by institutional inertia or political resistance. The COVID-19 crisis, too, is likely to entail serious consequences in domestic as well as international politics. What are its implications for global governance? Which tendencies is it going to reinforce, which ones will it weaken?

One of the defining trends of the past decade has been a growing anti-internationalism in many parts of the world. The economic crisis provoked by the pandemic is likely to aggravate this trend as discontent drives people to seek renewed (national) control and retreat behind existing borders.

Anti-internationalism, often coupled with right-wing populism, has posed a challenge to international institutions for years, limiting funding and stifling new initiatives, with human rights-related institutions a particular target. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated this challenge, most visibly in the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization. Anti-internationalism combines here with a geopolitical shift – especially the growing rivalry between the US and China, but more broadly the power shift away from Europe and North America. This shift leads to a reinterpretation of international politics as a zero-sum game in which gains on one side are immediately perceived as losses on the other. International organisations – typically built on the idea that

cooperation generates benefits for all – consequently face defiance and skirmishes over distributional issues.

The result will likely be continued stagnation in the creation and development of international organisations and the conclusion of new treaties – a trend we have already been observing since the turn of the millennium. Anti-internationalism and power rivalries breed stalemate and limit what existing institutions can do; and new efforts for cooperation are less likely to succeed, especially when they come with significant sovereignty losses, which, in turn, constitute easy targets for populist attacks. New initiatives may have better prospects when working through smaller groups of states, using informal tools rather than formal organisations or treaties, or channelling action through private actors.

This will likely lead to a more fragmented, and overall weaker, structure of global governance – one yet further removed from the ideal of universal, multilateral institutions of the post-World War II era. Such an outcome is not preordained – crises such as the current one also present opportunities for progressive change. Yet seizing them, and preventing further erosion, would require a broad mobilisation in favour of joint responses to common challenges, in favour of solidarity rather than the isolated pursuit of national interest. In the current storm, international cooperation needs active and determined support, or it will face gradual or even sudden decline.

Depoliticising through Expertise: The Politics of Modeling in the Governance of COVID-19

Annabelle **Littoz-Monnet**

Professor of International Relations/Political Science

POLITICS OF THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

The Western Flu

Mohammad-Mahmoud **Ould Mohamedou**

Professor of International History

Head of the International History Department

It might have originated in China – as President Donald Trump kept reminding everyone in not-so-subtle dog-whistling – but COVID-19 is a pandemic that is more revealing about the West’s current state. For all their diffusion and spread, pandemics are not merely a public health issue or a matter of geography. They carry socioeconomic and political overtones, which, in a globalised world, rapidly determine perceptions of the event and frame its history.

The Eurocentric tropes that have presided over international affairs were at play during the coronavirus crisis. Eurocentrism imposed its jaundiced centrality, pre-empting a more nuanced understanding of what was factually a multicentric international experience. The concerns and mindsets of some were amplified and those of others lessened, while the confounding narrative of a global crisis remained in place. Specifically, the Eurocentric paradigm shaped the crisis in three ways: by reasserting the North-South divide, by elevating the lifestyle of the privileged and by framing the public policy debate along the urgent resumption of neoliberalism.

Firstly, the crisis was given in a narrative of a threat “coming from afar”, menacing the rest of the world. Particular emphasis was placed on the sanctity of Europe and the United States. As racist incidents against Asians multiplied, China’s responsibility was incriminated referring to the country’s sanitary conditions and culinary traditions. From such a perspective, the West had to deal with something created by others.

Secondly, whereas prior deadly pandemics – such as Ebola, which primarily hit West Africa – had not been portrayed as having “altered the world forever”, the coronavirus was endowed with a world-historical dimension for its dramatic and disturbing intrusion in the intimate life

of the Westerner. Conflating the discursive “we” with a Northern “we”, citizens of these regions questioned the responses that had been adopted earlier and elsewhere – mask-wearing in Asia, for instance – as too intrusive for “open” societies and their “democratic” lifestyles, and a problematic Asianisation of the West. Citizens in the United States betrayed a sense of cultural imperial invincibility when ostentatiously flouting social distancing guidelines “in the name of American freedom”.

Finally, emphasis on the economic consequences of COVID-19 indicated how overwhelmingly this pandemic was cast through a neoliberal paradigm. Whether it was the pushback against statist interventionism in Europe, or the Trump administration’s insistence that people go back to their jobs, there was, in sectors, a palpable irritation with the disease, as if nature and the rest of the world could not be allowed to disrupt the forward march of these economies. Whereas previous pandemics highlighted other aspects, this crisis showed the pervasiveness of market capitalism in the fabric of European and American societies and its inexorability for large segments of the citizenry.

Corona will come to pass as the virus of the privileged. Revealing the inflation of self-infatuation prevalent in many countries – which Jean Twenge discusses in her *Narcissism Epidemic* – the pandemic brought to a halt the revered consumer economy and plans for summer holidays. It reminded us of the resilience of a problematic global health map between haves and have-nots, and it showed that many states remained profoundly unable to learn from others, blinded by their historical sentiment of superiority.

As policymakers around the world have found themselves confronted with the rapid spread of a new virus, scientific experts have been called in to “do” policy. Governments have appointed special groups of scientists to formulate opinions on the nature of the virus, how best to cure the sick, and what sanitary and social measures to adopt in order to curb its spread.

As such debates unfolded, highly technical forms of knowledge – produced through mathematical models and simulations – have informed policy, often concealing the more fundamental political questions that should have been addressed.

At the time when governments were deciding on whether “social distancing” or more radical lockdowns were effective and justifiable, philosophers, ethicists, social scientists and even doctors with clinical knowledge who work with patients were hardly heard. This is puzzling given that the policy solutions proposed – from partial to complete quarantine scenarios – had implications beyond medicine that deserved broader consideration. In fact, even the health consequences of complete quarantines, due to patients delaying visits to the doctor, people living in institutions suffering from isolation or the risk of increased violence in households, were not publicly discussed.

The problem at hand was debated nearly exclusively in technical, decontextualised and sanitary terms. The numbers produced by virologists and epidemiologists were invested with an aura of scientificity, which made them authoritative and act as a focal point in discussions. Such knowledge was perceived as easily actionable. Projections, because they are easily communicable, transportable and seemingly apolitical, can directly be acted upon by policymakers. Neil Ferguson’s model for instance pulled its weight in policy debates beyond the UK, as the numbers it projected acted as efficient alarm bells.

More than disclosing specific forms of instrumentalising knowledge, such observations point to the dominance of a certain vision of what counts as science in our societies. Forms of knowledge produced through statistical



analysis or complex models are held in higher regard in policy debates because they align more closely with current paradigmatic beliefs about what good science is.

Such reflections have clear implications for the governance of health. The point is not to argue that models should be replaced by other forms of knowledge. But precisely because there are no absolutes upon which policy decisions can be based, it is a call for *pluralist and flexible political debates* that can answer questions beyond “what works”, and address issues such as what counts, what is acceptable and under which circumstances.



POLITICS OF THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

The Global Pandemic and Brazilian Inequality

Graziella Moraes Silva

Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology

As the WHO declared Latin America the new epicentre of the epidemic in May 2020, it is worth taking a closer look at the situation of Brazil, a mid-income country that is the second worst affected by the virus worldwide.

In order to understand the dynamics of the pandemic in Brazil, it is necessary to consider the important role of Brazilian socioeconomic inequality, historically among the highest in the world. Unsurprisingly, death rates among Black Brazilians and poor people are significantly higher than those among their whiter and richer co-nationals.

Before the COVID-19 crisis, however, inequality had disappeared from the agenda of the Brazilian executive power, dominated by Jair Bolsonaro's paranoid fear of communism. By minimising the pandemic and the suffering it brought, Bolsonaro was not able to "rally round the flag" and unite the country around a common enemy like other world leaders. His support, however, has slightly increased and, more importantly, changed its basis.

The economic elites and middle classes who supported his election have now largely abandoned him, disappointed with his economic policies and his lack of

anti-corruption commitment. But the emergency aid package of BRL 600 (about USD 150) increased his popularity among the poorest populations and regions of the country. Ironically, the Brazilian Gini coefficient, the common measure of inequality, has experienced an important decline since the beginning of the pandemic due to the upward mobility of the poorest.

In the end, however, the consequences of the pandemic for Brazilian inequality remain unclear. The emergency help seems to be unsustainable for a developing country facing recession, and without a broader tax reform, debt will increase and the economic crisis will worsen. More importantly, this help does not address the lack of health infrastructure and services largely responsible for the death of more than 100,000 Brazilians.

Investing in quality public services through more progressive taxes in order to alleviate the chronic understaffing and underfunding of the Unified Health System would be the safest way out of the current crisis. Paradoxically, it could also be the least costly, especially when the price to pay is life itself.



POLITICS OF THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

Emergency Use of Unspent Public Funds: Dilemmas for Democratic Governance

Deval Desai, Christine Lutringer and Shalini Randeria

Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy


The response to COVID-19 entails the largest ever peacetime expansion in fiscal deficits, requiring new financial instruments and a repurposing of existing ones. How democratic governments have designed, funded and delivered welfare since March reflects the political and institutional reconfiguration of ties between states and citizens. The emergency release of funds also highlights unintended effects that pose dilemmas for democratic accountability.

Several countries have redirected massive welfare funds lying unspent, e.g. EUR 28 billion of European Structural and Investment Funds or, in India, USD 6.8 billion for the benefit of construction workers in the informal sector. Interestingly, such reallocation has revealed the bureaucratic obstacles and low institutional capacity underlying unspent funds in the first place. With everything from beneficiary identification to the funds themselves being administered by a complex constellation of institutions, targeted social welfare funds often fail to reach their designated beneficiaries. But their emergency mobilisation comes at a price as it suspends or bypasses the cumbersome mechanisms regulating distribution of funds. For all their faults, these are enshrined in law and tied to pathways for accountability and democratic control of public expenditure.

Politically, such repurposing changes what both "welfare" and "social" might mean. In the Indian construction

fund case, "welfare" is transformed from a long-term to a short-term phenomenon as monies meant for pensions are hastily disbursed as cash transfers. And in the EU, "welfare" is transformed from a set of social benefits for structurally weak regions to healthcare ones anywhere within a member state. The emergency mobilisation of funds thus accompanies a re-definition of "vulnerability" and of "society" by the state, which changes the kinds of welfare various groups of citizens or regions are given albeit without public debate. Emergency appropriation of funds is, of course, limited by the general accountability deficit of exceptional executive action. But this deficit is amplified as the appropriation of these funds reconfigures the identity of legitimate or relevant stakeholders, their modes of participation (de jure and/or de facto) in the allocation of the funds, and their standing to hold decision-makers to account.

Participatory decision-making, transparency and answerability, along with civil society monitoring and public scrutiny of state spending, may become the casualties of the bypassing or weakening of regulatory control owing to the pandemic. States may, in turn, reinforce their executive power in a sustained fashion, not only through legal and constitutional means but also by fiscal ones.



L'ENSEIGNEMENT

Professor Bill Adams, New Holder of the Claudio Segré Chair of Conservation and Development

Professor Adams will join the Graduate Institute in January 2021.

What did you gain from your experience as Moran Professor of Conservation and Development at the University of Cambridge?

I was appointed to the Department of Geography at Cambridge in 1984, and have been privileged to see many changes in the university and in my areas of research. Geography has been an excellent home for work on sustainable development and conservation, because it is so interdisciplinary. I have had colleagues who work on the physical and biological science of global environmental change, and others who work on the social science of development and poverty, and in the environmental humanities. This has been both challenging and rewarding: no research literature is out of bounds, and ideas and research findings are sure to have a lively reception. Cambridge also attracts excellent students at both the



undergraduate and graduate levels, and it has been a privilege to meet and teach them.

My own research on environment and development has focused on both Europe and tropical Africa. I tend to approach my research from the perspectives of environmental history (the evolution of thinking about sustainability and wildlife conservation, for example) and political ecology (for example the social impacts of development

and conservation projects, or the particular challenges of reducing human-elephant conflict).

You will join the Institute next January as the holder of the Claudio Segré Chair of Conservation and Development. What led you to accept this position?

The Graduate Institute is a unique organisation. I am excited by its international reach, especially into the transnational institutions based in Geneva, and also the community of students and scholars that it attracts. I have been fortunate to work in a strong research university in Cambridge, and have enjoyed some opportunities to take research ideas out into the wider world, for example through the Cambridge Conservation Research Institute, and through my work with the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership. I am looking forward to learning more of this world, and contributing to it, through the Graduate Institute. The task of making ideas and knowledge relevant is extremely important given the challenges that face the international community (and national governments) at the present time.

More specifically, what are the challenges for biodiversity, and why are they so important?

Biodiversity loss is one of the critical challenges of the Anthropocene, alongside climate change. Globally, huge efforts go into the protection of nature, yet biodiversity loss continues. This presents a huge challenge, both for policy,

but also for researchers who wish their work to be relevant to the difficult choices humanity faces in the 21st century. We all depend on nature in ways that we do not fully appreciate, whether we think in terms of the loss of rare species and natural beauty, or the dependence of human communities on living resources. A key challenge is to break down barriers between different academic disciplines so that those taking policy decisions understand both the natural environment and human society, and to open up better communication between citizens, government and businesses. Too often, decisions about nature and economic development are made without sufficient input from local people. Those trained in the natural sciences are often at odds with social scientists talking about issues of economy and justice. Decision-makers need to be equipped to integrate both of these dimensions, and to be open to voices from the ground.

So, development and biodiversity should go hand in hand?

Biodiversity and development are often treated as separate issues, and this is disastrously inefficient. Societies and economies sit within and depend on the living biosphere, even if the way we conventionally account for nature in our thinking about human futures pretends that it is somehow an "optional extra". Many rural communities depend directly on ecosystem resources for livelihoods, but no society is independent of the natural world – the commerce chains that supply us with everything, from our morning coffee to our seafood dinner, depend on natural living systems, as do the environments where people live and (for those able to) take their holidays. Good development planning needs the state of nature at its heart, and conservation planning must integrate human well-being, whether in Switzerland or the Sahara.

It is a mistake to think that we can trade off economic development and the state of the world's biodiversity: we need wealth, justice, human welfare and a biodiverse Earth to be achieved together. This is possible, but not easy. Quite a lot of things we do now are going to need to change if we are to finish the 21st century with an Earth that resembles the one we started with, and one that makes a human home that feels good to live in.

What are your main objectives as chair holder?

As holder of the Claudio Segré Chair of Conservation and Development I will be developing my research on landscape scale conservation and on novel conservation technologies (I have a co-authored book coming out in 2021 with Yale University Press on synthetic biology and conservation). I also look forward to meeting and working with the students in the Institute. In addition, I am excited by the prospect of meeting people across the community in the Geneva area interested in conservation and development. I plan to continue working to help build a world that is biologically diverse and meets all human needs.

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L'Institut a le plaisir d'annoncer la création de la chaire Claudio Segré « Conservation et développement ». La Fondation Segré, créée en 1996 par Claudio Segré, un ami de longue date de l'Institut, finance depuis plusieurs années un poste de *Distinguished Visiting Professor* occupé par Tim Flannery, scientifique australien de renom, qui travaille en particulier sur le changement climatique.

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New Professor

ISABEL PIKE (United Kingdom)
Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Sociology
PhD University of Wisconsin-Madison




Isabel Pike is a sociologist whose research focuses on gender, development and inequality in Africa. She received her PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2020. Her current book project, based on her doctoral thesis, explores the contested narrative in Kenya that “the boy child has been forgotten” as a means to understand both reactions to social change as well as the ways development discourse can be repurposed. This analysis of gendered narratives also explores the social category of “youth” – frequently associated with low-income urban, young men in public discourse – and the surprising ways in which men and women try to hold onto their status as youth as they age. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods, Dr Pike has several parallel projects, including on the gendered and economic dynamics of marriage and romantic relationships, occupational gender segregation in the informal sector, and the theoretical and methodological challenges of research on youth. She grew up in Uganda and prior to academia worked for the World Food Programme in Senegal, Burkina Faso and Mali.

L'engagement de professeurs : une priorité pour l'Institut

Au cours des deux dernières décennies, le monde universitaire dans l'espace atlantique s'est féminisé. L'Institut n'a pas échappé à cette tendance qui s'est largement répandue dans les sciences sociales.

Aujourd'hui, 61 % de nos étudiants sont des étudiantes.

Chez les professeurs, le déséquilibre de genre est encore important mais depuis 2014 l'Institut mène une politique volontaire afin de remédier progressivement à cette situation. Sur les 23 professeurs engagés ces sept dernières années, 13 sont des femmes, soit 56 %, de sorte que l'Institut compte aujourd'hui 35 % de professeures contre à peine 20 % en 2014.



The Place of Classrooms

Shaila Seshia Galvin

Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Sociology

With the approach of the new academic year, and a semester or more of hybrid teaching on the horizon, I have found myself thinking a lot about classrooms. I have learned and taught in classrooms of different kinds. Some have been sleek seminar rooms, book-lined offices, or vast auditoriums. Some came equipped with daunting banks of audiovisual equipment, others with only a candle. Sometimes classrooms took shape as field excursions, or as close-knit circles under the shade of a tree. At their best, classrooms are places of curiosity and imagination, places to be both inspired and challenged, places to be pushed and supported at the same time. For me, it is this extraordinary mix of things that makes classrooms exciting, and part of the reason why I have spent so much time in them.

So, what does one do when the singular *place* of a classroom is taken away, as has happened over the last months? During this time, I have been pushed to think beyond the *where* of the classroom, and to refocus on what it is that makes a classroom a place of learning. Something that stands out is the shared-ness of space, and the myriad connections that this can afford. As I see it, part of the challenge of teaching – and of learning – in this new environment is to cultivate a sense of togetherness and nurture those connections, whether in person, online or both.

Over the summer, my colleagues and I have discussed and debated how we might best design the courses we will co-teach this autumn in a way that is responsive to the times we live in. Planning “Histories, Theories, and Practices of Development”, Professor Gopalan Balachandran and I felt

that our course must deepen understandings of the precariousness of lives and livelihoods brought into sharp relief by the pandemic, and the social and political mobilisations around racism and white supremacy that have ensued. In my home Department of Anthropology and Sociology, where I co-teach the Doctoral Seminar with Professor Patricia Spyer, we are working to ensure that our incoming cohort of PhD students will be prepared to develop and pursue their dissertation research projects in circumstances where long-established customs and practices of fieldwork may not be possible. Long before the semester begins, our classrooms are being created not in locatable places, but through these reckonings and imaginations.

Not so long ago, I saw the walls of a classroom as something also to be bridged. Getting “beyond the walls” has often been an important part of the way I teach, as I try to bring something of the world into my classes and, wherever possible, to create opportunities for my students to learn experientially “out in” the world. This year, though, the world has burst into the classroom. And, what I am learning is that in these times, the most important place of the classroom is firmly planted in the world.

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→ <https://globalchallenges.ch>

LE DOSSIER

THE NEW FRONTIERS OF RISK



INDONESIA, Jakarta. Residents wade through floodwaters after hours of torrential rain.
21 February 2017. STR/AFP



THE NEW FRONTIERS OF RISK

THE PARADOX OF RISK IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL CONTRACTION

Dominic Eggel

Research Adviser at the Research Office

USA, Seattle. Late in the day boarded up business with rent strike posters and a tent on the sidewalk. 31 March 2020. 400tmax/iStock

Risk may be defined as a tension between a reality linked to a potential danger and the perception of this danger. Both reality and perception of dangers have evolved over time, among others because the relationship to death – that most ultimate of risks – has changed and new technologies have been developed. In pre-industrial societies risk was omnipresent, as invasions, wars, famines or epidemics punctuated the daily lives of populations. A certain fatality prevailed, as calamities were perceived as pre-ordained by natural order or godly will and risks were sublimated through myths, religion or witch-hunts. Certain sectors of society, however, specialised in risk-taking, such as knights whose sense of honour depended on bravery in combat, or seafarers who sought their luck at large.

Enlightenment’s new, forward-looking approach to temporality and promotion of human agency transformed mankind’s relationship to risk by adding the variable of freedom. Risk-taking also laid at the heart of (early) bourgeois entrepreneurship, as capitalism put a premium on risk and created financial markets to trade, broker and insure it. While successful in its efforts at domesticating old risks that had plagued mankind for ages, modernity’s utilitarian impetus and instrumental approach to nature also set loose new, potentially devastating risks, such as resource depletion and climate change.

However, the analytical approach inherited from Enlightenment also gave rise to the modern techniques of risk management based on the premise that risks can be endlessly broken

down, measured, segmented, anticipated, controlled, mitigated, and diffused. Today, risk management has become a multibillion industry employing an armada of venture capitalists, brokers, (re-)insurers, consultants, and rank and file managers relying on risk matrixes, actuarial science, statistical projections, and computer modelling to predict, administrate, repackage or sell risks.

Through the accumulation of massive surpluses of capital and wealth and the increased intervention of the state and its regulatory apparatus, industrial societies eventually were in a position to relax as they evacuated risks from everyday life. This evolution, however, has led to the paradox that while capitalism is based on risk-taking, neoliberal societies and markets have become

obsessed with control in their relentless pursuit of a risk-free utopia, breeding conformity instead of creativity and innovation. Risk-averseness has thus taken precedence, to the extent that we are seemingly no longer in a position to handle the unexpected and cope with major self-induced (war, economic crisis) or external (epidemics, earthquakes) cataclysms.

The COVID crisis, as a revenge of nature, has profoundly shaken societies worldwide and contributed to a reconfiguration – perhaps a multiplication – of risks and their perceptions. Above all a health risk, COVID-19 has impacted the current landscape of global risks in a much wider fashion. It has triggered a real risk of economic breakdown and social crisis, aggravating the seemingly unstoppable downward trends of growing inequality and eroding welfare states. Unsurprisingly, the crisis has also stirred political unrest as nationalists, identitarians and illuminati of all sorts and colours are emboldened by the closing of borders, the blossoming of conspiracy theories, the stigmatisation of alterity and appeals to civil disobedience.

Deeper, structural forces have, however, been at play, reconfiguring the global landscape of risks long before the outbreak of the pandemic. The internationalisation of fear – fuelled by new communication technologies – has been ongoing since G.W. Bush launched his War on Terror. The coarsening of international politics has been accelerated by Donald Trump and his illiberal acolytes as security risks such as the illicit proliferation of weapons are magnified by the multiplication of rogue states and non-state actors.

Despite the availability of big data and unprecedented means of forecasting and statistical modelling, uncertainty and unpredictability are pervasive. The looming collapse of temporality due to a seeming hyperinflation of the

present obfuscates our access to the past and thus our ability to anticipate the future. Technology, while hitherto a key catalyst for risk mitigation and management, is increasingly becoming

The nature and frontiers of risks are moving, and we may question whether current risk mitigation strategies are still adapted. To add to injury, the multilateral system, the most adequate

“While capitalism is based on risk-taking, neoliberal societies and markets have become obsessed with control in their relentless pursuit of a risk-free utopia, breeding conformity instead of creativity and innovation.”

a risk itself, as illustrated by gene screenings, cloning, cyberattacks, autonomous weapons and the so-called artificial intelligence.

While the risk that algorithms may ultimately emancipate themselves from humans and lead a life of their own seems low, the risk related to – purposefully or not – inbuilt biases or functional disconnect between those who design algorithms and those who apply them is much more tangible, as illustrated by the financial crisis of 2007. The most pressing risk remains, however, environmental degradation, which compromises human beings’ very living space and means of existence.

framework to deal with global risks, is ailing. As Aditya Bharadwaj argues in this dossier, continuously deferring risk to the future may ultimately be self-defeating since the hope to harness the unforeseen constantly eludes us. Rather than seeking to eliminate risks once and for all, or deferring them with arcane models or mitigation plans, it is time to pause and contemplate the structural issues that endanger our existence.

MOMENT OF SURPRISE: THE ANATOMY OF BIOMEDICAL RISK

Aditya **Bharadwaj**

Professor of Anthropology and Sociology

Risk is a sociological enigma. It is theoretically intricate, philosophically deep, and conceptually complex. As a cultural trope risk anchors human experience into an impossible conundrum: on the one hand risk behooves us to predict, prevent and prestidigitate a future purged of risk itself and on the other hand the very act of doing so

The work of human imagination actively formulates risk to mean something rather specific in specific contexts. However, hope for a risk-free future produces risk expectations that can at best be anticipated. The reason risk to human health is a complex phenomenon, nurtured in specific socio-economic and cultural assemblages,

as to how risks can be anticipated (pandemic preparedness) but never quite preempted. To live with risk is to live in mortal fear of the moment of *surprise*. We can say we lead lives suffused with risks that are often unknown (origin), mostly unknowable (causation) and continually unfolding (affliction). To live with (health) risk therefore is to live with uncertainty.

In the post-COVID 21st century, humanity's "risky future" will be actively reimagined. It is essential to understand that risk perceptions and risk projections are often responsive to material class interests and socio-culturally bestowed privileges (or lack thereof). These interests shape how we apprehend past encounters with risk to second-guess future risk scenarios. In the late neoliberal capitalist modernity, the concept of risk has been actively debated as a reflexive mode of self-understanding, both individual and societal. This is a problematic turn as risk inhabits a perplexing temporality where the reflexive experience of the past can seldom predict the future and the future can at best be consciously preempted. Simply put, mobilising the past contributes to reimagining it and predicting the future often forestalls it. The only temporal dimension in which potential risks can be meaningfully understood is the "here and now". In displacing risk into an unknowable future, societies and cultures merely prepare themselves for

“In the realm of risk management the one thing that can never be anticipated is the moment of surprise itself.”

makes the task of formulating action to neutralise probable, predictable or apparent risks a critical challenge. The task is challenging because the triumvirate of hope, expectation and anticipation circumscribes acts of mediating and managing risks. The mitigating calculus of biomedical risk management, and risk management more generally, turns hope, a wilful wish, into an expectation oriented toward a predetermined future scenario and (biomedical/technological) capabilities that in turn anticipate potential *surprise*, shock and threat to human health via preemptive anticipatory action.

is because human imagination cannot anticipate the moment of *surprise*. That is, the moment when risk moves from the realm of active (often fearful) imagination to concrete manifestation. How does one preempt *surprise*, anticipate it? In other words, in the realm of risk management the one thing that can never be anticipated is the moment of *surprise* itself. To produce knowledge responsive to biomedical and other risks in the anticipatory mode is to relentlessly infuse and diffuse an imagined future of *surprise*. The mysterious emergence of coronavirus and its rapid spread is an example in point




INDONESIA, Bali, Nusa Dua. A dancer performs next to a globe during an anti-deforestation campaign at the venue of the UN Climate Change Conference, 5 December 2007. Jewel SAMAD/AFP

the moment of *surprise*; a moment when all calculations, algorithms, projections and predictions crumble at the door of a unique occurrence. In this sense the future pandemics are gestating in the here and now, in our wanton destruction of rainforests and glaciers. It is no good projecting them into the future where the moment of *surprise* will laugh in the face of our purported preparedness. The coronavirus is mutating in the here and now, it is useless to expect and hope that a vaccine – assuming a credible one is ever found – will be effective against future alterations. In a similar vein, human fertility is declining in the here and now due to a complex mix of socioeconomic inequalities and forced mass migrations. The impact of environmental pollution (notably microplastics and CO₂ emissions) on reproductive morphology,

hormonal imbalances, plummeting sperm counts is both worrying and poorly understood. The countries of the South, once routinely chastised and stigmatised in the mid-20th-century development discourse for irresponsible and unchecked fertility, have sounded a low-frequency early warning over declining fertility. Across the developing world major cities are slowly stagnating at replacement-level fertility. The Himalayan nation of Nepal has in fact slipped below that level. This ought to force a radical rethink on established but simplistic policy prescriptions favouring active pronatalism in the imagined subfertile North and aggressive antinatalism in the purportedly overpopulated South.

The future risks to human population growth, health and viability (as a socioeconomic entity) are staring us in

the face. However, we fear and anticipate future risks because we fail to grasp the structural contexts gestating risks in the present. Rather than focusing on futures suffused with risks, we must attend to how our risk-laden and destructive social, political and economic practices incubate a florid spectrum of pathogens and a host of man-made afflictions. It is imperative we pause and assess how a certain form of human sociality and polity is risking human health. An unyielding virus or a plastic-infested planet impacting human health and fertility is a mere moment of unanticipated surprise announcing its risky presence. And in so doing, defying the arrogance implicit in the late-modern sociality adept at fostering grandiose and delusional modes of risk prognostications.



THE NEW FRONTIERS OF RISK

RISKY ENTANGLEMENTS BETWEEN STATES AND ONLINE PLATFORMS

Jérôme Duberry

Research Associate at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy

BELGIUM, Brussels. Global activists of Avaaz set up cardboard cutouts of Facebook chief Mark Zuckerberg in front of the European Union headquarters. 22 May 2018. John THYS/AFP

Every two years, the data generated in the world is doubling. The number of connected devices is projected to reach a staggering 29.3 billion by 2023. Although these numbers hide substantial variation between highly connected nations and others, the datafication of human life is a global phenomenon that imposes a high level of transparency on individuals, while allowing online platforms to develop and use sophisticated microtargeting

techniques in complete opacity. In this context, new risks arise on a global scale, putting into question the role and ability of the state to protect its citizens and institutions.

In the past two decades online platforms have accumulated vast amounts of personal data. Consumer data is collected from numerous sources (e.g. online behaviour) and across devices (e.g. smartphone) thanks to behavioural tracking (e.g.

cookies). Citizens have agreed, most of the time unknowingly, to exchange their personal data and metadata (i.e. data about data such as device used or location) for “free” services (e.g. web referencing, instant messaging). By aggregating and correlating data from these numerous sources, online platforms have gained the capacity to identify and profile citizens with great precision across devices, time and space. This new psychographic

profiling capacity has raised ethical and governance concerns among experts and populations. In this context, the European Commission asked online platforms to increase their efforts to moderate content more effectively. Moreover, the European Union (EU) adopted new legislation to ensure a better protection of privacy (i.e. the General Data Protection Regulation). However, protecting privacy and moderating content to prevent the spread of disinformation and fake news contradicts the business model of online platforms, which is based on unrestricted access to personal data and user attention.

The data collected feeds the machine-learning algorithms of online platforms designed to tailor relevant content to each online user. The gate-keeping role of online platforms is magnified by the sheer size of content available digitally. PageRank, for instance, is Google’s algorithm ranking websites according to specific user profiles and concurring keywords. However, by filtering only “relevant” content these algorithms fail to confront users to alternative views and risk confining them to sterile echo chambers. Moreover, how “relevance” is defined by online platforms remains opaque and the evolving nature of algorithms continues to elude regulators. In other words, the criteria used to select the information citizens access online are not transparent, challenging the capacity of the state to protect its citizens and institutions.

Governments, on their part, have an ambiguous relationship with online platforms. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the necessity of collaborating with platforms to collect data

“The relationship between states and online platforms presents a major risk for the populations and the legitimacy of national and, indirectly, international public institutions.”

and track citizens. However, such collaboration is not new. Political candidates have rapidly adopted online platforms to reach out to potential voters. Governments have mobilised online platforms to pursue economic goals, e.g. boosting foreign direct investment or tourism through digital campaigns, or for the sake of “security”, e.g. monitoring and watching their populations or interfering in the domestic affairs of foreign countries.

New techniques increase the precision, scope and scale of persuasion, while reducing their accountability. Psychometric profiling, for instance, makes ads more persuasive by adjusting them to specific psychological traits. Dark posts – disappearing after viewing – allow political actors to show transient messages to the most influenceable Facebook users. The Cambridge Analytica scandal shed light on the risks intrinsic to these new data-driven advertising techniques and their manipulative potential, notably with regards to voting behaviour.

Intelligence agencies have used online platforms to access personal information through backdoors. In cases such as the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbass, online platforms have been misused or instrumentalised for military purposes, to weaken the adversary, instil chaos,

and support kinetic military forces. In parallel, liberal democracies, including the EU, collaborate with online platforms to combat disinformation campaigns through the adoption of new policies, fact-checking tools, and awareness campaigns.

The relationship between states and online platforms presents a major risk for the populations and the legitimacy of national and, indirectly, international public institutions. States are struggling to find adequate mechanisms to regulate and tax the tech multinationals. Their difficulty is representative of the crucial and yet ambiguous role that platforms play today. On the one hand, states must ensure the protection of their citizens, including their privacy and free access to plural sources of information. On the other hand, states depend more and more on these digital infrastructures to communicate with their citizens and perform certain sovereign tasks. By giving such an important role to the private interests running the online platforms, states are jeopardising not only the credibility of their efforts to ensure the protection of their citizens, but also their future legitimacy.

UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH RISKS IN THE 21st CENTURY

Gian-Luca Burci

Adjunct Professor of International Law; Former Legal Counsel of the WHO and Jorge E. Viñuales

Harold Samuel Professor of Law and Environmental Policy at the University of Cambridge
Adjunct Professor of International Law

There is some risk in characterising global environmental change and its consequences as “global risks”. A risk is a danger that has not yet materialised. When it is “global”, its effects may be perceived as someone else’s problem. Above all, “risks” may be demobilising. Those who are to blame for climate change, ozone depletion, ocean pollution or biodiversity loss know it well. After losing the public relations battle around the drivers of the problem, their next demobilising strategy is to pretend that “nothing can be done about it”.

For global environmental change, these difficulties are compounded by the genuine complexity of the causal and feedback processes involved. For example, there is a clear but complex relation between environmental degradation and the COVID-19 pandemic, embodied in processes such as (1) land use change that modifies the boundaries between wildlife and human populations, (2) illicit wildlife trade, which facilitates the smuggling of sometimes highly regulated wildlife specimens (e.g. pangolins), (3) global air and maritime transportation, which disseminate pathogens, and (4) basic air pollution, which may serve as a vector for contamination or of vulnerability in a population affected by a respiratory disease. Thus, we know that there is a link between global environmental change and global health security, but at such an aggregate level, it is unclear what to do next.

Knowledge of complexity can be both empowering and demobilising.

Our inability to deal with global environmental change comes in part from the habit of thinking in small specialised boxes instead of adopting a more holistic approach. To understand why “zooming out”, rather than “zooming in”, may be important we can recall an observation made by Alfred Lotka, a prominent biophysicist of the early

or the species that evolves, but the entire system, species and environment. The two are inseparable.” This broad view was at the time shared by many other thinkers. In his book *The Biosphere* (1926), Vladimir Vernadsky called attention to the “bio-geo-chemical” cycles that govern the Earth system. The idea of Gaia conceptualised by James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis (1974), and more recently that of Paul Crutzen’s

“Describing phenomena at different scales, highlighting their interconnections, is absolutely fundamental for knowledge to be mobilising.”

20th century: “The physical laws governing evolution in all probability take on a simpler form when referred to the system as a whole than to any portion thereof. It is not so much the organism

Anthropocene (2002) with its “planetary boundaries” (2009), have similarly conveyed the importance of adopting a macrolevel approach to geological integration. Considering bio-geo-chemical



cycles highlights the role of life in sustaining, but also in undermining, the conditions in which life unfolds. These and other aggregate categories such as “climate change” or “biodiversity loss” involve considerable levels of ontological construction and therefore ambiguity. Yet, the realisation of their complexity must be a stepping-stone for action, not demobilisation.

What is then to be done? From an academic perspective, two basic suggestions seem apposite. First, to capture such intricate phenomena, broad conceptual aggregations are necessary, which depend upon the set-up of conducive institutional structures. Seeing the world in “disciplines”, institutionalised in faculties, departments, degrees, courses, textbooks, professions, etc., seems increasingly inadequate to tackle such challenges. What is needed is more problem- (not discipline-) driven thinking, encouraged by and institutionalised in problem-driven structures. “Environment” schools are currently leading this trend, as previously did public policy, public health,

business schools and, even earlier, faculties of medicine.

Second, describing phenomena at different scales, highlighting their interconnections, is absolutely fundamental for knowledge to be mobilising. Highly individualised occurrences, such as a person playing cards with friends in Northern Italy who gets sick and dies, may result from complex aggregate phenomena unfolding at the global scale. The vanguard in this scale integration effort lies, perhaps, in a new generation of (non-equilibrium) integrated assessment models, which connect the local and the global. One prominent example is the modelling of “tipping points” in the dynamics of global environmental change. To understand it, a detour is useful. Social scientists tend to assume that climate policy works like heating water into vapour and then cooling it back to water: putting more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere may change the dynamics of the climate system, but removing them is sufficient for the climate to go back to its prior “equilibrium”. Politically,

this means “pollute now and clean up later”. Yet, this representation of the world is demobilising and inaccurate. Emitting greenhouse gases should be compared to burning a piece of paper. Once the paper turns into ashes – the tipping point – one cannot simply go back by cooling the ashes. There is no “pollute now, clean up later”, for either climate change or other examples of global environmental change.

The 21st century will be increasingly confronted with global environmental change felt not just at the aggregate human timescale, but also in our everyday experience as individuals. Knowledge integration and appropriate levels of description are key conditions for us not to be mere spectators of a “risk” we can indeed address.

MAURITIUS, Mahébourg. Volunteers collect leaked oil from the MV *Wakashio* bulk carrier that had run aground at the beach. 13 August 2020. Beekash ROOPUN/L'Express Maurice/AFP



THE NEW FRONTIERS OF RISK

FINANCE AND RISK OVER THE LONG RUN

Rui Esteves

Professor of International History

FRANCE, Douarnenez.
An old sailing ship
sails in the bay during
the Douarnenez
Festival. 19 July 2000.
Emmanuel PAIN/AFP

Risk is a consequence of almost all human activity, and societies developed a number of strategies to deal with it, falling in one of three categories: avoid, pool and share. Avoidance is frequently inefficient because of the opportunity costs of shunting risky activities. Early on, individuals and organisations devised forms of pooling risks together or of sharing risk among them. Finance provided many techniques for this.

Risk can be pooled by self-insurance. Medieval traders used to split their cargoes in different ships, the same way that investors today diversify their portfolios. Pooling can also be done by insurers. While individual risks are idiosyncratic, aggregate risk is more manageable. Early forms of life insurance were tried in the Middle

Ages, but the business only matured once actuarial life tables appeared in the late 18th century. Increasingly accurate estimates of death risk by age and the law of large numbers allowed life insurance companies to match a predictable stream of payments with the regular income from insurance premia and their investments.

Insurers expanded their range of products over time by offering protection for less predictable risks, such as property damage, fire, natural disasters, or even financial losses. Because these risks were harder to forecast, insurers increasingly found themselves exposed to “tail risk”, whereby the concentration of simultaneous claims exceeded the insurer’s funds. Fire insurance companies, for instance, were first introduced after the 1666

Great Fire of London but faced high bankruptcy rates given the scale of the damage provoked by large city fires such as those started by the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Consequently, re-insurance emerged in the 19th century to deal with the fallout of these rare events.

Risk-sharing techniques developed parallel to insurance. Their specificity lies in spreading risk among several investors, rather than concentrating it on a single insurer. Since Roman times, traders could insure their cargo and even the ship carrying it by selling bottomry bonds, which they only had to repay if the ship reached its destination. Sharing was also a solution to cover large risks that exceeded the capacity of a single insurer. Insurance brokers shopped around for potential

“Unlike risk, uncertainty is not easily quantifiable and cannot be insured or traded efficiently in markets.”

investors, who added their names to the policy, thereby “underwriting” it. The rise of stock exchanges since the 17th century also created a liquid market for transferable securities (securitisation) that allowed issuers to sell and distribute risk. *Pfandbriefe* (covered bonds), collateralised by mortgages, were introduced in Germany in the late 18th century. Trading in government bonds also created a market for political risk, which investors can follow from the daily spreads of sovereign bonds.

Good ideas bear repeating, and many of these solutions were rediscovered in the financialisation wave since the 1970s. Mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) became infamous in the 2008 financial crisis, while today’s sovereign debt market is as active as its 19th century predecessor. Even bottomry bonds were revived with the introduction of “catastrophe bonds” (CAT) in 1997. Investors in these bonds stand to lose their capital if a given “act of God” is triggered. CAT bonds are mostly sold by re-insurers to protect themselves against the losses from natural disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes. In return, investors are paid very high yields which are not correlated with

other financial assets. An attractive proposition in any time (but especially in the world of rock-bottom yields since 2008), investment in these products increased from USD 22 billion in 2007 to over USD 100 billion today.

In 2003 Swiss Re introduced the first pandemic CAT bond insuring against spikes in mortality rates in five advanced nations. In 2017 the World Bank issued its own pandemic bond to pre-finance aid to developing nations in case of a pandemic. The bond’s interest varied between 7 and 11.5 percent above LIBOR (paid by Germany and Japan) and attracted a lot of interest. However, in April 2020 this was the first pandemic bond to be triggered by the COVID crisis. Though the amount lost by investors was but a fraction of the aid committed by the Bank since COVID (USD 200 million against USD 160 billion), the event chilled the market. COVID reminded investors that pandemic risk is in fact correlated with financial markets and the World Bank dropped the idea of issuing new pandemic bonds.

As insurers and markets extend their cover against increasingly hard-to-predict events, they face new obstacles. In their recent book *Radical Uncertainty*, John Kay and Mervyn

King warn against the false precision we get from statistical models of risk, based on probabilistic assessments about all possible states of the world. Black swan events such as the 2008 crisis are very hard to predict, but in real life we are not even certain about all kinds of possible events. In other words, life is not a game of roulette with clear fixed rules and probabilities. Unlike risk, uncertainty is not easily quantifiable and cannot be insured or traded efficiently in markets. MBSs and CAT bonds exemplify the limits of the financialisation of risk. Rather than hoping that probabilistic models will fill our knowledge gap about “unknown unknowns”, the authors call for more resilient strategies to prepare for future uncertainty and more flexible and collaborative decision-making to deal with it. COVID exposed the fragile networks of trade and finance underlying our globalised world and the need for international cooperation to fight the pandemic. This is to date the strongest endorsement of resilience and cooperation.



THE NEW FRONTIERS OF RISK

SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

Cédric Tille

Professor of International Economics

Director of the Bilateral Assistance and Capacity Building for Banks (BCC) Programme

A central feature of financial markets is that they are prone to “manias, panics and crashes”, to take the title of the seminal book by Robert Aliber and Charles Kindleberger. Corraling them through regulation is thus necessary to limit the damage from excessive volatility.

Ten years after the financial crisis of 2008, and faced with the disruptions brought by the COVID pandemic, are we about to face another wave of financial crises? Furthermore, how should we react to the pandemic while keeping in mind the financial consequences of long-term challenges such as climate change?

The 2008 crisis reflected an internal build-up of excesses in the financial system – a so-called “endogenous risk” – rather than an external exogenous disruption such as Covid. Years of low volatility had made lenders complacent to a large build-up of leverage, with regulators not seeing the danger soon enough. Not only was the imbalance large, it was present in segments of markets subjected to limited oversight.

Policymakers reacted rapidly once the crisis burst. They took the issue of leverage more seriously and implemented a range of more stringent limits, such as requiring large “too big to fail” institutions to hold bigger cushions of capital. Reform efforts have surely not been perfect, and in many instances could have gone further, but several steps were adopted that would have been unthinkable beforehand, such as the entrustment of the European Central Bank (ECB) with the supervision of large European banks. Central banks also have started paying much more attention to financial stability. As a result, the financial system entered 2020 in a better shape than it entered the 2008 crisis.

So, will COVID lead to a financial crisis? It may, but it would be a different crisis than in 2008. While in March financial markets showed bottlenecks that were reminiscent of 2008, the situation was rapidly addressed by an aggressive reaction of central banks. The main concern is not so much that excesses have built up within markets, but that the most severe recession

since World War II could trigger a wave of bankruptcies and losses for banks. As the amounts of debt owed by households and firms has kept increasing since the last crisis, an insolvency crisis is a serious risk.

The buffers built by regulators, such as limits on the size of mortgages, constitute a first line of defence. Macroeconomic support policies constitute a second one. These include the broadening of unemployment benefits, including for workers with reduced worktime, and financial support to firms facing a temporary drop in business. These income support policies reduce the risk of borrowers defaulting on their obligations. Should bankruptcies unfortunately not prove avoidable, a third line of defence is for policymakers to spread them through time to prevent a concentrated wave of insolvencies from magnifying financial distress by pushing collateral prices further down. An injection of public funds to recapitalise banks would also be an option. While this is never a popular policy, the current problem is not due to excesses by lenders, and direct

FRANCE, Paris. French and international newspaper headlines hanging on the gate in front of the Paris Bourse on the day following the 1987 stock market crash. 20 October 1987. Olivier NILSSON/Archives/AFP

support has often proved less costly than a very long period of stagnation due to ailing banks.

If we look past the pandemic, climate change constitutes a major long-term concern for financial stability. Climate events will unfortunately play a larger role in coming years, and their impact on economic cycles and financial losses needs to be taken into account. The earning prospects of entire sectors, such as oil and coal production, are likely to be affected, and lenders investing in them could face unpleasant reassessments of their portfolios. Failing to take into account environmental and climatic factors may well lead to a major crisis in the future.

The good news is that the financial sector and regulators have started recognising the issue, and are moving rapidly towards updating the models used to assess financial risk. A growing number of central banks have joined the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which is focused on handling the problem. Only time will tell whether this initiative will prove sufficient and timely enough to mitigate the impact of the coming climate events on the financial system.

To add to injury, the financial sector is faced with a rapid technological change, driven primarily by non-bank

actors. Advances in fintech are challenging the business of established financial firms, including banks, which ultimately will lead them to adapt to the benefit of the consumer. The emer-

financial system harder to monitor? Could the growing role of global technology companies in the provision of financial services overwhelm the ability of national regulators? This is a risk,

“If we look past the pandemic, climate change constitutes a major long-term concern for financial stability.”

gence of cryptocurrencies similarly challenges the central role of official money as the main mean of payment. The well-known Libra project has been met with a strong reaction by central banks, and substantially evolved in response to the concerns voiced by policymakers.

Innovation usually provides the consumer with new products that existing entities would have been slow to adopt. Could it, however, make the

and addressing this risk requires coordination among policymakers and joint efforts by central banks. Regulators and central banks have indeed become actively involved in shaping the evolution of the system, and updating the regulatory framework through the BIS Innovation Hub is a step in the right direction. Still, the risk of policymakers being “outgunned” by the new financial providers will have to be carefully monitored in the years ahead.

Black Conversations

Interview with Diandra Dillon
Founder and President



Diandra is pursuing a Master in International History. Originally from Jamaica, she moved to Los Angeles during high school. She later studied Environmental Science and Policy at Smith College. Through her interactions with different Black experiences worldwide, she identified with the need to change the narratives of misconceptions concerning Black individuals and to create a space where Blackness could be authentically expressed and observed in its complexity.

What is Black Conversations?

Black Conversations – BC – is an interactive platform that provides a space where people of African descent can engage in discussions and debate about our communities. The organisation seeks to engage diverse perspectives to understand the *Black* experience. It is a space where Black opinions are uplifted and empowered, deconstructing systemic dynamics established by non-Blacks who often dominate the discourse and policies shaping Black communities. BC strives to put Black people at the forefront of these discussions by promoting leadership, self-expression, agency, and accountability. BC wants to be a starting point in facilitating a sustained, positive change.

How does BC contribute to the Graduate Institute community?

Discussing topics about Black communities may be difficult in the classroom due to the paucity of knowledge and fear of sounding culturally insensitive. BC is a call-in space where we can respectfully voice our disagreements and grievances without sanitising or causing ostracisation. It helps its members dismantle stereotypes by understanding the conception of Blackness within distinct Black communities, beyond what is commonly portrayed by the media. The aim of these discussions is for members to think critically about having a community-centred approach to problem-solving.

How does BC participate in global discussions on race and race relations?

BC aims to have nuanced conversations about race and its members' contributions to social progress, providing a complete and complex representation of Black individuals in world-spaces. In addition, our dialogues focus on the intended and unintended consequences that structural racism has on the development and economic policies of Black communities worldwide. In partnership with the Afrique Students Association, BC seeks leaders and professionals within Black communities to serve as mentors.

What is your hope for this initiative?

BC hopes to collaborate with students and professionals to promote positive empowerment and self-determination. Thus, BC encourages having a critical understanding of the issues that thwart the socio-economic development of Black communities.



The International Council of Voluntary Agencies Publishes Students' Capstone on Security Risk Management

Emanuel Hermann and Silvan Oberholzer, both master students in Development Studies, conducted research for the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) as part of their Capstone Project, which gives students in the interdisciplinary masters programmes the opportunity to apply their analytical skills and deliver practical research projects with partners in International Geneva.

Please explain your Capstone and the importance of your findings

We conducted our Capstone on security risk management (SRM) in the humanitarian sector in cooperation with ICVA, based in Geneva. ICVA was interested in how SRM was included in decision-making processes and how it affected the work of humanitarian NGOs, particularly if it led to organisations being less willing to engage in high-risk areas.

Over eight months, we interviewed representatives of international as well as local humanitarian NGOs, donor agencies, and experts working on SRM in humanitarian action. These interviews were complemented by an online survey for humanitarian practitioners who were either directly responsible for or involved in SRM processes.

Our research uncovered two major findings. First, security risks received far less organisational attention than either reputational or legal risks. Second, we found that certain underlying SRM practices triggered the transfer of risks to an organisation with a limited capacity to manage such risks.

What did the Capstone offer you that was unique in terms of learning experience?

The Capstone was, in many ways, an enriching experience that showed us the relevance of taking one step back from the research topic under study; this required a thorough understanding of existing debates and practices around the topic. This allowed us to critically reflect on current decision-making processes and SRM practices, and the broader functioning of the humanitarian sector. Building on this, we were able to draft the recommendations for humanitarian practitioners and actors involved in agenda-setting and policymaking in humanitarian action.

Additionally, perseverance and patience during and after the research process were key. It was great to see that our efforts were rewarded when ICVA invited us to publish a shortened version of our Capstone report, that allowed us to disseminate our research to a wide audience.

Finally, through ICVA's network, we were able to speak to people in decision-making positions within humanitarian NGOs and donor organisations, which gave us first-hand insights into how humanitarian actors try to mitigate security risks for their staff. Through our publication, we hope that we can provide a platform for a renewed dialogue between international and local humanitarian NGOs as well as their donors.

→ <https://www.icvanetwork.org/resources/security-risk-management-capstone-final-report>

Pride Is Still a Riot

Matheus **Ferreira Gois Fontes**

Second-year master student in International Law

and Massimiliano **Masini**

Second-year master student in Development Studies



Going into confinement following the COVID-19 pandemic is without a doubt the most extraordinary circumstance for Pride since parades spread across the globe in the 1970s. For a community that built its political platform through a struggle on the streets and that claimed the streets as a space for celebration, their emptiness forces us into a moment of introspection and reflection.

Community has a special meaning for queer people. Since not all groups support our identities, reaching for an inclusive group “out there” is essential in the process of (re-)claiming identity and existence in the public space. Having this taken away, as we were locked inside our homes, many of us realised the importance of surrounding ourselves with queer people and allies alike. The distance from our chosen families forced us to pause and reflect on the persistence and renewal of discrimination.

Pride marches began one year after the Stonewall riot on 28 June 1969, where queer clients at the Stonewall Inn bar flooded the streets of New York City, rioting against the police raid that intended to close one of the few places that allowed openly queer people. By remembering this event, we shed a light on the importance of political activism for the present recognition of basic rights for LGBTQIA+ people. And the engagement of early activists – mostly black and transgender – should inspire queer activists and allies all around the globe.

The celebratory spirit of pride should not be an excuse *not* to protest, or *not* to demand equality of rights and opportunities against the persisting, overarching sexist and patriarchal structure, which is far from coming undone. Rather, this spirit should motivate us to persist in the political battle for social justice in all its dimensions.

Indeed, we must not oversimplify the historical fight of LGBTQIA+ activists for our rights and recognition in light of recent progress; the rise of openly anti-queer (as well as sexist, racist, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic) political forces throughout the world – including in Europe and North America, where many wrongly thought this to be inconceivable – has not been met with the appropriate institutional resistance.

The fight for LGBTQIA+ rights is ongoing, and requires persistent and conscious action.



LES ÉTUDIANTS

Solidarity That Started with Students

As the COVID-19 pandemic required the Graduate Institute to close its physical campus during the spring 2020 semester, two students – Alexa-Rae **Burk** (left in photo above), Founder and President of the Parents’ Initiative and newly elected President of the Graduate Institute Student Association (GISA), and Elizabeth **Nakielny**, President of the Welfare Committee – came up with a novel way to unite the student body.

Why was the Solidarity Initiative created?

The Initiative was created to provide practical and emotional support to students. We were aware that during confinement, some students might have to quarantine themselves because they were feeling unwell or were immune-compromised; others might have felt alone and isolated. It was with both shock and awe that we witnessed borders closing and lockdowns imposed. With confinement, the Solidarity Initiative acted as an anchor for people. Within 72 hours of setting up our mutual aid system, almost 100 participants were matched up to provide help and support with things like purchasing groceries, running errands or simply connecting via WhatsApp with uplifting messages of support.

What were some of the unexpected outcomes of the Initiative?

We were surprised by how the Solidarity Initiative blossomed. We were reluctant to take “ownership” of it, and instead encouraged and envisioned this Initiative as something belonging to all students. Individuals, GISA and other student initiatives flexed their creative muscles and the spirit of solidarity. There were calls to help volunteer with local organisations, a quarantine cookbook was written, podcasts

were broadcasted, a digital connectivity challenge was invented and much more. There was also real advocacy behind the scenes from the Solidarity Initiative, alongside the GISA board, for the creation of a COVID-19 Solidarity Fund for students impacted financially by the crisis, as well as an option for a pass/fail grading system.

What activities will you pursue going forward?

Our strength is in our flexibility. We remain ready to respond to what arises, whilst taking into account our limitations as working moms and students with additional responsibilities as now GISA President and Welfare Committee President. Our ultimate goal is to serve the Graduate Institute community and our own families. We are aware that students who are returning to Geneva, or coming here for the first time, may be required to self-isolate for 10 days, so we have already launched a Solidarity Initiative “2.0” to help support those in quarantine.

How do you see solidarity at the Institute and in the world?

Solidarity and compassion go hand-in-hand; both are based on principles of equality. Unlike traditional forms of charity, which can be very hierarchical, solidarity is a relationship between equals. A personal wish at the Institute level is that we can break down some barriers to talk and share our struggles, allowing us to ask for help when we need it. A capitalist culture means that we don’t always feel safe showing our humanity; we are working to create a humanscape at the Institute, where compassion, solidarity and humanity flourish.

Entretien avec Djacob A. S. Oliva Tehindrazanarivelo

Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République de Madagascar



Comment êtes-vous devenu ministre des Affaires étrangères de Madagascar ?

J'ai toujours voulu mettre mes compétences au service de mon pays d'origine. J'ai pu le faire à travers des consultations ces dix dernières années mais n'avais jamais imaginé le faire en tant que ministre. En novembre 2019, j'ai fait partie de la délégation malagasy pour la Commission mixte Madagascar-France sur le différend relatif aux « îles Éparses » au large de Madagascar. Deux mois plus tard, on m'a appelé pour dire que le pays a besoin de moi. C'est ainsi qu'en une semaine je passai d'enseignant universitaire à ministre.

Quels sont les défis pour vous en tant que ministre et pour Madagascar en cette période particulièrement complexe pour les relations internationales ?

En cette période de pandémie, l'un des défis pour un nouveau ministre comme moi est l'absence de contacts personnels avec mes homologues étrangers à cause de l'annulation des conférences présentielle. Or, ces contacts me permettent d'appeler aisément ces homologues à toute heure pour des questions relatives à la protection des intérêts du pays et de sa diaspora.

Pour Madagascar, je citerai deux défis parmi d'autres. Le premier, circonstanciel, est de trouver des mesures

contre la COVID-19 qui tiennent compte des réalités locales et d'orienter les aides internationales vers des besoins identifiés par l'État. Le deuxième est de garder la neutralité politique vis-à-vis des partenaires étrangers qui nous demandent de soutenir telle décision, condamner tel acte, sachant que cela va froisser un autre État. Pour un pays comme Madagascar qui a besoin du soutien de tous pour son projet d'émergence, c'est un exercice d'équilibre de faire admettre à un important partenaire, et sans en faire un ennemi, que la préservation de nos intérêts ne nous permet pas d'accéder à sa demande.

Vos études à l'Institut, et notamment votre spécialisation en droit international public, sont-elles utiles et pertinentes dans votre nouvelle fonction ?

La formation globale reçue à l'Institut est très utile dans la prise de décision et la rédaction d'instructions sur diverses questions qui me sont soumises quotidiennement. Ma spécialisation me permet de défendre au mieux les intérêts de Madagascar dans des discussions de traités, de demandes de privilèges ou d'exceptions, et d'apporter des éclairages sur des questions de droit international examinées au sein du gouvernement.

Quels conseils donneriez-vous à nos étudiants aujourd'hui ?

Il faut tirer profit de la formation pluridisciplinaire offerte par l'Institut car dans la vie pratique vous serez amenés à discuter toutes questions internationales et on s'attend à ce que vous les maîtrisiez. À l'intérieur de votre discipline, ne vous spécialisez pas trop tôt et laissez la vie professionnelle le faire au gré des fonctions que vous allez occuper.

GENEVA
ACADEMY

Académie de droit international
humanitaire et de droits humains
Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights

#Master's Programmes

#Armed Conflict

#Human Rights Protection



LES ALUMNI

Gloria Gaggioli, New Director of the Geneva Academy

Tell us about your background. What attracted you to a career in international law?

Born in Geneva from Italian parents, I evolved in a socially diverse and multicultural environment. I have always admired the work of international organisations (IOs) and NGOs located here, which deploy immense energy to help victims of armed conflicts and the most vulnerable. This led me to study international relations, and the Graduate Institute was the perfect place to do so. When I graduated, the University Center for International Humanitarian Law had just been created and I immediately decided to enrol as it was offering all the specialised international law courses I dreamt of... I am humbled and extremely happy to lead now its successor, the Geneva Academy, which has shaped my career. This institution gave me the necessary expertise to get a much-coveted position as Thematic Legal Adviser at the ICRC. Passion for teaching and research then brought me back to academia in 2014 and I am grateful to the University of Geneva for having believed and invested in me.

What role should the Geneva Academy play in addressing today's IHL and human rights challenges?

I see our action and impact in four areas. First, we train tomorrow's leaders in the fields of international law related to armed conflict. Second, we are shaping the debate and providing guidance to states, IOs and other stakeholders by producing academic and policy-oriented research. Third,

we have a unique position to ensure connectivity with and amongst Geneva-based institutions, and in particular UN human rights bodies. Lastly, we strive to locate respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law at the centre of the international community's preoccupations. This is not an easy task at a time where security and economic concerns are at the forefront.

What are your priorities for the Geneva Academy?

My priorities are to ensure that our masters are at the top in terms of substance, with cutting-edge teaching methods and professionalising activities. This year, in response to the global health crisis, we are offering all of our master programmes in blended teaching. This involves challenges but also opportunities. For instance, practitioners from all over the world are registering for our Executive Master, which can now be followed entirely online. I thus want to explore opportunities to jump into the digital age in a purposeful and targeted manner. I wish also to strengthen our research and potentially develop conflict-related interdisciplinary research; we cannot solve current humanitarian challenges without integrating various international law branches and disciplines. This ambitious plan requires resources at a time of maximum constraints. We will need to think out of the box and develop projects that become self-sustainable in the long run.

→ www.geneva-academy.ch

Patricia Danzi Appointed Director General of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)



Born in Switzerland, Patricia Danzi is the daughter of a Swiss German secondary school teacher and a Nigerian diplomat. She studied in the United States and Switzerland, and holds a master's degree in Agricultural Economics, Geography and Environmental Science. After representing Switzerland in the women's heptathlon at the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, she began work at the International Committee of the Red Cross, with posts in Europe, Africa and Latin America. She assumed the responsibilities of Director-General in May 2020.

In 2001, you participated in an Executive Education programme at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies. What are the commonalities and differences of today's notion of development as compared to 20 years ago?

First of all, let me say that I never missed a class during the eight months of the programme! This type of study was different from my previous experiences in the US and at ETH Zurich. The development knowledge proposed to the students was scrutinised through a rich and contextualised reality check and translated into action proposals. At the same time, this contextualisation made the common features that are part of any development process appear.

In 2020, the lexicon has changed but reflects the same concerns from the 2000s: grassroots involvement is now embedded in localisation, solidarity is still considered a core element of partnership, participation is again used as the key process for community engagement and continuum is now dynamised via the concept of nexus.

Whatever the words are, the understanding and acceptance of the basics of the notion of development are better today than 20 years ago, and the 17 SDGs are a reference frame in the global world. In Switzerland, the COVID-19 crisis has been a stimulus for opening a debate on the necessity to revisit what could be more inclusive development. Furthermore, COVID has demonstrated – in Switzerland and elsewhere – that answering short-term urgencies is intertwined with proposing long-term resilience developments.

How is Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy (ICS) 2021–2024 capitalising on previous strategies and what are the focal points for the next four years?

This Strategy has been, perhaps for the first time, easily understood, supported and accepted by the Parliament without contesting the assumptions of for what and why the budget was meant to be used (CHF 12.5 billion from 2021 to 2024, of which the SDC is expected to manage CHF 9.45 billion). It builds on previous foci, such as peace, the rule of law, populations' needs, climate change, effectiveness, Switzerland's long-term interests and the added value offered by international cooperation. But today's ICS foci are formulated in a more concise manner. The focus on population/partner needs, for example, will be better articulated.

The new ICS was also inspired by the 2020–2023 Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy: it is not just about setting out what Switzerland wants to achieve in the long term, but also about knowing what relevance and value is granted to our objectives by our partners.

The ICS also emphasises that special attention be paid to further engage the private sector. This engagement is not new; it started with the support of informal/micro, small and medium size production units, responding to the needs of poor/under-privileged populations for jobs and financial support to reduce dependency and escape poverty through entrepreneurship. Today's international firms and SMEs are ever more interested in reducing inequalities and poverty for the sake of their markets' growth. ICS shares that same interest, but in the interest of leaving no one behind. When designing these partnerships, ICS has to remain vigilant to marry the approaches in the best interest of the communities it is meant to serve.

At the same time, the informal economy continues booming because of COVID, and acts as an accelerator, which is a reality that we have to keep in mind.

Any strategy needs data and knowledge to be developed and translated into action. This knowledge has to contribute to prospective visions that can be applied later according to context. How can the Institute contribute to these objectives?

The production of quantitative and qualitative data is booming in an exponential way in all fields. The multiplication of data platforms is not an end in itself, as data need all kinds of skills to be scanned and contextually analysed. Statistics are important and it is only with reliable data that SDG indicators can be reported successfully. Such a process is the condition to widen the perspectives and to build projections and options for defining scenarios for future action.

In that context the Institute is in a good position to take up the challenge of contributing to reach the previous objectives. During the COVID-19 crisis, the Institute gained experience by mastering virtual teaching, learning and social interactions, ensuring that its rich network of students and alumni will remain one of its comparative advantages.

Nevertheless, real social interactions are indispensable tools for analysing and understanding reality. That is why I am excited to visit the Institute, to share with faculty and students my experience and reflections about the common interests the Institute and SDC could develop in the future.

Interview by MICHEL CARTON
Emeritus Professor of Development Studies



LES ARCHIVES

Fourty Years of “Development” Theories, Policies and Instruments

Michel **Carton**

Emeritus Professor of Development Studies

The Graduate Institute archives contain an extensive collection of different types of documents covering the majority of the activities managed by the IUED’s *Service études et projets (SEP)*, from 1962 up to the creation of the Graduate Institute in 2008. These documents are located within a specific fund and include projects, studies and further education programmes, the majority of which being implemented in French-speaking countries as well as Colombia and Haiti, thanks in great part to the financial support of the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC). The archives cover a wide breadth of topics, among them health, rural development, hydraulic planning, informal education/training and informal sector/economy.

Two other specific funds relate to SDC’s involvement in South Africa and Rwanda. The H.-P. Cart fund comprises the archives of Henri-Philippe Cart, the former Vice-Director at the SDC who passed away in 2007, in connection with his activities in both apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa (since the 1970s). Mr Cart also supported Swiss academic institutions focused on development issues (such as IUED). In addition, a fund dedicated to the Rwanda situation in the 1990s is being prepared, and will be made available at the beginning of 2021. This fund will illustrate the mediation and information roles played in the country by different organisations, including IUED. This will complement the François Mitterrand archives on Rwanda currently available in Paris.

All the corresponding files include information on the socioeconomic situation and national/international development policies in the concerned countries. The files also hold descriptions and analyses of the development policies and instruments in use in the international development community ranging from the 1960s to the 1990s.

Such archives are an invaluable source of information and knowledge about the debates on what have been theories, policies and instruments of “development” over a period of more than 40 years. Passing through these files reveals that contemporary debates can be traced through time, revealing that today’s rushed conclusions often lack historical depth, which the files can now provide.

These archives are an addition to the administrative archives, which depict the institutional and academic dimensions of IUED from its creation in 1961 up to its merge with IUHEI in 2008.

The development-related funds and the administrative archives represent a unique source of research and teaching activities for universities, development partners, and international and non-governmental organisations, in both the Global North and South.

Currently, the SEP and H.-P. Cart funds are available for consultation. Requests in this regard can be made to the archivist, Isabelle Cramer.

LA RECHERCHE

Nouvelles publications



Cambridge Studies in Law and Society.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 310 p.

THE UNCOUNTED *POLITICS OF DATA IN GLOBAL HEALTH*

Sara L.M. **Davis**

In the global race to reach the end of AIDS, why is the world slipping off track? The answer has to do with stigma, money, and data. Global funding for the AIDS response is declining. Tough choices must be made: some people will win and some will lose. Global aid agencies and governments use health data to make these choices. While aid agencies prioritise a shrinking list of countries, many governments deny that sex workers, men who have sex with men, drug users, and transgender people exist. Since no data is gathered about their needs, life-saving services are not funded, and the lack of data reinforces the denial. *The Uncounted* cracks open this and other data paradoxes through interviews with global health leaders and activists, ethnographic research, analysis of gaps in mathematical models, and the author’s experience as an activist and senior official. It shows what is counted, what is not, and why empowering communities to gather their own data could be key to ending AIDS.



Third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. 580 p.

CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW

Paola **Gaeta**, Jorge E. **Viñuales**
and Salvatore **Zappalà**

Cassese’s International Law is a new edition of an established classic. Authors Paola Gaeta, Jorge Viñuales, and Salvatore Zappalà have built on the legacy of international law luminary Antonio Cassese to offer a thought-provoking and lucid account of the discipline.

This edition presents complex legal reasoning in an accessible way to form a rigorous and well-written text. It compares the traditional legal position with the evolving law, and it provides detailed yet accessible examinations of the main contemporary issues, including the use of force, the UN role, human rights, humanitarian law, international criminal law, environmental law and economic law. In addition, the late Professor and Judge Cassese’s unrivalled expertise as a world-leading practitioner and highly-respected academic brings a breadth of knowledge and experience to the book.

All chapters in this new edition have been substantially revised to incorporate new developments and all major decisions from the ICJ, the ITLOS, arbitration tribunals, the WTO organs, human rights courts, international criminal tribunals and the ICC, among other bodies.



Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 162 p.

GOVERNING THROUGH EXPERTISE *THE POLITICS OF BIOETHICS*

Annabelle **Littoz-Monnet**

This book provides us with a fresh analysis of the enmeshment of expert knowledge with politics in global governance. Through a unique investigation of bioethical expertise – an intriguing form of “expert knowledge” that claims authority in the ethical analysis of issues that arise in relation to biomedicine, the life sciences and new fields of technological innovation – Annabelle Littoz-Monnet makes the case that the mobilisation of ethics experts does not always arise from a motivation to rationalise governance. Instead, mobilising ethics experts – who are endowed with a unique double-edged authority, both “democratic” and “epistemic” – can help policymakers manoeuvre policy conflicts on scientific and technological innovations, and make their pro-science and innovation agendas possible. Bioethical expertise is indeed shaped in a political and iterative space between experts and those who do policy. The book reveals that knowledge and politics become entangled through the operation of three logics, labelled “orchestration”, “ideational alignment” and “calibration”, which act as stabilisation mechanisms and prevent contestation.

Nouvelles publications



London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. 387 p.

WHEN CAN OIL ECONOMIES BE DEEMED SUSTAINABLE?

Edited by Giacomo **Luciani** and Tom **Moerenhout**

This open access book questions the stereotype depicting all Gulf (GCC) economies as not sustainable, and starts a critical discussion of what these economies and polities should do to guarantee themselves a relatively stable future. Volatile international oil markets and the acceleration of the energy transition has challenged the notion that oil revenues are sufficient to sustain oil economies in the near to medium term. But what is the meaning of economic sustainability? The book discusses the multiple dimensions of the concept: economic diversification, continuing value of resources, taxation and fiscal development, labor market sustainability, sustainable income distribution, environmental sustainability, political order (democracy or authoritarianism) and sustainability, regional integration. The overarching message in this book is that we should move on from the simplistic branding of the Gulf economies as unsustainable and tackle the details of which adaptations they might need to undertake.



VoxEU.org Book. London: CEPR Press, 2020. 385 p.

COVID-19 IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

Edited by Simeon **Djankov** and Ugo **Panizza**

The COVID-19 pandemic started in China but soon moved to Europe and the US. At the beginning of the pandemic, it was hoped that warm weather and younger populations would shield many developing economies from the virus; this hope has not been realised. While many advanced economies have made progress in controlling the pandemic, many countries in Africa and Latin America are registering an increase in the number of cases and may suffer long-lasting consequences from the pandemic.

There is a large, rapidly growing body of literature on the economic effect of COVID-19 in advanced economies. However, developing and emerging market countries differ from advanced economies in both the structure of the economy and the tools that can be used to implement macroeconomic policies aimed at reducing the amplitude and the economic costs of recession associated with the pandemic.

This eBook, co-published with the *International Development Policy* journal at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, summarises the early work focusing on developing and emerging economies.



Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 945 p.

DEFENCE ARGUMENTS IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

Vol. 18 of ICSID Reports, edited by Jorge E. **Viñuales** and Michael **Waibel**

The ICSID Reports provide an authoritative published collection of investor-State arbitral awards and decisions rendered under the auspices of the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), pursuant to other bilateral or multilateral investment treaties. These fully indexed decisions make an important contribution to the growing body of jurisprudence on international investment law.

Given the increasing availability of such decisions in the public domain, volume 18 inaugurates a new format characterised by a thematic focus, significant space devoted to analysis of the field, more detailed summaries of reported cases, and reports in the form of carefully selected excerpts of relevant decisions.

Volume 18 focuses on *Defence Arguments in Investment Arbitration*, including an opening piece from leading scholar and practitioner Professor Jan Paulsson, and a 100-page preliminary study by Jorge E. Viñuales, Harold Samuel Chair of Law and Environmental Policy at the University of Cambridge and Adjunct Professor of International Law at the Institute.



Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 401 p.

THE UN FRIENDLY RELATIONS DECLARATION AT 50 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Edited by Jorge E. **Viñuales**

The year 2020 marks the 75th anniversary of the United Nations Organization, and the 50th anniversary of the United Nations Friendly Relations Declaration. In commemoration, some of the world's most prominent international law scholars from all continents have come together to offer a comprehensive study of the fundamental principles of international law.

Each chapter reflects decades of experience, work and reflection by the most authoritative voices of the field. At the same time, the book is an invitation to end narrow specialisation and re-engage with the wider body of rules and processes that lie at the foundations of the international legal order.

The volume includes contributions from (in chapter order): Jorge E. **Viñuales**, Georges **Abi-Saab**, Samuel **Moyn**, Umut **Özsu**, Olivier **Corten**, Shotaro **Hamamoto**, Dire **Tladi**, Laurence **Boisson de Chazournes**, Jason **Rudall**, Marcelo G. **Kohen**, Martti **Koskenniemi**, Ville **Kari**, Guillaume **Futhazar**, Anne **Peters**, Eibe **Riedel**, Jia **Bing Bing**, Leslie-Anne **Duvic-Paoli**, Tullio **Treves**, and Pierre-Marie **Dupuy**.



International Development Policy. Issue 12, online and in print (Brill | Nijhoff). 2020.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY DRUG POLICIES AND DEVELOPMENT: CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE

Edited by Julia **Buxton**, Mary **Chinery-Hesse** and Khalid **Tinasti**

The latest thematic issue of *International Development Policy* explores the relationship between international drug policy and development goals, currently and within an historical perspective. Criminalisation and coercive law enforcement-based drug control responses at both the international and the national levels are shown to undermine peace, security and development objectives.

The 15 contributions address the drugs and development nexus from a range of critical viewpoints, highlighting gaps and contradictions, as well as exploring strategies and opportunities for enhanced linkages between the control of illegal drugs and development programming.

→ <https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.3408>

→ <https://brill.com/view/title/58981>



International Development Policy. Issue 12.2, online. 2020.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY LA COVID-19 DANS LES PAYS EN DÉVELOPPEMENT | LA COVID-19 EN LAS ECONOMÍAS EN DESARROLLO

La Revue internationale de politique de développement et le Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ont publié *COVID-19 in Developing Economies*, un ebook coédité par Simeon Djankov et Ugo Panizza (voir ci-contre). Les auteurs y analysent notamment les effets de la pandémie sur la pauvreté, les inégalités et l'économie informelle. Ils interrogent les réponses politiques contre la COVID-19 et leurs conséquences macroéconomiques et financières. Sept des 28 contributions en anglais ont été traduites en français et/ou en espagnol et réunies dans ce numéro de la revue.

→ <https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.3455>



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CP 1672 – CH-1211 Genève 1 | Tél.: +41 22 908 57 00 | graduateinstitute.ch

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Couverture: USA, Californie. Des pompiers face à l'avancée de l'incendie
aux abords de Santa Rosa. 27 septembre 2020. Samuel CORUM/AFP

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La nouvelle Maison des étudiants Grand Morillon

Conçue par l'architecte japonais Kengo Kuma, la Maison des étudiants Grand Morillon offrira 254 studios, 263 studios avec cuisine, 88 appartements avec une chambre, 6 appartements avec deux chambres, 21 appartements avec trois chambres, 26 cuisines communes et de nombreux espaces d'activités.

- Mise en location dès le 5 octobre 2020
- Ouverture dès le 4 janvier 2021